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December 2011
Supervisors: Professora Doutora Raquel M. Gaspar
Professora Doutora Isabel Proença
JÚRI
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Abstract
Infrastructure investments are essential to achieve economic prosperity, promoting growth
and enhancing well-being. Any infrastructure project is a long-term and complex project, par-
ticularly due to the specific nature of the assets and because it involves numerous stakeholders
with different interests and objectives. In such conditions, uncertainty and risks are emphasized.
Financing infrastructure is particularly challenging given the amount of funds required that
are mostly sunk costs. An attractive mechanism, in the governments’ perspective, is to use
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Project Finance techniques. Multilateral Development
Banks (MDB) assume an important role on the raise of funds. Besides their primary lending
function, another relevant role emerges - risk reduction.
Public entities encourage private sector involvement in infrastructure particularly through
PPP. These partnerships are used to reduce the infrastructure gap and accelerating the delivery
of public assets and services with clear advantages over traditional methods of procurement.
Theoretically, economic reasons may be presented supporting PPP.
Portugal has a long history using PPP but there are very few papers on the field. In this
dissertation, the Portuguese experience is presented with a focus on five projects. In addition,
a model to access the relative operational performance of the SCUT concessions is developed
using Data Envelopment Analysis.
PPP are particularly relevant to developing and emerging countries where the less stable
environment emphasizes risks. Different country’s risk factors affect PPP arrangements, condi-
tioning the investments intensity and the participation of the private agents, as well as, of MDB.
To explore these issues, an empirical analysis is performed using PPP data from 1990-2007. The
results indicate the dominance of the economic conditions and of the legal framework, to ex-
plain the agents’ participation in PPP and, MDB’ participation is higher for riskier countries,
confirming the mechanism of risk reduction.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Infrastructure investments are essential to promote economic growth and development. The
World Bank (1994) estimates that, in general, a one percent increase in infrastructure is associ-
ated with a one percent increase in GDP and even more “the adequacy of infrastructure helps
determine one country’s success and another’s failure”.
The long-term need for infrastructure remains large, in both developed and developing coun-
tries. Particularly to developing countries, infrastructure investments are critical to foster the
path to development. Trends like globalization, deregulation of key business sectors such as
telecommunications, power or transportation and the privatization of government-owned enti-
ties, improved the participation of the private sector and the use of Project Finance (PF) as
the preferred vehicle to finance large infrastructure investments.
According to the World Bank (2004), only Latin America countries need US$50 billion of
infrastructure investment per year over the next decade. China’s infrastructure investment
needs remain massive, estimated at about US$2 trillion during the 2001-2010 periods. Con-
cerning sectoral needs in developing countries, the electricity sector required an investment of
US$120 billion / year from 2001 to 2010, and US$49 billion / year for water and sanitation
from 2001 to 2015.
In developing countries, the poor quality of infrastructure services, the financial constrains
faced by many governments and underdeveloped local capital markets contributed to involve
the private sector in providing infrastructure services. It is now increasingly recognized that the
private sector can play a dynamic role in accelerating growth and development. The involve-
ment of the private sector can bring with it, additionally to a way of raising the necessary funds
1
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and thus, eliminating the funding gap,1 the ability to implement projects in a shorter time, the
expectation of more efficient operation, better management and higher technical capability. Pri-
vate sector involvement can take many forms, but in recent years, Public Private Partnerships
(PPP) with its variants, have become the primary form of private participation in infrastructure.
PPP are, in general, long term cooperation agreements between the public sector and private
sector for the provision of an asset, socially relevant, an infrastructure or a service. Typically,
the private sector is responsible for design, built, finance and operate the new asset. The pos-
sibility of risk transfer from the public sector to the private sector is at the heart of the PPP
model and the main reason for its recent expansion.
Infrastructure investments are prone to particular risks, namely the existence of natural mo-
nopolies that exclude competition, the assets nature (capital-intensive, immobile and not easily
redeployed for other uses), non-tradable outputs and in addition, pricing problems may appear,
related to the political sensitiveness of the services to be provided.
Moreover, for projects developed in emerging countries, risks are enhanced from the combina-
tion of country risks with the risks that are typical of this class of assets, making apparently,
such ventures not appealing for private investors. In this context, Multilateral Development
Banks (MDB) assume a critical function, mitigating risks and increasing the feasibility of PPP.
MDB are an important actor concerning infrastructure projects. Besides the traditional lend-
ing function, important new functions emerge like credit enhancement and mechanism of risk
reduction, facilitating the raise of private flows, and also helping governments to perform the
necessary reforms.
As such, political, legal, social, economic and financial risks may be even more important in
developing countries than in developed ones due to the less stable environment and as a con-
sequence, this same conclusion seems to be evident about the participation of MDB in PPP
arrangements, for those countries.
1The funding gap results from infrastructure requirements that far exceed the currently available financing
resources of the public sector (Fitch Ratings, 2004). Also called the infrastructure gap (Deloitte, 2006).
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This research is focused in developing / emerging countries, first, because the data available is
concerned with these countries and second, given the enhancement of risks that characterized
this group of countries, the analysis of the determinants of infrastructure PPP using proxies for
the different risk dimensions is expected to provide richer and more interesting results.
To address these issues, the main goal of this thesis is to perform an empirical analysis of the
cross-country determinants of private sector and MDB participation in PPP, using developing
countries data from the World Bank PPI database. To shed more light into the risk mitigant
effect of the participation of MDB in PPP arrangements, the number of projects with MDB
participation and the dollar value of the support provided by these agencies for the projects
developed in each country/year is also considered. Simultaneously, we explore which country’s
factors influence PPP investments and the total count of PPP projects.
A related issue and because Portugal has a considerable history using PPP, but surprisingly
there are very few papers on the topic, our second goal is to study the Portuguese experience
with PPP. Therefore, this work presents the Portuguese experience, based on a detailed analysis
of five of the major infrastructure projects and programmes developed under PPP schemes. The
main purpose is to identify success factors and challenges for each PPP. In addition, a model
to ascertain the relative efficiency of the SCUT concessions is developed using Data Envelop-
ment Analysis. This technique provides an overall measure of efficiency, although it only allows
comparisons within a homogeneous group.
Particularly in a context of a worldwide financial crisis, these topics are gaining relevance to all
engaged in the PPP markets, namely, governments, private investors, financial institutions, reg-
ulatory agencies and the society in general. It is worth to mention that infrastructure projects
are seen as counter-cycle measures to revitalize the economy, particularly under PPP schemes.
First, because it is expected that infrastructure investments have a positive impact on economic
growth and employment creation, and second, given the budgetary and fiscal constrains that
limit the governments ability to fund these projects directly. Simultaneously, Portugal with its
PPP policy is facing severe criticisms, given the high debt burden and affordability issues. In
this context, an objective assessment of the merits and drawbacks of each PPP arrangement is
valuable.
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This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 defines infrastructure projects, with the associated features of uncertainty and risk.
The major steps in project management are mentioned and in addition, a classification scheme
of risks is presented;
Chapter 3 details the traditional sources of infrastructure finance. In addition, a particular em-
phasis is given to Project Finance and to the role of MDB. Cost-Benefit Analysis is presented
as the general framework to evaluate infrastructure projects, encompassing the financial analy-
sis. Funding options are discussed and this chapter ends with some general trends for the future;
Chapter 4 enumerates the different possibilities for private sector involvement in the provision
of public services, details PPP highlighting the main differences to traditional public service
delivery. Particular attention is given to the theory supporting PPP, reviewing the literature
on the field;
Chapter 5 is focused on the Portuguese experience with PPP, starting with the legal and insti-
tutional framework and then, describing four of the major transport projects, with a brief note
on the PPP health programme. Concerning the operational performance, a model is proposed
to assess the relative performance of the SCUT concessions using Data Envelopment Analysis;
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the empirical analysis of the determinants of the private sector and
of MDB participation in PPP arrangements to developing countries. Related to this analysis,
also the determinants of the number of PPP projects and of PPP investments are studied, and
of the number of projects with MDB, as well as, of the amounts of support provided by MDB.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary and the main conclusions are drawn.
Chapter 2
Infrastructure and risks
What is infrastructure? This chapter starts presenting some possible definitions of what consti-
tutes infrastructure and their typical characteristics. Infrastructure projects, given their long
lives and interrelated parties, emphasize complexity, uncertainty and risk. As such, Section 2.2
pursues with a clarification of the concepts of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity, followed with an
overview of the process of risk / uncertainty management developed over the entire life cycle
of the project and as a fundamental pre-requisite for success. Lastly, a possible classification of
the main risks, typical of infrastructure projects, is presented in Section 2.4.
2.1 What is infrastructure?
In Grimsey and Lewis (2002) words “Infrastructure is easier to recognize than define”. In
fact, several definitions of what constitutes infrastructure may be found. For instance, the
Free Online Dictionary defines infrastructure as “the basic facilities, services, and installations
needed for the functioning of a community or society, such as transportation and communica-
tions systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, post offices, and
prisons”.1
On the other hand, according to the World Bank, “infrastructure is a large-scale technological
system, a collection of basic, immovable physical facilities, equipment, and installations, needed
to fulfill basic transport, distribution, storage, and processing functions, that is, infrastructure
delivers essential public and private services and includes the operational procedures, organiza-
tion, and management needed to make systems function according to their specifications.”2
1http://www.thefreedictionary.com/infrastructure, accessed on March 25, 2011.
2http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/janfebmar03/box1pg3.htm, accessed on March 25, 2011. Nev-
ertheless, it should be noted that in the World Bank’s database of infrastructure projects, only projects in trans-
5
CHAPTER 2. INFRASTRUCTURE AND RISKS 6
As noted by Fulmer (2009), common features to nearly all definitions are that they mention
or imply the following characteristics: interrelated systems, physical components and societal
needs. Therefore, a shorter definition proposed by this author is that infrastructure constitutes
“the physical components of interrelated systems providing commodities and services essential
to enable, sustain, or enhance societal living conditions”.
In respect to the classifications available, it is also possible to distinguish between economic and
social infrastructure. Economic infrastructure includes highways, water and sewerage facilities,
energy distribution and telecommunication networks, whereas social infrastructure encompasses
schools, universities, hospitals and prisons (Baren, 2009; Wagenvoort et al., 2010).
Moreover, according to Bhattacharyay (2009), a distinction should be made between hard and
soft infrastructure. The former refers to physical structures or facilities that support the society
and economy, such as transport (e.g., ports, roads, railways); energy (e.g., electricity genera-
tion plants, gas and oil pipelines); telecommunications (e.g., telephone and internet); and basic
utilities (e.g., drinking water supply, hospitals and health clinics, schools, irrigation, etc.). The
latter refers to operating procedures, management practices, regulatory and institutional frame-
works, governance mechanisms, informal and formal channels of communication, and political
and social networks. Basically, it refers to all that support the development and operation of
hard infrastructure.
Another classification for infrastructure projects is the distinction between greenfield and brown-
field projects. Greenfield projects concerns infrastructure assets that are build from the begin-
ning, where there are no constraints imposed by previous work and it is not necessary to remodel
or demolish any existing structure, they are build in “green” field. By opposition, in brownfield
projects, the goal is to rehabilitate and improve the existing and badly dilapidated infrastru-
cture assets, that could not easily be privatized or replaced, for instance, water distribution
networks or roads.
Apart from the classification criteria and the fact that infrastructure encompasses several diffe-
rent sectors, there are some consensus on the literature concerning their main characteristics
port, telecommunications, energy and water/sewerage are included. Projects in education, health, and other
social services are treated separately.
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(Bhattacharyay, 2009; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Ramamurti and Doh, 2004). Typical chara-
cteristics are:
• High development costs;
• Substantial sunk costs because a high proportion of total costs refers to investment in
the construction phase, made upfront, before the project becomes operational and starts
generating revenues;
• The existence of natural monopolies in infrastructure sectors that exclude competition.
In fact, due to the enormous amount of capital required to the construction of some
infrastructure assets, the most efficient way to serve consumers, is often to have a single
provider (economies of scale). Although, as pointed by Ramamurti and Doh (2004), the
technological change can turn natural monopolies into potentially competitive markets,
see for instance, the telecommunications sector;
• The assets nature - capital intensive, immobile and not easily redeployed for other uses;
• Non-tradable outputs, that are not possible to be exported or imported, with the exception
of energy or telecommunications and just to neighboring countries;
• Political salience - leading to potential problems related to the delivery and pricing of the
products and services (that are essential to enhance the populations’ living conditions);
• High complexity and uncertainty, given the long lives of these assets and the involvement
of numerous stakeholders.
All these characteristics create high barriers to entry and to exit, acting as strong limitations to
competition on infrastructure businesses. The lack of competition and the non-tradable nature
of the outputs implies that the “invisible hand” of the market do not guarantee the optimal
allocation of goods and services, turning government intervention essential to counteract these
market failures. This intervention may take several different forms, from direct provider of goods
and services (the traditional approach) to just acting as a regulator, a facilitator or a client. The
high asset-specificity, typical of infrastructure assets, namely site and physical specificity, makes
each project unique and as a consequence, involves large sunk costs that have relatively little
value outside that specific transaction. This reality emphasizes the role of long-term contracts
and of relational contracting, in what constitutes more complex forms of governance, namely
Public-Private Partnerships.
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Different studies (Calderón and Servén, 2004; Romp and de Haan, 2005) point to the relevance
of an adequate level and quality of infrastructure, as a key ingredient for productivity, growth
and development. The basic notion is that “infrastructure matters”, although the literature
does not report a constant or systematically positive effect on growth (to an overview, see for
instance World Bank (1994) or Fay et al. (2010)).3 In the actual context of a global financial
and economic recession, infrastructure as becoming a hot topic in the public debate. A higher
rate of investments in infrastructure is seen as an essential stimulus to the economy. At the
same time, demographic changes and years of insufficient investment, create pressures for more
infrastructure and with a better quality. This is particularly true for developing and emerging
countries, that need huge investments in order to support their expanding economies, but it is
also true, for developed countries, where the challenge is to upgrade and improve the existing
systems. Nevertheless, the financial capacity of the public sector is already overstretched, with
high deficits and high debt levels. One possible solution is to involve the private sector in
partnerships with the public sector, to obtain new sources of capital. Nevertheless, this is not
a miraculous solution, nor even a consensual one, as it will be explored in next chapters.
Infrastructure should be managed and financed in a long-term basis, enhancing the complexity
and uncertainty inherent to these projects. Next section attempts to clarify the concepts of
risk, uncertainty and ambiguity, that tend to be used interchangeably.
2.2 Risk, uncertainty and ambiguity
Every investment decision is considered as a sacrifice of resources made with an expectation of
favorable future returns. Associated to any investment, there is an inherent risk feature related
to the uncertainty of the outcome, whether positive or negative. In this first definition of risk,
two key aspects are relevant: something that may happen (implies a probability) and that may
have a positive or negative impact.
Another definition for risk, from PMBOK (2000) is “an uncertain event or condition that, if it
occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project objective”. But although risk and uncer-
3For instance, Calderón and Servén (2004), in a relevant empirical contribution, study the impact of infrastru-
cture development on economic growth and income distribution, using a large panel data set encompassing over
100 countries and spanning the years 1960–2000. The most important conclusion reached, is that infrastru-
cture both raises growth and lowers income inequality, becoming an essential ingredient for poverty reduction,
moreover, because this effect is more pronounced concerning the low income countries.
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tainty, in general, are used as synonymous in everyday life, they meant different things. More
precisely, using Knight (1921) definitions, “risk is measurable uncertainty”, meaning that it is
possible to establish a priori statistical probabilities for each of the known possible outcomes;
and “uncertainty is unmeasurable uncertainty”, when it is not possible to attribute probabili-
ties for each possible outcome or it is not possible to know all potential outcomes, or both the
outcomes and the probabilities are unknown.
The issue of decision-making under risk and uncertainty has long fascinated economists. First
with the Expected Value Theory, considered in the mid-seventeenth century; next with Bernoulli
proposing that people maximize expected utility rather than expected value; and evolving with
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), turning the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) the domi-
nant approach in the economic analysis of choice under risk and uncertainty.4 According to
EUT, the choice between different alternative courses of action is based on the desirability or
“utility” of each action’s possible outcomes, weighing those values by their respective proba-
bilities and selecting the course of action that yields the greatest expected utility. In parallel,
risk-return models were developed in finance, with the basic assumption that people will try
to minimize the level of risk for a given level of return (Markowitz, 1959). The main criticism
made to these models, is that the utility of decision outcomes or the risk and return of choice
options are determined entirely by the “objective value” of possible outcomes and the wealth
they generate. Kahneman (2003) emphasizes that the evaluation of outcomes and choice op-
tions, however, is influenced by a variety of relative comparisons.
Reinforcing the idea of the necessity of comparability among different choice options, new
theories have emerged - the “Regret Theory” (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) and the “Prospect
Theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the Regret Theory, decision-makers try to ma-
ximize expected utilities and simultaneously minimize the net regret, defined as the difference
between what was received and what could have been received with a different action under
the same state of the world. Feelings of regret or rejoicing (if the realized outcome is better
than the alternative) affect the choices made by decision-makers. Usually, feelings of regret are
stronger than feelings of rejoicing, as cited by Weber and Johnson (2009). Prospect theory is
a descriptive theory that, in contrast to EUT, measures relative losses and gains, as changes
from a reference point, and not the absolute wealth. The value function is normally concave
for gains (risk aversion), convex for losses (risk seeking) and is generally steeper for losses than
for gains indicating that there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains (loss aversion).
4For more details on the historical perspective see, for instance, Weber and Johnson (2009).
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All the models presented above, are models of decision under risk, when probabilities can be
assigned to different outcomes. But uncertainty refers to situations where no probabilities can
be attached to possible outcomes. Nevertheless, models have been proposed which imply that
all uncertainties can be reduced to risks, at the very least by simply applying the principle of
insufficient reason (principle of indifference) and treating the unknown probabilities as though
they were known to be equal. However, in the real life situations, decisions are made without
explicit knowledge of probabilities, under conditions of “ambiguity”.
With Ellsberg (1961) renewed interest in the problem of decision under uncertainty as emerged.
Ellsberg (1961) showed that people clearly distinguish between risk and uncertainty in what
was known as the Ellsberg’ Paradox. The simplest example, known as the “two-color” problem,
may be explained as follows: consider two non-transparent urns, each containing red and black
balls. The first urn has 50 black balls and 50 red balls. The second urn also has 100 balls, but
with a mixture of black and red balls that is unknown. People are asked to choose an urn to
draw from, and bet on the color that will be drawn - they will receive a $100 payoff if that color
is drawn, and $0 if the other color is drawn. They must decide where to bet on:
1. A red draw from Urn I or a black draw from Urn I
2. A red draw from Urn II or a black draw from Urn II
3. A red draw from Urn I or a red draw from Urn II
4. A black draw from Urn I or a black draw from Urn II
For the first two options, people are indifferent because the odds of winning are the same in
both urns. But in cases 3 and 4, people uniformly prefer a draw from Urn I, in what constitutes
a paradox. Because if people consider a draw of a particular color from Urn I as more likely,
than otherwise they would not choose Urn I in both cases 3 and 4. Choosing Urn I in case 3,
means that people believe (rightly or wrongly) that Urn II has more black balls than red. But
if that is their belief, then they ought to choose Urn II in case 4. This example illustrates that
a majority of decision makers when confronted with a choice between a risky option and an
uncertain one, choose the risky option, exhibiting ambiguity aversion.
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People’s actions in presence of uncertainty depends not only on the perceived probability of
the event in question, but also on its vagueness or ambiguity (Fox and Tversky, 1995). These
considerations provide evidence against the validity of EUT.
If we are comparing two events with different levels of knowledge, the contrast makes the less
familiar bet less attractive. Fox and Tversky (1995) reinforce the comparability aspect, mean-
ing that ambiguity aversion will be present when subjects evaluate clear and vague prospects
jointly, but it will greatly diminish or disappear when they evaluate each prospect in isolation
(comparative ignorance hypothesis). In the same line of research, Chow and Sarin (2001) argue
that the complete disappearance of ambiguity aversion, in a non-comparative condition, may
not be as robust as initially Fox and Tversky (1995) had supposed. The main conclusion is that
the clear bet is priced higher than the vague bet under both comparative and non-comparative
conditions. In a comparative condition the knowledge difference between the known and the
unknown bet becomes more relevant and by contrast, in the absence of a direct comparison
(non-comparative condition) this difference is smaller, but it does not disappear.
Ambiguity aversion has received much attention since Ellsberg’s seminal work, mostly because,
decision makers usually do not know the precise probabilities of potential outcomes in real life
situations. As Zeckhauser (2006) emphasizes, in the real world of investing, the widespread
situation is “ignorance”, where not even the possible states of the world are known. As a sum-
mary, the knowledge about the probability distribution of possible outcomes, can lie anywhere
on a continuum, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Continuum of knowledge about outcomes and probabilities
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Ambiguity concepts have been incorporated in several research fields, but finance is proba-
bly the research area with more applicability. A large and growing literature had appeared
incorporated ambiguity aversion in the explanation of observed market anomalies, regulatory
recommendations and investment strategy (for more details, see for instance, Kocher and Traut-
mann (2010)). Some examples include applications of ambiguity to financial regulation and
investment behaviour (Easley and O’Hara, 2009; Zeckhauser, 2006), emphasizing the effect of
ambiguity aversion on self-selection and market size.5 Yet, Bossaerts et al. (2010) study the
impact of ambiguity on portfolio holdings and asset prices.
A related concept is risk and uncertainty management, critical to all projects and particularly,
for large infrastructure projects.
2.3 Risk and uncertainty management
Traditionally, risk management has been defined as a global approach to minimize or eliminate
adverse consequences of risk to a project or organization. More precisely, a risk management
system includes policies, procedures and practices that aims to identify, analyze, evaluate, mi-
tigate and monitor risk. A formal risk management process should be applied at all stages in
the project life cycle and managing risk is an ongoing process, involving all the stakeholders,
although the risks’ nature will change as the project evolves.
As mentioned in Chapman (1997), implementing procedures for risk management earlier in a
project life cycle is, undoubtedly, more complex and difficult, but this is compensated with the
higher benefits that may result from improvements in the project plans and from opportunities
that can be captured in initial stages of the project. By contrast, implementing risk manage-
ment routines, later in a project life cycle, face particular challenges, namely “contracts are in
place, equipment has been purchased, commitments are in place, reputations are on the line
and managing change is comparatively difficult and unrewarding”.
5Investors that are ambiguity averse, shy way from markets for ambiguous investments, leading to reduced
competition and lower prices. This effect of selection between different market segments is an important aspect
by which ambiguity affects market outcomes.
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Chapman (1997) developed a generic process for project risk analysis and management with a
detailed nine-phase structure. But, as mentioned in his work, other specific risk management
processes, with more or less detail, can be considered equivalent. Figure 2.2 shows the generic
steps in any risk management process.6
Figure 2.2: Risk Management Process
Source: JISC - infoNet
The four main stages of the risk management process are:
• Identification - For each project it is critical to identify areas of risk. For instance, as
a starting point, it may be relevant to focus on the project plan, the main stakeholders,
the resources available, the organizational environment and the external environment.
Typically, large and complex infrastructure projects with a long tenor, are particularly
exposed to changes in the external environment that may affect the normal project deve-
lopment. To mention just a few possibilities, we may consider: changes in government,
new legislation affecting environmental issues, changes in the demand patterns for parti-
cular services, economic recession. In this phase, it could be useful to distinguish between
generic risks that are common to all projects, from specific risks, inherent to the nature of
the project that is being developed. It is possible to use a checklist for risk identification
but it is always necessary to think about what is “unique” in that project.
6Available on http://www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/InfoKits/risk-management, accessed on March 15, 2011.
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• Analysis and Assessment - In order to focus our attention and resources in the most
serious risks, it is necessary to prioritize risks. To access the risk relevance, it is usually
considered two parameters: the probability - the likelihood of the risk occurring; and the
impact - the consequences if the risk does occur. The impact could be measured in terms
of time, cost and quality. Another relevant feature is the risk proximity. Although, there
is a natural tendency to focus on immediate risks, that sometimes it is too late to avoid
or mitigate, attention should be devoted to risks that have a larger horizon and could be
effectively manageable.
If the risk identification and assessment show more serious risks than had been anticipated,
a serious judgement must be developed about the viability of the project. Sometimes, it
will be necessary to review the initial business case and to explore different options.
• Response - General types of response to risk, according to the PMBOK (2000), include:
– Avoidance - is changing the initial project plan so that the circumstances which
may give rise to the risk no longer exist;
– Transference - is the transferability of the risk to other entity;
– Mitigation - is to take actions to lessen or reduce the impact or the probability of
the risk;
– Acceptance - dealing with the risk, creating contingency plans.
The transference and acceptance of risks constitutes a more general process called “Risk
Allocation”.7 The general principle to be followed is that, for each risk associated with
the project, it should be transferred to the party best positioned to deal and manage it.
• Monitoring and Control - The final phase is to continually monitor the identified risks
and the effectiveness of risk responses. As an ongoing process, attention should be given
to changes on the probability and impact of the risks under consideration, to the identifi-
cation of new emerging risks, and to remove risks that have passed. To accomplish that,
effective reporting mechanisms should be applied.
7The optimality of risk allocation is a cornerstone of Public-Private Partnerships, as it will be explored in
Chapter 4.
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What has been presented in this section, until now, constitutes the traditional approach to risk
management. But a new trend has emerged, that incorporates recent literature developments.
Ward and Chapman (2003) argue that project risk management should be changed to project
uncertainty management, given that “risk” is usually related to adversity, threats to the project,
affecting its performance. This narrow view is a very restrictive approach. Opportunities should
also be considered in the analysis and therefore, uncertainty management will encompass not
only the negative impacts on project outcomes, but also the changes that may be seen as op-
portunities. Besides this larger scope achieved, managing uncertainty is also identifying and
managing the sources of uncertainty, aspects of extreme relevance for the earliest phases of the
project life cycle, when uncertainty is at its maximum value.
In the same line, Perminova et al. (2008) emphasize the role of uncertainty in projects. They
argue that traditional project management and risk management processes are, in essence,
detailed action plans, that must be followed in order to achieve the main goal of the project
- to deliver a product or service according to the clients’ specifications and meeting the three
basic criteria of time, cost and quality. This is not enough to deal with uncertainty, defined as
“an event or situation, which was not expected to happen, regardless of whether it could have
been possible to consider it in advance”. As such, planning is necessary, but not a sufficient
tool in managing risks and uncertainty. In this respect, new tools are gaining relevance such
as information sharing, reflective learning and accumulating knowledge. As each project is
considered a unique endeavor, the main risk is that all the experience and knowledge gathered
in the project development will be lost, after its conclusion. Nevertheless, each project is unique,
only to a certain extent. Experience and knowledge, can and should be used, in other projects,
for instance through the standardization of successful procedures. The creation of a system of
lessons learned and sharing information and knowledge, will enhance flexibility and will turn
uncertainty more manageable.
But what kind of risks and uncertainties are typical of infrastructure projects? Next section is
devoted to explore this topic.
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2.4 Classification of risks
Possible risk classifications abound in the literature. For instance, Trujillo del Valle (2004)
classifies infrastructure risks in four categories: political, legal, financial and project-specific,
yet Tinsley (2000) examines the structures and risk mitigants of fourteen classes of risk and
Lemos et al. (2001) classifies the risks in twelve different classes for projects developed under
the Private Finance Initiative. As a summary, the following risks are considered: sponsors,
design and construction, operational and maintenance, political, legal, market, environmental
and social, and force majeure.
Sponsors risk - refers to the sponsors’ financial strength, technical competency and experience
in similar projects, according to Tinsley (2000). Naturally, projects will benefit from previous
sponsor relationships and knowledge acquired in former businesses.
Design and construction risks - arise when it is impossible to complete a project on-time, on-
budget and it is unable to perform as planned. Risks due to engineering and design failures
or construction problems, originating delays and cost overruns. Usually, these risks are not
supported by lenders and are a sponsors’ responsibility, which in turn, use turnkey contracts to
allocate these risks to constructors.
Operational and maintenance risks - occur when a project does not operate as planned or costs
more than expected to operate at an agreed capacity or efficiency. Following Nguyen (2002),
strategies to mitigate these risks include: allocating the risks to operators through specific
contracts, conducting technical studies using tested and proven technologies, obtaining cost
guarantees and technology insurance, and having experienced management.
Political risk - includes the risks of expropriation, currency convertibility and transferability,
and political violence, such as war, sabotage or terrorism. Matsukawa and Habeck (2007) argue
that risks “that arise from the actions or inactions of the government that adversely affect the
operation of a private company engaging in infrastructure business”, should also be included.
For instance, breach of contract, change of law, taxes or incentives and frustration of arbitration.
Legal risk - is related to the degree to which creditors have legal rights and can rely on local
enforcement, using the definition proposed by Esty and Megginson (2003).
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It should be emphasized that infrastructure projects are particularly affected by political and
legal risks, furthermore, if the project is developed in an emerging country. The main chara-
cteristics of these projects, like heavy up-front investments, long contract periods and the fact
that they provide services which are essential to the communities, make them more prone to
these risks. Political and legal risks can be minimized by obtaining government guarantees and
through the participation of multilateral development banks in these projects, e.g., the World
Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Market risk - deals with the possibility that fluctuations in demand and changes in the prices
of inputs or outputs may not cover all the costs of the project and full repay the debt. Market
risk includes interest rate risk, inflation risk and foreign exchange risk. This last one, appears
with a mismatch of the currency of the operating costs, revenues and the debt. Also included
here, and of critical importance for the viability of any infrastructure project, is demand risk -
the risk that the demand for the service does not correspond to the level expected. This risk
is of particular relevance for transport projects. Many of the unsuccessful stories in this sector,
have resulted from overoptimistic traffic projections, that do not materialize in the operational
phase (Estache et al., 2007). It should be noted that for this kind of projects, differently from
other infrastructure sectors, it is not possible to establish from the beginning contracts with
the clients. Market risk can be managed in several ways: hedged through proper financial
derivatives,8 making detailed market projections and lastly, using contractual agreements with
suppliers or output buyers - obtaining take-or-pay agreements and long-term sales contracts
(when possible).
Environmental and social risks - refer to possible adverse environmental and social consequences
of the project. In recent years, the environmental impact of a project plays an important role
in deciding whether a project can proceed or not. Although for many years this kind of risk
was not an issue, specially in third world countries. The adoption of the Equator Principles
by many lending institutions, in 2006, is a clear sign of the importance of adopting responsible
environmental and social policies. The Equator Principles are a voluntary set of guidelines
for managing social and environmental issues related to the financing of development projects.
The financial institutions only provide loans to projects developed “in a manner that is socially
responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices” (Equator, 2006). As a
strategy to mitigate these risks, sponsors should make detailed environmental studies, obtain
all the necessary environmental licenses and also, use private insurance.
8Although these instruments are not always available in emerging markets, where, for instance, foreign ex-
change risk is more likely to occur.
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Force majeure risk - results from events that are beyond the control of the parties involved in
the project and for that reason, exempt the parties from legal consequences of non-performance,
according to Nevitt and Fabozzi (2000). Examples are natural disasters such as fire, flood or
earthquake, although the scope of this risk is hard to define. Private insurance is usually the
option available to prevent this kind of risk, but hardly it will cover all the contingencies.
As already mentioned, earlier project phases are mostly characterized by uncertainties, and as
the project matures, these uncertainties are transformed into risks. In respect to the type of
risk, the design and construction phases are particular exposed to delays in completion, cost
overruns, insolvency or lack of experience of contractors or key suppliers, and environmental or
social problems (Estache et al., 2007). As the project evolves and starts the operational phase,
more exposed will be to market and political risks.
Concerning developing countries, more serious risks may arise related to the unavailability of
materials or equipment for construction and operation, and in addition, foreign currency fluctu-
ations can cause a significant increase in costs. In parallel, the mechanisms available to mitigate
or hedge the risks, face severe limitations. In practice, in most emerging countries, difficulties
may appear due to market imperfections, for instance, derivative markets not sufficiently devel-
oped, limited contracting possibilities due to the legal and regulatory framework and different
methodologies for risk measurement and evaluation, among other factors.
A synthesis of the previous risk classification is presented in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Risks and mechanisms of mitigation
Risk Definition Mechanisms of mitigation
related to the technical competency,
Sponsors financial strength and previous experienced sponsors
experience of the sponsors
Design / when it is impossible to complete risk allocation to the constructor
/ Construction the project as originally envisaged due to through turnkey contracts
engineering, design or construction failures
risk allocation to operators through
Operational when a project does not operate as planned contracts; technical studies using tested
/ Maintenance and have higher operating and and proven technologies; cost guarantee
maintenance costs and technology insurance; having
experienced management.
risks of expropriation, currency convertibility,
transferability and political violence; obtaining government guarantees;
Political risks that result from the actions or inactions participation of multilateral development
of the government that adversely affect banks and export credit agencies
infrastructure businesses
related to the degree to which creditors obtaining government guarantees;
Legal have legal rights and can rely on participation of multilateral development
local enforcement banks and export credit agencies
when possible variations in price and hedging using proper financial derivatives;
quantities of inputs or outputs may not making detailed market projections;
Market cover all the costs of the project and full contractual agreements (with suppliers
repay the debt: Foreign exchange, interest or output buyers - obtaining take-or-pay
rate, inflation and demand risks agreements and long-term sales contracts)
Environmental adverse environmental and to obtain previously environmental
/ Social social consequences of the project licenses and permits, private insurance
events that are beyond the control
Force majeure of the parties and that exempt the parties private insurance
from legal consequences of non-performance
(e.g natural disasters, wars)
Any infrastructure project is a long term and complex endeavor. Furthermore, development of
infrastructure assets requires large amounts of financial resources and face a lengthy gestation
period. What are the possibilities to finance such projects ? Next chapter is focused on the
topic of infrastructure finance.
Chapter 3
Infrastructure finance
All around the world, infrastructure needs are growing rapidly far exceeding the public resources
and other traditional sources of financing available, in what is called the “infrastructure gap”.
This fact constitutes a strong motivation, if not the main motivation, for the involvement of
the private sector in businesses that once were a government exclusivity. The private sector
involvement can assume different formats but for infrastructure projects, Public-Private Part-
nerships (PPP) are usually the option chosen. This chapter begins with a presentation of the
sources of infrastructure finance. Section 3.2 details Project Finance, as a privileged funding
mechanism for infrastructure projects. Section 3.3 explains the fundamental role of Multilateral
Development Banks (MDB) and similar agencies in supporting infrastructure projects, role em-
phasized particularly in times of financial distress. Section 3.4 provides the general framework
where the financial features should be analyzed, comparing financial viability with economic
viability. Next, the controversial issue of who should pay (and therefore, finance) infrastructure
assets and services is addressed in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 draws some prospects for
the future.
3.1 Sources of infrastructure finance
In a first classification, finance for infrastructure can arise from public or private sources. In the
past, the government assumed this responsibility with the majority of projects being developed
under traditional procurement methods, fully financed with public resources. From the second
half of the 20th century onwards, a new phase emerged with privatizations and new regulation
models appearing from the new roles attributed to the State, making Public-Private Partner-
ships (PPP) and others forms of private sector involvement more frequent in infrastructures
businesses. PPP are long-term cooperation agreements between the private and public sector
20
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for the provision of an asset or service. Note that in most PPP, finance is entirely private. In
addition, a PPP scheme may use Project Finance (PF) techniques or not. In PPP with PF,
the private agents rely exclusively on the assets and cash-flows of the project, to pay the debt
and to provide returns to investors, while in others PPP, private agents can obtain revenues
guarantees or service fees from the public partner. An arrangement to be considered a PPP,
should have at least the following main characteristics: long-term horizon, bundling of different
project phases, risk sharing between the public and private partners and private finance. Diffe-
rent possibilities exist for private sector involvement beyond PPP. Hence, other mixed situations
concerning financial sources, may appear. A breakdown between public and private finance is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.1
Figure 3.1: Composition of infrastructure finance
1PPP are further explored in Chapter 4 and PF is detailed in next Section 3.2.
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Any infrastructure project is financed with two types of capital, debt and equity, similarly to
other kinds of projects. Three general categories of capital and loans are used: equity, subor-
dinated debt (also called mezzanine financing or quasi-equity) and senior debt that usually are
secured or asset-backed. The proportion of capital that a sponsors commits to the project -
the equity - has no upside or downside limit (in case of distress, losses could achieve 100%).
Equity investors are the last in priority for repayment. Concerning debt, while the downside is
unlimited (also to the full extent of the amount lent), the upside is limited to the rate of inter-
est charged on the loan. Typically, given the risks, maturities and amounts involved, project
debt has higher spreads than corporate debt. The senior debt usually is the largest part of
the financing (more than 50% of the total) and are provided by commercial banks, being the
first debt to be placed (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 2000). This debt is not subordinated to any other
liability, meaning, that it is first in priority of payment. There are also subordinated loans, that
assume a secondary position concerning the priority of payment and usually have a higher rate
of return as a reward to the higher risk level. These loans are long term, unsecured and may
be considered as equity by senior lenders.
Nevertheless, unlike other kinds of projects, infrastructure projects exhibit particular characte-
ristics that influence the source of the financial resources to be used. Infrastructure finance
usually has the following characteristics: longer maturities (ranging from 5 to 40 years), larger
amounts, higher risk and uncertainty, but at the same time exhibit stable returns (Mor and
Sehrawat, 2006).
A wide range of funding sources are available to finance an infrastructure project:
• Government funding (grants, loans, credit enhancement) and direct investment;
• Commercial banks that are the largest source for project loans, typically arranged as
syndicated bank loans;
• Multilateral and bilateral agency funding (MDB and export credit agencies);
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Projects have extremely high debt levels (mean debt of 70%). Although, according to Nevitt
and Fabozzi (2000), there is an usual misconception that project financing involves little or no
equity investment by the owners or sponsors of the project. Effectively, lenders only provide
funds to projects where the sponsors have enough money at stake to guarantee the proper
motivation and commitment level, therefore, ensuring the efforts to a successful conclusion. In
fact, the appropriate level of the debt to equity ratio of a project is the result of the negotiation
process between the sponsors and the lenders.
In this respect, Esty (2003a) explains that high leverage levels are justified to infrastructure
projects, usually structured in a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), because high debt levels pro-
vide a governance mechanism and prevent agency costs. In a SPV, agency costs of equity
(managerial discretion, expropriation) are high and agency costs of debt (debt overhang, risk
shifting) are low due to less investment opportunities.
Considering the type of debt, bank loans are the preferred form of external finance, because are
cheaper to issue, allow better monitoring and are easier to restructure during distress.2 Accord-
ing to Sorge (2004), international syndicated bank loans accounted for 80% of total project debt
flows, over the period 1997-2003, and to a lesser extend, bond markets were used. Although the
volume of capital raised through international project bond markets remains relatively small,
the market has gained maturity during the 1990’s. For instance, Esty and Christov (2002)
pointed that from 1997 to 2001, project bonds grew almost three times faster than project
loans, despite the Asian crisis and the economic slowdown. The emerging project bond market
is particularly interesting to institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension
funds, whose long-term liabilities match the long-term tenor of project bonds. The Ras Laffan
Liquified Natural Gas project in Qatar represents a milestone in this respect with its $1.2 billion
bond offering completed in December 1996 (see Dailami and Hauswald, 2007). Nevertheless,
in a more recent statistical overview of infrastructure investments, Esty and Sesia (2007) point
that in 2006, bank loans still accounted for 86% of the total debt raised by project companies,
trend that still is maintained. Wagenvoort et al. (2010) mention that for the European coun-
tries, considering the years of 2006 to 2009, on average, about 80% of a project is funded by
loans.
2Typically, given the long life of the project, restructuring and renegotiation of the deal will occur and it will
be easier to work on a solution with a small group of banks, rather than, with a large number of bondholders.
Additionally, a more concentrated debt ownership structure will increase the benefits of monitoring and as showed
in Dewatripont and Legros (2005), projects financed through a few intermediaries are likely to perform better
than others.
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Loans and bonds tend to be long-term credits and concerning loans, they are usually provided
by a bank syndicate. A syndicated loan is a large loan in which a group of banks jointly of-
fer funds to a borrower firm. Members of the syndicate are classified as “lead arrangers” or
“participants”. The lead arranger establishes and maintains a relationship with the borrower
firm, negotiates the credit contract, namely the terms of the loan - principal, interest, maturity,
collateral and guarantees an amount for a price range. Typically, the participant lenders do
not directly negotiate with the borrowing firm and is the lead arranger, who takes the respon-
sibility for arranging the deal, attract other banks as participants, conduct due diligence and
monitoring the performance of the borrower firm.3
Loans are priced at a fixed spread above a benchmark interest rate, usually the EURIBOR or
LIBOR, and bonds carry a spread above a comparable risk-free government security. However,
spreads are only one component of the economic cost of a syndicated loan that the borrower
has to pay, with the rest corresponding to a variety of fees: arrangement fee, participation fee,
commitment or facility fee and agency fee. Some fees are usually charged during loan syndi-
cations, others are paid during the whole lifetime of the loan. Bonds also carry fees, but they
tend to be paid up front and are mostly related to issuance costs.
From a lender’s perspective, the pricing of loans and bonds should reflect the riskier nature of
infrastructure investments. Particularly, risks that are not possible to allocate to the best party
positioned to deal with each of them and project-specific risks that are difficult to diversify. To
overcome these drawbacks, Sorge (2004) mentioned that lenders are making increasing use of
innovative risk-sharing structures, alternative mechanisms of credit protection and new capi-
tal market instruments to broaden the investors’ base. Concerning credit protection, financial
institutions are using credit derivatives, new insurance products against macroeconomic risks
and political risk guarantees. Others possibilities include the use of real options and the secu-
ritization of project loans.
Besides loans and bonds, infrastructure funds have become available to a large pool of investors,
appearing as a new source of private finance. These debt investors are typically, institutional
investors such as pension funds, which intend to match their long-term obligations with the
long dated and stable income flows offered by these assets, but also, retail investors. It is now
3For more details on the role of the lead arranger, see for instance Gatti et al. (2008) or Sufi (2007).
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recognized that infrastructure funds are a good option, comparing to investments with the same
risk, like bonds or real estate, being a stable asset class which offers long tenors and relatively
higher yields. In addition, infrastructure is often classified as a “defensive” asset, exhibiting
low correlation with more traditional equity assets. This is an attractive feature if the investor
goal is portfolio diversification.4
Infrastructure has some common features with real estate, namely, heavy up-front investments
in construction, operating costs that are relatively predictable and the assets’ long life, pro-
viding stable yields. But also exhibit some relevant differences - the assets are often natural
monopolies with a large costumers’ base, giving rise to the need of regulatory control. Also,
projects have strong cash-flows, extensive government involvement, a large environmental effect
and broader dependencies with the economic and social context.
Exploring this topic, Dechant and Finkenzeller (2010), perform an empirical study to compare
investments and the role of real estate in a multi-asset portfolio when alternative assets are
considered, namely, infrastructure. Because infrastructure has similar underlying characteris-
tics to real estate, it is expected that both assets offer identical diversification benefits inducing
investors to face a trade-off between both asset classes. The results confirm that infrastructure
is an important asset for portfolio diversification and moreover, that theoretical allocations to
real estate are probably overestimated when infrastructure is not considered. Notably in down
markets, both assets constitute attractive investments for downside risk averse investors.
Innovative funding techniques, such as securitization, are of critical importance to attract pri-
vate investors. Initially, the lack of accurate data on project default rates, recovery timings and
losses, turned securitization a difficult task. Nevertheless, as more data has becoming available
confirming that infrastructure loans have better performance with higher recovery rates when
compared with other corporate loans, and at the same time, the rating agencies start to elabo-
rate rating methodologies, the securitization option of infrastructure loans has moved from just
a possibility to a reality.
The suitability of securitization for infrastructure funding may be explained by the fact that
cash flows are stable and concession driven, and also because in essence, credit risk is partly
guaranteed by government (see Forrester, 2000, 2001). Securitization applies equally to a single
4More details available on Singh et al. (2006).
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project loan, as well as, to a diversified pool of loans. Good candidates are syndicated infrastru-
cture loans, given their amount, long tenor and risk profile. Securitization involves two different
phases, as next Figure 3.2 highlights.
Figure 3.2: The process of securitization
Source: Jobst (2008)
In the first phase, the company or financial institution (originator) pools the assets into what is
called the reference portfolio. This collection of assets is typically a group of small and illiquid
assets that are unable to be sold individually. Next, this asset pool is sold to an issuer, such
as a SPV. In phase two, the SPV finances the acquisition of the pooled assets by issuing mar-
ketable securities that are sold to capital market investors. At the same time a trustee account
is created, funded by the cash flows generated by the reference portfolio (revenues generated by
the projects), providing payments to investors. It should be noted, that usually, the originator
services the loans in the portfolio, collects payments from the original borrowers, and deliver
them directly to the SPV or the trustee, being compensated by a servicing fee (Jobst, 2008).
In a more recent sophistication, the reference portfolio is divided into different classes, called
tranches, each of which has a different level of risk associated with it and is sold separately,
allowing different risk/return profiles that match the risk appetite from the investors. In the
end, the result will be different creditors with varying degrees of seniority, where more se-
nior creditors will be paid first in case of bankruptcy (senior debt tranche) and only if there is
remaining money, the next most senior tranche will be paid, and so on, in a “cascade waterfall”.
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The main advantages of securitization arise from the possibility of risk diversification, enhance-
ment of the sources of funding where illiquid assets are converted into marketable securities and
facilitates financial institutions to comply with the requirements of regulatory capital, because
initially, no capital reserves were necessary to cover highly rated securitized debt. As explained
in Jobst (2008), the assets are removed from the originator’s balance sheet, improving the credit
rating what allow issuers to raise funds more cheaply than would be possible on the strength of
the originator’s balance sheet alone. Moreover, unlike conventional debt, securitization does not
inflate a company’s liabilities. Instead it produces funds for future investment without balance
sheet growth.
In essence, all the assets that present a stable cash flow pattern can be transformed into a
marketable debt security. Under the generic name of asset-backed securitization (ABS), it is
possible to find a variety of underlying assets: mortgages, project finance loans, corporate and
sovereign loans, consumer credit, lease/trade receivables, and individualized lending agreements.
It should be noted that the current financial crisis has been, in part, attributed to the secu-
ritization of debt and some misconceptions concerning the underlying risk. The securitization
experience has began around the 70’s, with apparently only positive effects. Nonetheless, with
the debt crisis that started in 2007, the demand for lending money either in the form of mort-
gage bonds or collateralized loans obligations (CLO - the securitization vehicle for loans) had
almost stopped. However, the eventual return of CLO appear to be very important, as they are
the primary mechanism by which syndicated and leveraged loans can be sold to other investors
besides banks.
More recently, some signs of recovery are evident. In an article from Institutional Investor
(November 2010), it is mentioned that the European ABS market is returning to life, although
restricted to few countries, “credit terms are much stricter, with investors demanding that the
cushions for losses, known as credit enhancements, be much larger than in past transactions”.
In addition, because of new capital rules, banks have to keep securitized transactions on their
balance sheets: “in the last decade securitization was more about capital relief as much as
funding, but there’s no doubt that the pendulum has swung in the direction of funding”.5
5http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article.aspx?articleID=2717366 accessed on April 18, 2011.
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Summing up, it is obvious that there is a huge gap between investment demand for infrastructure
and financing supply. And although, the traditional modes of financing, through banks and
financial institutions, raising funds from the domestic capital markets and also foreign direct
investment would continue, more and more pressure on governments will lead to a continuous
search for alternative ways of financing these investments. In this respect, Project Finance
appears as a potential solution, issue that will be explored in next section.
3.2 Project Finance
There is no single and precise definition of Project Finance (PF). For instance, Esty (2004)
defines it “as the creation of a legally-independent project company financed with non-recourse
debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset, with a single purpose and a limited life”.
The non-recourse nature means that project own assets and cash flows are the sole source to
meet financial obligations and to provide returns to investors.
Besides non-recourse debt, PF may imply limited recourse debt. In this last situation, for some
period of the project life (e.g., until construction is complete or another milestone is achieved),
lenders have some recourse to the sponsors for repayment. This feature is highlighted by the
next definition of Tinsley (2000): “Project financing is an option granted by the financier
exercisable when an entity demonstrates that it can generate cash flows in accordance with
long-term cash flows forecasts. Upon exercise of the option, the entitys parent(s) or sponsor
company(s) balance sheet is no longer available for debt service. The assets, rights and interests
of the development are usually structured into a special-purpose project vehicle and are legally
secured to the financiers as collateral”.
In its modern form, PF was first used on a large scale to develop the North Sea oil fields during
the 1970’s, where the scale and risk of the investment far exceeded the capabilities of any single
petroleum company or even any single consortium of companies, as mentioned in Kleimeier and
Megginson (2000). Since then, PF has been extensively used with many success stories, but
also, with some financial failures like the Euro tunnel project. The 31-mile link between the
UK and France was one of the most expensive projects in the world. The project faced several
delays and cost overruns and has become a disaster for lenders (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 2000).
PF techniques are now applied across the world, to numerous private and public infrastructure
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projects, including power stations, gas pipelines, telecommunication facilities, bridges, tunnels,
toll roads, railway networks and more recently, the building of hospitals, education facilities,
government accommodation and tourism facilities.
The project companies have structural attributes like high leverage, separate legal incorporation
through a creation of a SPV with a finite life (that usually matches the life of the project), highly
concentrated debt and equity ownership structures and involve several contractual agreements
from input suppliers to output buyers. Project sponsors are usually State-own enterprises,
governmental entities with social welfare goals or well known international operating compa-
nies, that are joined together through ownership of the SPV and by supplemental contractual
agreements. As mentioned by Esty (2003a, 2004), on average, this extensive contractual net-
work involve 15 different parties linked by at least 40 different agreements - PF is sometimes
referred to as Contract Finance. It should be emphasized that this last feature is critical for
the allocation of risks among parties. Figure 3.3 exhibits the typical PF structure.
Figure 3.3: Typical Project Finance structure
Source: Adapted from Esty (2003a)
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PF presents several advantages. First, is a new source to raise capital to mega-projects, that
otherwise will be outside the reach of even the largest corporations or even governments. Second,
the ability to allocate risk to those parties best able to manage them, provided by the web of
contractual arrangements is another key advantage, which is pointed in the literature as the
main reason for the use of PF, nowadays (Esty, 2002). Other advantages presented by Esty
(2003a) are:
• PF is used to protect the corporate balance sheet against risks associated with large
projects. In fact, even if the project fails, this would not affect the financial integrity of
the sponsor’s core businesses, the creation of a SPV prevents risk contamination;
• PF is used as a government system used to prevent agency problems over free cash-flow.
Because these projects are prone to high levels of free cash flow, inducing possible mana-
gerial mismanagement through wasteful expenditures and sub-optimal investments, PF
provides an organizational solution. Therefore, high leverage, joint ownership and the ex-
tensive use of contracts are structural attributes of the project companies that discourage
costly agency conflicts among participants.
For all the reasons pointed above, PF is much different from corporate finance. In essence, in
corporate finance, all the assets of the sponsor company respond to a project default, it is the
overall financial health of the sponsor, focusing on balance sheet and cash-flow, that matters.
Additionally, given the high ratios of debt-to-equity, lenders may use “step-in” clauses, per-
forming a close monitoring of the management and operations that would be not acceptable in
a corporate finance environment. Finally, in PF the organizational and financial structure of
the SPV fits one purpose, has a finite life and cannot be easily duplicated, contrary to what
happens in corporate finance.
A synthesis of the main differences is presented in Table 3.1.
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Type of capital Permanent - an indefinite Finite - time horizon
time horizon for equity matches life of project
Dividend policy Corporate management Fixed dividend policy -
and makes decisions immediate payout;
reinvestment autonomous from investors no reinvestment
decisions and creditors allowed
Capital investment Opaque Highly transparent
decisions to creditors to creditors
Financial Easily duplicated; Highly-tailored; which
structures common forms can not generally
be re-used
Low costs due to Relatively higher costs
Transaction competition from due to documentation
costs for providers, routinized and longer
financing mechanisms and short gestation period
turnaround time
Might require
Size of financing Flexible critical mass to cover
high transaction costs
Basis for credit Overall financial health Focus on balance
evaluation of corporate entity sheet and cashflow
Technical and Focus on Cash flow and
economic feasibility project’s assets contractual
arrangements
Cost of capital Relatively lower Relatively higher
Typically broader Typically smaller group;
Investor/lender base participation; deep limited secondary
secondary markets markets
Source: Comer (1996)
Although having a larger scope not limited to infrastructure projects,6 this kind of projects is
by excellency, the more appropriate field of application for PF techniques. As a summary of
the previous exposition, three reasons support this argument, namely, the ability to raise large
amounts of money, the inherent structure of risk sharing among participants, and finally, the
financial and organizational structure that fits each project nature, being highly tailored. In
addition, for governments, PF techniques are very attractive, because projects must prove to be
free-standing, financially viable without recurring to governments funds. While very appealing
this last reason, generating more acceptance of the public opinion in an apparent idea of getting
“more” infrastructure for free, the reality shows a more complex picture, as the Portuguese PPP
cases under study show in Chapter 5.
6Other possible applications include, for instance, industrial projects.
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In a governments’ perspective, the involvement of multilateral development banks and export
credit agencies in PPP provides significative support for infrastructure projects, not limited to
the financial aspects. Of course, MDB are an important source of funds, but other relevant
functions appear, issue that we cover with more detail in the next section.
3.3 The role of Multilateral Development Banks
For infrastructure projects, loans provided by multilateral development banks (MDB) and simi-
lar agencies are a critical source of funds. Even more, their participation reduces the perception
of risk to the other agents and reinforces the social aspects of the project. In a brief explana-
tion, a MDB is a financial institution, created by a group of countries, that provides financing
(long-term loans and guarantees) and professional assistance to developing countries. Typically,
the developed countries act like donors and the developing countries are the borrowers. Export
credit agencies (ECA) are financial agencies that provide government-backed loans, insurance
and guarantees to private firms for their activities abroad. The main goal of ECA is to promote
exports and trade from their respective countries. Most industrialized nations have at least one
ECA, which is usually a national, public or publicly-mandated agency.
In broader terms, the mission of MDB is to provide financial resources to promote investments
that foster development. According to Buiter and Fries (2002), two key characteristics distin-
guish MDB from other private banks and bilateral donors: first, their multilateral share-holding
structure and preferred creditor status, and second, a subsidized capital base and access to other
subsidies.
There is an important role of MDB in mitigating the risks of an infrastructure project. Some
advantages obtained directly from the MDB participation are: they extend maturities, reduce
spreads and through the enhancement of the projects viability, they provide countries with
experience in using complex financial structures and dealing with international financial insti-
tutions. This last reason also contributes to the development of the local markets and to the
strengthening of the host country regulatory framework. Indirectly, such participation acts like
a sign to lenders of the creditworthiness of the deal, making fund raising more easy, because
projects are subject to detailed appraisals including several financial and non-financial aspects
before being approved (see Griffith-Jones and Lima, 2004; Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007).
CHAPTER 3. INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE 33
The involvement of MDB is particularly relevant to developing countries. In order to foster pri-
vate participation, developing countries should pursue macro-economic stability and improve
their institutional framework, namely, strengthening procedures for contract enforcement and
dispute settlement and developing a coherent set of policies for trade, tax and competition. In
this scenario, the role of MDB is critical, because besides the traditional lending function, im-
portant new functions emerge: credit enhancement, mechanism of risk reduction facilitating the
raise of private flows and helping governments to perform the necessary reforms. This has been
stressed in several works, for instance, Hainz and Kleimeier (2006), Matsukawa and Habeck
(2007), OECD (2006), Pessoa (2008), Sorge and Gadanecz (2004) and World Bank (1994).
In this respect, Bhattacharyay (2009) summarizes the main advantages of the involvement of
MDB in infrastructure projects - “they can help improve the flow of private savings and capital
into infrastructure investments by:
• developing bankable projects,
• designing appropriate, innovative financial instruments,
• assisting countries to enhance their technical capacity and knowledge,
• enhancing financial market depth, efficiency, liquidity, and adherence to international and
regional standards or best practices,
• promoting further financial integration.”
The group of MDB include the World Bank, the four regional development banks and several
other banks and funds. The World Bank started its operations in the aftermath of the World
War II with the purpose of lending to poorer countries, using resources from the rich nations.
Initially, the financial help was centered in countries ruined by war and later to those in the
early stages of economic development (Gurria and Volcker, 2001). Four regional development
banks appear with the same goals: the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was founded in 1991 following the
fall of the Berlin Wall and its main focus was to finance investments, mostly private sector
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investments, that foster the transition toward open market economies, in the post-communist
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.7
With a more restrictive ownership / membership structure and focusing on special sectors or
activities, appeared other banks and institutions, that shared the classification as MDB: The
European Commission (EC) and The European Investment Bank (EIB), International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), The Nordic Develop-
ment Fund (NDF) and The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), The OPEC Fund for International
Development (OPEC Fund). In addition, a number of sub-regional banks were also established
for development purposes.8
Some of the major MDB, namely the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks
and the World Bank, are oriented to provide loans and grants to governments, in a form of
budgetary finance. In exchange for this finance, the borrowing governments commit themselves
to implement institutional reforms and to invest in human and physical capital. Instead, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corpora-
tion (an affiliate of the World Bank) are institutions more devoted to finance private sector
investments.
In the early years of operations, these MDB financed and supported primarily public sector
infrastructure projects, through loans, technical assistance and policy-based lending. More re-
cently, in the 1990’s, private capital flows faced an exponential increase to many middle-income
countries and to some few low-income countries, like China and India. This fact has raised
doubts about the role of MDB, particularly in emerging countries. As pointed by Buiter and
Fries (2002) and Gurria and Volcker (2001), the episodes of rapid development and economic
growth were concentrated in specific countries from East and South Asia, and until now, this
growth was not translated into general poverty reduction and enhancement of the population
living conditions. As a conclusion, it is argued that the MDB original mission still makes sense
for those countries, although it should not be an indefinite task.
7Source: World Bank, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0, ac-
cessed on April 27, 2011.
8For instance, the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), Central
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), East African Development Bank (EADB) and West African
Development Bank (BOAD).
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As cited in Gurria and Volcker (2001), the MDB should continue to lend to the emerging market
economies, particularly, because: “given the immaturity of their economic and financial insti-
tutions, the small size and vulnerability of their markets, and the volatility of global financial
markets, access of these countries to private capital can be unreliable, limited and costly for
them, exposing them to great insecurity even when their long-run growth prospects are strong”
and “lending is a vehicle for policy change and promoting international goals”.
In addition, it is emphasized that MDB should expand their private sector operations in a
manner that “catalyzes rather than substitutes for private finance”, once again, reinforcing the
enabling role of such institutions in expanding opportunities for private finance.
But criticisms still remain, namely the delay in obtaining financing from the World Bank (ap-
proximately 2 years) and inflexible rules that limit the access of some low-income countries.
Additionally, it is argued that the participation of MDB will distort free competition in finan-
cing infrastructure projects. The MDB activity will lead to a selection effect, choosing what
projects will have access to finance and blocking the access to others (Forrester and Tillett,
1998).
Prospects for the future, emphasize a more selective role of the MDB, focusing on areas not
adequately covered from other sources. Recent trends like globalization and a strong shift to-
wards private and market-based approaches lead to an increasing role of the private sector and
international finance institutions, as major actors on economic development. At the same time,
there is an uneven distribution concerning the access to private financial resources, across coun-
tries and regions. As mentioned in Lindbaek et al. (1998), private flows are heavily concentrated
on a restrictive number of countries, sectors and borrowers: 75 percent of net private capital
flows go to a dozen countries, albeit including the largest developing countries - this leaves over
100 developing countries with little access or none, to private financing.
Thus, while many of the traditional destinations of resources now have access to private finance,
there remains a large number of countries which continue to need MDB involvement to mobilize
financing. Although a dilemma emerges, since the findings on aid effectiveness suggest that to
achieve greater impact, MDB should concentrate financial assistance on countries where poli-
cies and institutions are already supportive of development. Usually, these countries are also
attractive to private investors. In this scenario, MDB will be pushed towards countries where
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the conditions for investment are more difficult, but at the same time will be more selective
about investing in these countries where the probability of success is small. As a consequence,
investment selection will be reinforced given rise to a more limited range of lending opportuni-
ties (Lindbaek et al., 1998).
Until now, we are focusing our attention on how to finance infrastructure projects, but a related
feature and of critical importance is the discussion about the infrastructure project viability.
Moreover, if it is worthwhile from the society’s viewpoint, adopting a welfare perspective. Issue
explored in next section.
3.4 Financial viability vs economic viability
To guarantee the access to the necessary financial resources, any infrastructure project should
demonstrate that is economically justifiable. To accomplish that, of particular relevance appear
projections of future sales, earnings and cash flows patterns. Moreover, if the project is to
be financed with PF, the financial viability of the project is an imperative condition, because
project’s cash-flows and assets are the unique source to full repay the debt.
At this point, a clarification should be made - any appraisal of an infrastructure project goes
beyond mere financial analysis given its intrinsic nature. A more appropriate framework is
for instance, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), to assess whether, or to what extent, the project
is worthwhile from a social perspective, taking into account all the gains (benefits) and losses
(costs) to the society. As mentioned in European Commission (2008), in their Guide to Cost-
Benefit Analysis of investment projects, CBA is by far, the most commonly used technique
when the goal is to evaluate public investment, particularly when European financial support is
requested. Nevertheless, other kinds of project analysis exist, like Cost-Effectiveness Analysis,
Multi-Criteria Analysis and Economic Impact Analysis, that are used usually as complements
to CBA. Figure 3.4 illustrates de main steps in project appraisal using CBA based on the cited
guide (European Commission, 2008).
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Figure 3.4: The process of project appraisal
Legend: ENPV - Economic Net Present Value
Source: Adapted from EU (2008), Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of investment projects
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Very briefly, a CBA starts with the study of the social, economic and institutional context in
which the project will be developed. This assessment is very important, because all the projec-
tions of benefits and costs, as well as, the accuracy of the demand forecasts, will depend on the
macro-economic and social conditions of the region or country. A clear project identification
should be developed including: definition of the project’s objectives to assess if the project
has social value; clarification of the scope of the project involving indirect and network effects
(for instance, diverted road traffic for transport projects), positive and negative externalities
should be accounted for; and definition to what extend costs and benefits should be considered,
because depending on the geographic level adopted in the appraisal, larger or smaller categories
of economic social actors may be affected by the project.
Next step involves the feasibility and option analysis - different options are explored in order to
choose the “best” option. As an example if we consider a transport project, options at study
may be: different routes, different construction timings or different technologies. The feasibility
study aims to identify the potential constraints and related solutions, evaluating the technical,
regulatory, economic and managerial aspects. Any project should demonstrate its feasibility to
move on to the next phase of financial analysis. Otherwise, it must be abandoned or another
option explored.
Concerning the financial analysis, it is still mostly based on discount cash-flow approaches,
where the project forecasts of cash-flows are discounted to compute a Net Present Value or an
Internal Rate of Return. The time horizon for infrastructure projects is usually of 20 years for
this analysis and obviously, never exceeds the economic useful life of the project. The assess-
ment of the investment costs, the operating revenues and costs and the sources of finance, is
critical to determine if the project has financial sustainability. The project should demonstrate
that it can generate cash (including revenues and any kind of cash transfers) in a timely manner
in order to consistently match disbursements year-by-year.
The economic analysis that follows is made taking into account all the effects on the society,
instead of just the results to owners or other stakeholders directly involved with the infrastru-
cture asset. In this phase, the main goal is to understand if the project will contribute to the
economic welfare of the region or country. To all the costs and benefits should be given a value.
The use of accounting shadow prices, based on the social opportunity cost is a key technique
and when market values are not available, the effects should be monetized through different
CHAPTER 3. INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE 39
techniques. Sometimes, relevant environmental, social or health effects appear with the deve-
lopment of the project, but they don’t have market prices. In such situations, they need to be
evaluated and quantified with a realistic monetary value, and included in the project appraisal.
As an example, for a transport project, a non-market impact is savings in travel and waiting
time, and that can be evaluated by the value of working time savings, meaning, the opportunity
cost of the time to the employer, equal to the marginal cost of labor (European Commission,
2008).
As a result of the economic analysis an Economic Net Present Value (ENPV) will be computed.
This ENPV is the most reliable social indicator of CBA and constitutes the main reference
for the assessment of the economic performance of the project. It is possible that sometimes,
projects that failed on the financial analysis, will now show positive ENPV and with this
broader view of the benefits to the society, the project should be developed. The last phase of
project appraisal is the risk assessment, topic explored in the previous chapter (see Section 2.3).
Having said that the value of an infrastructure project transcends the financial aspects assuming
its nature as a public good and that a broader view is requested encompassing all the economic
effects on the society, is now time to answer the fundamental question of who should pay for
infrastructure. Next section explores this controversial issue.
3.5 The bottom line: taxes or user fees?
Following the previous discussion, a related topic is answering to the question of who should
actually pay for the infrastructure assets and services - taxpayers or users charged with fees?
It is important to distinguish between financing and funding of infrastructure. The former is
related to the provision of financial capital, by debt and equity that will finance the project, the
later is concerned with who actually bears the cost of providing the infrastructure and with the
resources that will be used to service the financial capital. Based in Fay et al. (2010), Figure 3.5
highlights the possibilities concerning funding and financing infrastructure.
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Figure 3.5: The balance of infrastructure financing and funding
Source: Adapted from Fay (2010)
There is a balance between the funds collected from taxpayers and users and the extend of
financing available. This financing is then channelized to infrastructure projects, through na-
tional budgets, international assistance and from the private sector. It should be noted that
concerning the private sector, their willingness to enter the projects are determined by the pos-
sibility of recovery the costs and obtain a reasonable profit rate (supported directly by users
or from public subsidies - indirectly by taxpayers). International development assistance will
depend on foreign taxpayers.
In parallel, efficiency gains are also an important aspect to be considered in this equation. As
explained in Fay et al. (2010), efficiency gains can have different sources, namely, countries may
be spending more on some types of infrastructure than they need to and with this, compromis-
ing the private sector participation with more innovative and advantageous solutions; reducing
institutional obstacles to capital expenditure; reducing delays in infrastructure rehabilitation
and improving maintenance that will improve services with a lower cost. All these examples,
can help reduce the overall funding (and financing) needs.
What is obvious from the previous figure, is that only two sources appear concerning funding:
taxpayers or users. General taxes on wealth, consumption and income are collected by govern-
ments in what constitutes the main source of funds to finance public expenditures, in addition
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more specific benefit taxes and user fees are imposed on the presumed or actual beneficiaries of
the services provided. Economic principles postulate that charging beneficiaries for the costs of
infrastructure can be more efficient than to rely on general revenues to fund an infrastructure
project. The “user pay principle” means that beneficiaries should pay for the services they
benefit and it is a general rule, that applies to most goods and services, although this notion
has little support in economic theory when dealing with public goods.
According to Duff (2004), the main rationale to justify user charges is to make government’s
use of resources more efficient and not specifically, to produce revenue. It is argued that “any
society should use its scarce public resources in a manner that will provide its people with as
large a bundle as possible of services that they want, and that is all that is meant by efficient
resource use.” In times of budgetary stringency, to maximize efficiency in the use of scarce
public resources, is an imperative. In addition, the imposition of user charges will induce more
accountability and market-oriented approaches - if users are asked to pay for a service, they
will be naturally more concerned with the availability and quality of the service to be provided.
Albeit the general principle that public services should be payed for, instead of “offered for free”,
several related issues appeared that are not easy to solve. First, it is not easy to determine
the appropriate domain for user charges or to design and implement user charges when they
are appropriate. Second, the cost of collecting the fee may exceed its amount, for instance, to
implement a system to collect tolls in a road, considering the equipment costs, administrative
costs and the related social costs of additional congestion, may lead to the conclusion that such
charging makes no sense. Third, new infrastructure is needed partly to meet the requirements
of general population increase, and in this situation is difficult to justify why should the users
pay for a service that in the past was for free. Finally, user fees are difficult to implement,
given the political salience of infrastructure projects and their social visibility. More active civil
society movements create difficulties in imposing user fees. For instance, using the Portuguese
reality, strong opposition appeared when the tolls for the 25th April Crossing were raised to
meet the contractual terms of the Lusoponte concession.9 Given the social disturbance, the
government was forced to rescind this decision. Another example, is the recent substitution of
the shadow tolls for “real” tolls in the SCUT concessions, originating several protest actions.
9In the initial agreement, the tolls for both crossings - Vasco da Gama bridge and 25th April Bridge - were
to be equalized.
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In an attempt to identify areas of government expenditure more suitable for user charges, given
the nature of the market and the “impurity of the goods”, Duff (2004) presents the following
conclusions (as an example, not an exhaustive list):
• For social services, public housing and general administration - benefit taxes and user fees
would be inappropriate;
• For health care and education - charges might be imposed provided that access is guar-
anteed on the basis of right, need or merit;
• For transportation, water and sewerage, and the collection and disposal of solid waste -
benefit taxes and user fees are specifically recommended.
Nevertheless, there isn’t a particular formula to be followed concerning the decision whether to
use taxes or users fees. Every infrastructure project should be evaluated by itself, taking into
consideration, the macro-economic and social conditions of the populations that will be served
with that infrastructure asset. In the end, it will be a political decision.
But what to expect concerning infrastructure investments and the main sources of financing
given the recent economic recession and financial crisis? Next section highlights some possible
trends.
3.6 Prospects for the future
In what concerns infrastructure projects the future seems to exhibit controversial trends. First,
several developing countries, as well as, more developed countries will continue to struggle with
fiscal pressures, not allowing to spend in infrastructure the needed amounts, not only into new
projects but also, to rehabilitate the existing assets. Second, the availability of bank financing
has not fully recovered from the credit crisis, with a syndication market nearly moribund and
few active banks in the infrastructure market. At the same time, population growth and demo-
graphic changes will continue to require more quantity, quality and efficiency in public services
provision. As an illustration, China and India alone will need more than US$1.5 trillion for
infrastructure development in the period of 2010-2015, as reported in Fay et al. (2010).
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International support for infrastructure projects (through MDB and similar agencies) will con-
tinue, but it is expected to suffer a decline and to be more selective. In recent years the
international assistance has been substantial, supporting directly the stimulus packages to the
economies, where infrastructure investments are significant. These anti-crisis packages reached
for example, in 2009, in the World Bank Group, US$22 billion and another US$55 billion was
leveraged from bilateral and multilateral agencies.
The private participation in infrastructure projects is expected to continue to growth, main-
taining the trend of the last 20 years and it is expected to reach US$230 billion by 2013. From
the attractiveness of the market will depend this pace of growth. In this respect, to provide
better comfort to investors it is fundamental to continue to encourage better design of projects,
professional project evaluation and appraisal, monitoring and control developed through all the
life cycle of the project. Such processes contribute to reinforce the credit quality of projects and
hence, to increase the likelihood of private market financing. As mentioned in Izaguirre (2010),
in this crisis scenario, only projects with strong economic and financial fundamentals and the
backing of financially solid sponsors, will be able to reach closure, in what reflects a general
trend of “flight to quality”. Commercial banks are adopting more conservative approaches with
more stringent conditions. Typically, financing involves higher costs, shorter tenors and lower
debt-to-equity ratios.10
Governments are facing hard challenges in the current economic climate in order to find solutions
for the infrastructure gap. Public-Private Partnerships, at a first glance, appear as a promising
mechanism to attract private capital, but nowadays this solution is far from consensual and
several aspects merit careful attention. Next chapter will explore this topic with detail.
10The outlook for developing / emerging countries is further detailed in Section 6.2.
Chapter 4
Public-Private Partnerships
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have faced in recent years an exponential growth all over
the world, not only in developing countries but also in developed ones, that find in PPP a new
instrument to offer more infrastructure assets and better services to the public. PPP are used
to build new and upgrade existing public facilities such as schools, hospitals, roads, waste and
water treatment plants and prisons, just to mention some possibilities.
This chapter begins with a definition and overview of PPP and their historical perspective.
Section 4.2 presents different possibilities for private sector involvement in the delivery of public
services. Section 4.3 details the PPP delivery model, following a presentation of several related
key concepts. Finally, Section 4.5 explains, briefly, the theoretical arguments supporting the use
of PPP and clarifies in which circumstances PPP may offer a better solution than traditional
procurement.
4.1 Definition and overview
There is no unique definition of PPP. For instance, one possible definition is presented by the
European Commission (2004): “public-private partnership... refers to forms of cooperation
between public authorities and the world of business which aim to ensure the funding, con-
struction, renovation, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision of a
service”. Inherent to the idea of partnership is that it should be mutual beneficial and seek to
achieve compatible objectives. More definitions can be found in Allan (1999) or OECD (2008).
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Although there are several definitions for PPP, as they come in different types and forms, the
literature has reach a consensus concerning the main characteristics of this form of procurement
(Allan, 1999; Grout, 1997; Välilä, 2005). The key characteristics are:
• The involvement of the private sector in providing public services or assets to meet public
interest objectives;
• The long-term nature of the relationship;
• The distribution of risks between the public partner and the private partner aiming to
achieve the optimality of risk allocation;
• The bundling of different project phases (e.g. design and construction or construction
and operation);
• The private financing of the project (if not all, at least, a substantial part) and the use of
project finance mechanisms.
Historically, forms of cooperation between the public sector and private sector could be found
from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly in the form of BOOT
(Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) or BOO (Build-Own-Operate) concessions. In a BOOT agree-
ment the private partner design, build, finance and operate/manage the asset1 and by the end
of the contract, the asset is transferred to the public sector, free of charge. A BOO agreement
is almost the same deal, but the ownership of the asset stays with the private partner. For
instance, Lemos et al. (2000) and Sawant (2008) refer the construction of the Suez Canal in the
nineteenth century, using private finance, as an example.
After a period of decline, on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, explained by seve-
ral economic and political reasons, like: financial failures where lenders lost significant amounts
of money (e.g. the Panama Canal), abuses by the private sector in pricing the services provided,
using their monopolistic power and an increasing government role in the economy, dictated by
the emergence of socialist and communist policies; concessions have gain a new impetus starting
in the 1970s (for further details on the history of concessions, see Lemos et al. (2000)).
A milestone in PPP development is the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK, which
was introduced by the Conservative government in 1992. The PFI is different from traditional
1Also called a Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) agreement.
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concessions because in the former, the government assumes strictly the role of buyer of the
services provided by the private partner, instead of acquiring the assets. Later, in 1997, the
incoming Labour government revitalised the PFI and rebranded it as PPP, an umbrella term
that includes PFI. The general idea supporting PFI, and more broadly PPP, is to foster private
involvement in the provision of public services, achieving a genuine transfer of risk to the private
sector and at the same time, securing value for money in the use of public resources. See for
instance, Allen (2001), Lemos et al. (2000) or Spackman (2002), for more details on the UK PFI.
More recently, the popularity of PPP and concessions can be explained by several reasons. First,
severe budget constraints help to understand the need of private funds to implement projects
otherwise not undertaken, or at least, not undertaken so soon. Second, is recognized that the
private sector could offer innovation, expertise and efficiency delivering projects to the specified
standard, on time and on budget. Third, a more general shift on the government’s role in the
economy, from direct provider of public goods or services to a procurer or regulator. Finally,
Spackman (2002) argues that PPP were first used as “off-balance sheet” finance, helping gov-
ernments performing the necessary infrastructure investments without compromising the public
accounts. PPP allow the substitution of current investment costs, that the government will in-
cur if procured the infrastructure asset in the traditional way, to a series of future payments.
This substitution may make the government budget look “better”, thereby undervaluing the
cost of PPP and biasing decisions in favour of PPP, as emphasized by Allen (2001) or Monteiro
(2005). This could be particularly attractive for the Euro countries, where there is a limit on
public expenditure. The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and The Stability and Growth Pact
require that government deficits should generally not exceed 3% of GDP.
It should be noted that the European Commission seems to encourage the use of PPP to develop
infrastructure. Accordingly, they have published Guidelines for Successful Public-Private Part-
nership (European Commission, 2003) and the Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions (European Commission, 2004). These
two documents offer guidelines, where in essence, the main concern is with the respect of the
rules and principles of the Treaty: transparency, equality of treatment, proportionality and
mutual recognition.
Although all the recent attention given to PPP, they are a small part of the public infrastru-
cture market, as most public infrastructure projects are still traditionally procured. In a recent
CHAPTER 4. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 47
study performed for the European market, from 1995 to 2006, Blanc-Brude et al. (2007) show
that the importance of investment through PPP remains relatively small in comparison to
traditional public procurement methods. The only European countries where PPP appear to
have macroeconomic significance are the UK, Portugal and Spain. Even for the UK, where
undoubtedly the PFI is very important and has played a pioneering role in the development of
modern forms of PPP all around the world, the PFI remains of limited significance: “The vast
majority of investment in the UK’s public services has been, and will continue to be, procured
through conventional means. However, other innovative procurement approaches, and PFI in
particular, have been used to deliver some of the government’s most complex and significant
public sector infrastructure projects and programmes (...) The PFI programme continues to
play a small but important part in the Government’s investment plans” (HM Treasury, 2008).
Studies performed by Deloitte (2006) and Grimsey and Lewis (2007), show that PFI projects
represent between 10% and 13% of all UK investment in public infrastructure.
Evaluating the performance of PPP is a critical task and this evaluation should be made over
the entire life cycle of the project. Most projects are either under construction or in the early
stages of operation, thus there is only empirical evidence on the construction phase and re-
searchers (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007; Grout, 2005; Nisar, 2007) have found that PPP perform
better than traditional procurement in delivering the assets on time and on budget, particularly
when PPP involve the construction of assets needed to deliver public services, like hospitals,
prisons or roads. Also, the majority of the value for money tests reported significative financial
savings when PPP are compared with conventional public procurement methods, yet this is not
a consensual result, because some results point in the other way too.
However, a note of caution should be made: on one hand, it is a fact that using PPP, projects
are delivered “on budget”, but on the other hand, PPP are associated with higher costs. This
suggests that a more realistic budget is used in PPP, because the private sector evaluates and
prices explicitly all the risks supported and want to be rewarded for bearing them. It is showed
by Blanc-Brude et al. (2006) in a study for the European road sector: the ex ante cost of a
PPP road is on average, 24% more expensive than a traditionally procured road (all other
things equal), and this difference is approximately similar to the ex post cost overrun reported
in traditional procurement methods. This result seems to suggest that this cost difference is
the consequence of the assumption by the private partner of the construction risks.
CHAPTER 4. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 48
PPP do not offer a miraculous solution for every public sector infrastructure problem. There
are also several drawbacks, mostly related with public sector inability to deal with such struc-
tures (lack of expertise and experience), insufficient competition and high transaction costs. For
instance, in the UK, HM Treasury (2008) clarifies that PFI arrangements may be appropriate
if the capital value of the project is above £20 million to ensure that procurement costs are not
disproportionate. Sometimes, pooling a number of projects together will solve this problem,
lowering procurement costs.
Not all forms of private sector involvement in the delivery of public services constitute PPP.
Next section explains the different possibilities, highlighting the main advantages and drawbacks
associated with each one.
4.2 Possibilities for private sector involvement
In the past, the government (including local authorities, municipalities and other public agen-
cies) has often taken the exclusive responsibility of public service delivery, but there is a gradual
recognition that this may not be the best solution to efficiently provide services to the pub-
lic. Consequently, recent years witnessed an increasing trend to involve the private sector in
infrastructure and in the delivery of public services. In the basis of this trend, several different
arguments are presented in a mix of ideological, political, economical and financial factors, as
cited in Lemos et al. (2000), not only to explain the flourishing of concessions, but also other
forms of private sector involvement.
These arguments, already listed in the previous section, include the emergence of the New Cap-
italism that privileges the use of private capital and the regulatory role of the State instead of
direct interventions, budgetary constraints faced by the governments, globalization of financial
markets with the emergence of innovative financial instruments and new classes of investors,
development of project finance techniques and lastly, but with no less importance, the private
sector efficiency, as a result of competition, expertise and more capacity to design innovative
solutions. This last reason was one of the main justifications given by governments to justify
the partnerships with the private sector.
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The difference between public service delivery models rest in the assessment, allocation and
management of risk between the parties. Under traditional procurement, the public sector
makes short-term contracts characterized by input-based specifications with different private
firms (different stages of the project are contracted out separately) and ownership and funding
are responsibilities of the government. But several other possibilities for private sector involve-
ment appear in the delivery of public services. Following Pessoa (2006) and the World Bank
classification, there are in general six typical forms:2
• Short term service contracts - Specific tasks, usually everyday maintenance jobs, are
contracted to the private sector, but overall services management remains within the
public sector;
• Management contracts - The government pays a private operator to manage the fa-
cility, the private firm respond to day-to-day routine maintenance needs by contracting
private companies, on behalf of the public entity. This type of contract involves the
payment of a fee to the private company and can provide gains in managerial efficiency;
• Lease contract - The government leases the assets to a private operator for a fee. The
private operator maintains and operates the assets, taking on the operational risk, but is
very demanding for the public entity, who remains with the responsibility for investments;
• Greenfield Projects - New projects usually built and operated by the private sec-
tor, which assumes the commercial risk. Such projects can take many forms, but the
most common is Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). Others forms of greenfield projects in-
clude Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Design-Build-Operate (DBO), Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO) and Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT). High up-front investments re-
quired from the private sector and the long life of such projects, turn the distribution of
risks between the parties a key cornerstone to achieve success.3
• Concessions - In a concession, the government grants a private entity the exclusive right
to build, operate, maintain and carry out investment in an asset over the contract period.
The private partner usually pays a fee to the government to obtain this right. Typically,
concessions are free-standing projects, meaning that the investment costs will be recovered
through the cash-flows generated by the project (for instance, toll roads where the private
partner collect user fees - tolls). In this type of arrangement, ownership belongs to the
2Available at http://ppi.worldbank.org/resources/ppi methodology.aspx, accessed on May 6, 2011.
3Similarly, for brownfield projects, various acronyms exist, like, Rehabilitate, Operate, and Transfer (ROT),
Rehabilitate, Lease or Rent, and Transfer (RLT), or Build, Rehabilitate, Operate, and Transfer (BROT).
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public sector and by the end of the contract, the asset will revert to the public sector,
free of charge. This form of involvement can generate high efficiency in operations and
investment, but requires considerable commitment and regulatory capacity from the public
sector.
• Divestitures - A private entity buys an equity stake of a public utility, through an asset
sale, public offering, or mass privatization program. Divestitures may be classified into
Full or Partial, if the government transfers 100% of the equity in the State-owned company
to private entities or just a part, and in this last option, may or may not imply private
management of the facility.
From the above description, it is obvious that options that yield higher involvement of the
private sector, with more potential efficiency gains, also tend to demand a higher level of gov-
ernment commitment and a better prepared institutional framework. Table 4.1 presents the
main advantages and drawbacks associated with the different possibilities.
Table 4.1: Pros and cons of the different private involvement options
Option Typical Pros Cons
duration
Service 6 months Can inject good Unlikely to greatly improve
contract to 2 years technical expertise performance where overall
management is weak
Gains can be difficult to
Management 3 to 5 years Gains in managerial enforce; public entity
contract efficiency remains responsible
for investment
Commercial risk borne Administratively
10 to 15 by the private sector, demanding; public
Lease years giving strong entity remains
performance responsible for
incentives investments
Good way of getting Not a good solution if
Greenfield 15 to 30 efficient delivery supporting distribution
projects years of bulk services, with systems are in bad shape, or
private investment traffic levels are uncertain
Potential for high Requires considerable
Concession 25 to 30 efficiency in commitment and
years operations and regulatory capacity
investment
Indefinite, but Potential for high Requires credible
Divestiture may be limited efficiency gains regulatory framework
by a license
Source: Pessoa (2009)
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Not all forms of private sector involvement are considered PPP. Albeit, as cited in the literature
(HM Treasury, 2008; Välilä, 2005), there are no single definition for a PPP and it is possible
to find similarities and overlaps between different delivery models. For clarification purposes,
under the umbrella term of “partnership”, sharing key features as the long-term nature of the
arrangement, distribution of risks between the public and private partner and the resource to
private funds, is possible to consider concessions, greenfield and brownfield projects, and other
arrangements included in the private finance initiative (PFI), as PPP. This will be the approach
followed in this work.
As already mentioned, in a PFI contract, the public sector buys services from the private part-
ner. This kind of contract implies always a construction phase and an operational phase and
the financing of the project is a responsibility of the private partner. Under the PFI arrange-
ment, the private partner provides the capital asset and the services, the ownership of the asset
belongs to the private partner and the public sector pays for the use of the facilities over the
contract period, acting like a purchaser of services. According to Lemos et al. (2000), this is the
main difference between PFI and a traditional concession. In a PFI deal, the public sector is no
longer acquiring assets and providing for the services, but instead is only buying services. For
that reason, PFI is not limited to economic infrastructure projects like concessions, but could
be applied to several other sectors (social infrastructure) like schools, accommodation, prisons,
hospitals, etc. As a conclusion, PFI may be considered as a sub-sector of PPP, with the specific
purpose to deliver a service of publicly managed assets using private capital.
As a final note, it should be reinforced that PPP are different from conventional contracting-out
arrangements and from privatizations. Typically, contracting-out involves a service provided by
the private sector and that was previously provided by the public sector. But the responsibility
and control remains with the public partner. In the case of privatizations, the ownership and
the responsibility for the service provision is transferred to the private sector. According to
Allan (1999), the common feature between these three possibilities is that, in each, the public
sector role changes from direct provision to the public to its role as a procurer of services and
a regulator. PPP lie somewhere between simple contracting-out and privatizations in the con-
tinuum of private vs public involvement. Figure 4.1 summarizes that idea.
CHAPTER 4. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 52
Figure 4.1: Continuum of public vs private involvement
More recently, Grimsey and Lewis (2007) mentioned that hybrid approaches between conven-
tional procurement and PPP are appearing. The purpose is to lower costs and at the same
time, to obtain flexibility with a clear definition of responsibilities and rewards for the parties
involved. To better understand PPP, next section presents the main features, advantages and
drawbacks of this form of public service delivery.
4.3 The PPP delivery model
There are important key features characterizing PPP. First, the private sector is responsible
for delivering an infrastructure asset and usually, also takes the responsibility for the operation
and maintenance of this asset providing the related services. Under the most common form
of PPP, the private sector designs, builds, finances and operates the asset based on “output”
specifications decided by the public sector. The public sector defines the main goals to be
achieved in terms of public interest (quantity, quality and price policy of the public services to
be provided) and is the private sector, who is responsible for deciding how they will provide
those services, desirably through innovative solutions. The private sector partner is usually a
consortium that creates a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Through this separate legal entity,
who is fully responsible for its own assets and liabilities, the project is carried out, without
compromising the financial stability of the sponsors, avoiding risk contamination.
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Second, risk should be allocated to the party best able to deal and manage it. As noted by
Leahy (2005), a PPP does not necessarily mean that the private sector assumes all the risks,
or even the major share of project’s risks. The emphasis should be in the optimality of risk
allocation, essential to ensure value for money, rather than the maximization of risk transfer
from the public partner to the private partner. The risks are shared between the public and
private sector and usually have a performance-based payment mechanism, in which the private
partner will receive a stream of payments, from the government or from end users or both.
The fact that payments are performance-related, ensure that the private sector has the right
incentive to control and manage risk effectively throughout the contract period, in order to
avoid penalties for under-performance or misconduct.
PPP projects face different risks and uncertainties, namely: sponsors, design and construction,
operational and maintenance, political, legal, market, social and environmental and force ma-
jeure. Each project is unique with a particular location and a specific sector and therefore,
is exposed to different risks with different degrees. In this context, the complex contractual
structure typical of PPP, plays a fundamental role in the allocation of risks between the parties.
It should be noted, that one of the major problems of traditional public procurement methods,
rest in the correct assessment and evaluation of the risks and like cited in Leahy (2005), there
are several examples of unsuccessful projects with delays and cost overruns, where an emble-
matic example is the London underground jubilee line extension project. The project has faced
serious difficulties, largely due to problems on the construction phase associated with tunneling.
From the initial forecasts of three years to completion, costing £2.1 billion, it was finished two
years later, costing a total of £3.5 billion.
Third, PPP are usually long term arrangements, lasting from 20 to 30 years. In this respect,
the establishment of a climate of confidence among the parties is critical for the success of the
partnership, as typically, renegotiations will be necessary. In the words of Pessoa (2006): “The
longer the nature of the objective, the larger are the uncertainties associated with the project
and the more critical and relevant the third “P” of a PPP becomes”.
Fourth, bundling of different project phases. Under traditional procurement methods, the pub-
lic sector make different contracts with private entities for the construction of the infrastructure
asset and for the maintenance/provision of a service. Under a PPP, there is only one private
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entity who is responsible for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the asset
(bundling). The main justification is that way, the private partner has the incentives to take a
whole life cycle approach. The private partner will make investments in the construction phase
that will lower maintenance costs, improving the quality of the services provided.
And fifth, private finance is used, usually, a mix of equity and debt. Sometimes, also public
funds may be used in a form of grants or subsidies. SPV’s capital structure is highly leveraged
and the debt-to-equity ratio could reach 90% in the case of PFI arrangements as mentioned
in HM Treasury (2008). The benefits of private finance are well covered in several works (HM
Treasury, 2008; Marty and Voisin, 2008; Nisar, 2007). The benefits may be summarized in the
following: more effective due diligence and monitoring by private lenders, as they have long-
term capital at risk, leading to improved whole-of-life risk allocation and management.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, debt is the main source of capital for infrastructure
investments and lenders will receive interest and repayments according to a specific schedule.
For projects that typically exhibit the characteristics of high leverage and long-term tenors,
lenders will be particularly interested in the performance of the SPV in meeting the public
sector criteria. The technical and financial viability of the SPV and its ability to deliver the
service and repay the debt is critical. Marty and Voisin (2008) show that lenders are therefore,
a third party in the deal that have the necessary expertise and proper incentives to conduct due
diligence and close monitoring of the SPV activities, acting indirectly on behalf of the public
sector and reducing problems of asymmetric information, as the public sector is the party less
informed.4
Intrinsic to PPP there are several benefits that could be pointed. To the private sector, there are
new investment opportunities through the accessibility to markets that once were an exclusive
of the public sector, allowing greater diversification and profitability. In the public sector side,
the advantages are probably more clear:
• Leveraging of public funds, allowing projects to proceed, even when the public funds are
not available for their implementation. And as a consequence, allowing the governments
to canalize their scarce resources to other high-priority areas of expenditure;
4This active role of lenders is further emphasized for projects financed by project finance mechanisms, with
non-recourse debt.
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• There is an explicit identification, quantification and allocation of risks among the part-
ners, which is translated into more efficiency in risk management. By contrast, in tradi-
tional procurement, risks tend to be ignored as an element of cost;
• The involvement of the private sector allows access to economies of scale or scope;
• The use of a performance-based mechanism for payments, inducing quality improvements.
Usually, payments only begin after the construction phase, when the provision of the ser-
vice starts and are conditional upon the quality of the service provided. Using satisfaction
metrics, PPP encourage a strong customer service orientation;
• Empirical evidence shows that PPP permit on-time and on-budget delivery and significa-
tive financial savings are reported. PPP can lower overall life cycle costs;
• More effectiveness and efficiency in public service delivery. Private partners are free from
bureaucracy and not affected by political considerations, which allow them to operate
more flexibly and effectively than a government department or agency;
• Private ownership stimulates a more profitable use of infrastructure assets through mul-
tiple uses;
• PPP may “serve as vehicles to introduce tolls or other user-charge systems, while still per-
mitting government to distance itself from these developments” increasing public tolerance
to such initiatives, according to Allan (1999);
• More efficiency in the procurement process. The need of preparing output based specifi-
cations makes the public sector focus on exactly what it wants. Hence changes causing
cost increases, due to modifications on the public sector requirements, become less likely,
as emphasized by Blanc-Brude et al. (2006).5
However, there are also several disadvantages in a PPP delivery model. In the words of Akin-
toye et al. (2003), the main problems are “high cost of the procurement process, lengthy and
complex negotiations, difficulty in specifying the quality of service, pricing of facility manage-
ment services, potential conflicts of interests among those involved in the procurement, and
the public sector clients’ inability to manage consultants”. In summary, the worst drawback of
PPP is high transaction costs, namely, costs with tendering, bidding, contract negotiation and
5Nevertheless, it was a problem for the first PPP that Portugal developed – changes required by the government
had led to significant cost overruns as reported in Monteiro (2007).
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monitoring. According to Allen (2001), these costs are three times higher in a PPP than in
traditional public procurement.
Another consequence of high procurement costs is that it may compromise effective competi-
tion. Not all private firms have the necessary scale to enter in the PPP market and a lack
of competition could be a problem in achieving value for money. Also, a lack of expertise by
the public sector to deal with these arrangements is a common problem for several countries
starting using PPP. But as the market evolved, these problems will be minimized through
standardization of some procurement procedures and as more experience is gathered in the
public partner side, lowering transaction costs. Although each project is unique, as mentioned
in Lemos et al. (2001) there are strong similarities among projects in the risks involved and
in risk mitigation techniques, allowing standardization. For instance, HM Treasury (2008) has
developed a standardized version of PFI contracts, which is mandatory for all PFI arrangements.
But, several other concerns are addressed in the literature. First, private funding is more ex-
pensive than the government’s cost of debt used in conventional procurement. This is a fact,
but according to Grimsey and Lewis (2007) and Klein (1996), this is also a false argument. The
apparent cheapness of sovereign funds reflects the fact that taxpayers are not remunerated for
the risk they take. The public sector can transfer risks to taxpayers and end users without hav-
ing to compensate them. However, if they were to be remunerated properly, then the difference
between private financing and government funding would disappear. In addition, it should be
noted that the assumption that governments are more reliable borrowers does not hold for all
countries (see, at this purpose, the actual sovereign debt crisis affecting some European coun-
tries, including Portugal, and the impact on the government’s financing costs).
Furthermore, de Bettignies and Ross (2009) show that private developers (using private funds)
have also the advantage of freely terminate bad projects and only are capable of implement
projects with positive and higher expected returns. On the other hand, public developers may
choose to finance projects with lower expected returns and even, may sustain inviable projects
for political reasons.
Second, if the PPP is to be refinanced, then costs and benefits should be balanced among the
parties. Risks, liabilities and benefits should be shared among public and private participants,
considering the life-cycle of the project. In most PPP, after a successfully construction phase,
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there is usually a decline on risks compared to the risks at the project’s beginning. Thus, it
is possible to renegotiate the debt financing, obtaining more favorable terms. Also, the matur-
ing of the market has brought more competition and more financial players, making possible
to obtain better financial conditions. Although, there is an obvious argument that the public
partner should share the benefits of renegotiations, this was not what happened in the early
times of PPP.
Third, sometimes significant fixed payments are made by governments for a long time horizon
and as a consequence, reducing government’s fiscal flexibility. As mentioned by Hodge (2006)
or Monteiro (2005), this “lock-in” effect of long term contracts might compromise the decision
making capacity of future governments and is more generally related to the critical topic of
“affordability”, issue explored in the next section.
Fourth, there are also concerns related to community access to the services and the user fees
“level”. It is possible to solve these problems through contractual terms, where the public
sector ensures the attainment of public interest objectives. In this respect, it is common to
use shadow tolls for roads projects, as a support for low volume roads, based on availability or
other performance measure. That way the government provides a subsidy to the private partner
making the project viable. But, some problems still remain. For instance, in a study about the
first wave of UK hospitals to be built under the PFI, Shaoul (2005) showed that using the value
for money methodology the results “are far from rational and serve to redistribute wealth and
increase social exclusion”, in accessing health care services.
Finally, a fifth issue, related with the previous one, the PPP model is not applicable to all
sectors. As illustrated by Riess (2005), the PPP model should only be applied to public ser-
vices where the quality is relatively easy to contract on – services that can be clearly specified,
measured and guaranteed – and where there is good potential for life cycle cost savings. Good
candidates for PPP are services linked to roads, tunnels, bridges, water resources and supply,
waste management and accommodation. By contrast, information and communication technol-
ogy services (ICT) and core services in health, education and prisons, appear not to be suitable
for PPP, although some success stories do not full corroborate these findings. See, at this
purpose, the successful case of the “Joint Services Command and Staff College”, an education
project for the training of staff officers of all three Armed Services – Army, Navy and Royal Air
Force, in the UK (Lemos et al., 2003).
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Regarding ICT projects, they usually have a high degree of complexity and uncertainty, what
makes a full specification of the output required to be delivered a very difficult task. For ins-
tance, Grout (2005) cites the Libra project, for the installation of a new computer system in the
UK’s magistrate’s courts to replace a fragmented system, as an example of an unsuccessful ICT
project. A lack of competition with only one bidder have resulted in poor project assessment
and in a weak position of the government in the contract renegotiation.
Several key concepts appear related to PPP, namely the achievement of value for money in the
use of public resources. The necessity to compute a public sector comparator to fully justify
the option for PPP. Recently, also issues of affordability or sustainability are becoming central
when discussing PPP. Next section explains these concepts.
4.4 Key concepts related with PPP
PPP should only be adopted if they are expected to deliver better value for money (VfM) over
traditional procurement methods. Therefore, the assessment of VfM is critical in choosing the
method of public sector delivery.
Value for money is a relative concept and is measured in terms of a comparison between diffe-
rent approaches to deliver public services. The ultimate goal is to inquire if public resources are
spend economically, efficiently and effectively. It can be defined as “the optimum combination
of whole-life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user’s requirement” (HM
Treasury, 2008). It is important to stress that this does not mean choosing among methods
with the purpose of cost minimization. Cost is only one feature to be considered. Obviously,
factors determining VfM will vary from project to project and between sectors, but it is an
imperative that the VfM assessment should integrate any project appraisal.
As an example, the European Commission (2003) indicates several factors that normally con-
tribute to the achievement of VfM in PPP: reduced life cycle costs, better allocation of risk,
improved service quality, faster implementation and generation of additional revenue. In the
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same line, the HM Treasury (2008) has published key drivers of VfM, from a public sector
perspective, including: clarity on the objectives to be achieved, focus on whole life costs, op-
timization of risk allocation, rigorous identification, transferability and management of risks,
long term nature of the contracts, use of output based specifications, competition, performance
measurement and incentives, sufficient skills and expertise in both the public and private sec-
tors, flexibility and an appropriate procurement process.
Grout (2005) illustrates potential VfM tests and their applicability. In essence, these tests try
to answer the question if a PPP will bring more net economic benefits to the public when
compared with the same project carried out through traditional procurement. This last option
is normally called the public sector comparator (PSC). The PSC is, in essence, a benchmark
against which the VfM of a PPP option is assessed. If the net present value of the option PPP
is superior to the net present value of the PSC, then the VfM is demonstrated and the project
should be carried following the PPP route.
As already mentioned, choosing a PPP is appealing for the governments, because the short
term effect will be a reduction on government’s expenditures and it will not contribute to the
budget deficit. But PPP have also a long term effect and the future stream of payments to the
private partner must be taken into consideration. Irrespective of the method chosen to public
service delivery, affordability means that all the stream of government’s expenditure should be
“accommodated within the intertemporal budget constraint of the government” (OECD, 2008).
Similarly to the assessment of VfM, also, affordability must be based on a comparative assess-
ment between two approaches: traditional procurement and PPP. VfM and affordability are
related issues and it can be argued that if an approach has better VfM, it is also ensured that
this approach is also affordable.
Affordability or financial sustainability should ensure fairness and equity among generations,
and that public resources are distributed fairly between current and future taxpayers. A major
concern in respect to PPP affordability is the risk of over-burden future generations of taxpayers.
If governments do not commit themselves in efforts to conduct a long-term financial planning,
matching the potential sources of revenues with the debt and other long-term obligations, then
serious problems may arise. At this purpose, it should be noted that a typical argument used
against the PPP model, is the lack of transparency and accountability.
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Until now, the PPP model has been presented, highlighting the main advantages and draw-
backs. This option is far from being a panacea to solve a country’s infrastructure problems.
Nevertheless some economic justifications appear supporting this form of procurement, issue
explored in the following section.
4.5 The theory behind - Rationale for PPP
Economic theory highlights three main characteristics of PPP that help to explain the better
performance when compared to traditional procurement methods: bundling, private ownership6
and risk transfer (see de Bettignies and Ross, 2004; Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Grimsey
and Lewis, 2007; Grout, 1997; Riess, 2005; Sadka, 2006; Välilä, 2005). In the next sections,
these topics are explored, but first, some key concepts are presented, addressing the role of the
State in the economy and forms of public sector intervention.
4.5.1 Public sector intervention in the economy
In general, under a competitive free market the efficient amount of all goods and services is pro-
vided, but although this is a fundamental premise, it is only true for private goods. In reality,
there are market failures, meaning a situation where the allocation of goods and services by a
free market is not efficient. Typically, market failures include public goods, goods that generate
externalities, asymmetric information problems and imperfect competition (e.g. monopolies).7
Public goods - Some goods and services have specific characteristics which imply that an effi-
cient amount of them will not be provided by the free functioning of the market. Typically,
pure public goods are non rival in consumption and non excludable. The first characteris-
tic means that consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce availability of
the good for consumption by others and the second one, that it is impossible to exclude
any individuals from consuming the good (e.g. national defence and law enforcement). In
this situation, no private firm would enter the market, there is no incentives to produce
6Not in the legal sense, as it will be explained in Section 4.5.3.
7This introductory section was based on Greater London Authority (2006).
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this good and without public sector intervention, there would be no supply. On the other
hand, there are pure private goods, which are rival and excludable in consumption (e.g.
food) and here, the private sector has the necessary incentives to provide them. In real-
ity, we have mixed situations that lie between pure public goods and pure private goods,
Mixed goods.
Externalities - Where the actions of one agent creates a cost or benefit on third parties, which
is not accounted for (spillover effects). In the case of positive externalities, not all the
benefits are considered and the market will provide too less of this activity. By contrast,
in the case of negative externalities, not all the costs are considered and the market will
provide too much of this activity. There are also goods where the benefits to the society
exceed the individual benefits. For instance, education which not only generates benefits
to the individual but also to the society, more educated persons will lead to higher pro-
ductivity. In this situation we have, Merit goods.
Information problems - A fundamental assumption under which markets are efficient is
perfect information between all parties. But for some goods and services, information
problems arise with complex information and when we have long time horizons involved,
problems that may prevent the economic agents from making rational and efficient de-
cisions.8 Asymmetric information is also a common problem and it refers to a situation
where one party have better information than the other. According to Dewatripont and
Legros (2005), there are two types of information asymmetries: hidden information and
hidden action, which in turn are closely related to the possibility of adverse selection and
moral hazard, respectively. With hidden information, one agent has superior information
compared to other agents and with hidden action, one agent can take actions that are not
observable by the others. Thus, adverse selection can occur due to a lack of information,
which can make economic agents enter a deal that do not deliver the level of satisfaction
that was expected, prior to the settlement of the deal. Moral hazard can occur after
the establishment of the contract. This phenomenon may appear because agents have an
incentive to behave in a manner post-contractually that they were not expected to behave
in, pre-contractually.
8In practice, it should be noted that unless information problems assume a huge proportion, the majority of
markets are able to function without all individuals having perfect information.
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Imperfect competition - Another fundamental assumption for efficient markets is perfect
competition among all the economic agents. Perfect competition is characterized by the
fact that no buyer or seller has market power (no single agent is able to influence market
prices). But there are industries which are natural monopolies, typically the case of many
infrastructure assets. In this situation, due to the high fixed costs of production, only one
firm could be profitable in the long run. For instance, railways, water services, electricity.
All the cases above, examples of market failures, justify the intervention of the State to over-
come these failures. These are included in the essential role of the State associated with the
allocation of resources.9 Public intervention aims to achieve allocative efficiency, also called
Pareto efficiency, which occurs when resources are allocated optimally, meaning that it is im-
possible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off.
Clearly and as illustrated above, there is a close link between market failures and the provision
of infrastructure assets and public services. Hence, traditionally, public sector intervention has
been mostly through public production and ownership. In this case, the public sector sub-
stitutes the market and provides essential goods and services, for instance, schools, hospitals,
prisons, roads and rail networks. There are also other relevant forms of intervention, namely,
through regulation correcting the functioning of the market and through taxes and subsidies,
for instance, subsidizing activities with positive externalities and penalizing activities with ne-
gative externalities.
But either intervention took place to overcome market failures in allocating resources efficiently,
or either for reasons of social justice, aiming to achieve a desirable distribution of income, gov-
ernments may fail to be effective for different reasons. Electoral pressures, excess of bureaucracy,
lack of capacity (incompetence, limited information or limited control over private responses to
its actions) and improper motivation, are some of the reasons that may be pointed.
Moreover, the public sector has poor mechanisms available in deciding how to allocate resources.
Where price information is not available the public sector tends to use cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) to determine whether the benefits or value of an intervention outweigh the costs. The
success of this analysis depends on the capacity to accurately assess both the costs and benefits.
9For completeness reasons, it should be noted that two additional roles are assigned to the State: redistribution
of income and wealth – distribution function – and maintaining high employment, price stability and promotion
of economic growth – stabilization function of the economic activity (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973).
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To conclude, it is important to note that public sector intervention must arise from the presence
of a market failure and has a cost, introduces distortions to the economy and could be not effec-
tive. Public sector funds come from taxation on individuals and businesses and it is important
to evaluate the full benefits and costs of the intervention. A PPP appears as a new mechanism
of market intervention, which substitutes traditional public management and ownership. In
this respect, Välilä (2005) emphasized that a PPP should be used to alleviate market failures
inherent to the provision of infrastructure assets or public services, but must prove to be an
advantageous solution over traditional public provision.
4.5.2 Bundling
As already mentioned, one of the typical features of a PPP is bundling of different project
phases. The public partner usually makes a unique contract with a private consortium in-
volving the construction and the operation / maintenance of the assets in order to deliver the
services. The main advantage of bundling is that complementarities between tasks, namely,
design, construction, finance and operation, will give the private partner incentives to minimize
costs in a full lifetime basis.
Theoretical literature focusing on bundling as a key feature of PPP is based on incomplete
contracting models (Hart, 2003) or asymmetric information models (Bentz et al., 2002).
Hart (2003) uses a incomplete contract framework to explain in which circumstances PPP are a
better choice when compared with traditional procurement. Specifically, the trade-off between
generating life-cycle costs savings and meeting public-interest objectives, is explored. In Hart’s
model, two types of investments can be made at the building stage by the private partner, that
will affect the operation of the asset:
• Investment A - that will lower the cost of operating and maintaining the infrastructure
and at the same time, will improve the quality of the service to be provided. An example
is an innovative design of a prison building, allowing a reduction of the number of security
guards needed. This investment will reduce maintenance costs and improve the quality
of the facility (better security conditions).
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• Investment B - that will reduce costs in the operating phase, but contrary to investment
A, it will also reduce the quality of the service. With the prison building example, con-
sider the use of new materials in the construction phase that allow better durability which
induce lower maintenance costs, but at the same time, may create problems of lighting
and air quality, lowering the quality of the building.
In this model, contract incompleteness imply that, first, both investments are non-contractible,
meaning that at the settlement of the initial building contract, they are not predictable. And
second, that impacts on service quality induced by these cost-saving investments, although no-
ticeable, are still within the scope of the contract.
Under traditional public procurement, the public sector contracts separately with different pri-
vate entities for the construction and for the operation / maintenance of the asset (unbundling).
In this case, clearly, the builder has no incentives to perform the investments, as any profit will
revert to others. With bundling (under a PPP), both investments will be carried out because
the benefits, in terms of lower operating costs will be internalized by the builder/operator. In
this last situation, from a society perspective, a PPP could be an optimal choice if the welfare
gains associated with investment A are large enough to offset a possible welfare loss associated
with investment B. It is possible to conclude from here, that if it is easy to contract on the
service quality and therefore overcome the loss of welfare induced by investment B, the stronger
are the reasons supporting the choice of a PPP.
In another strand of the literature, Bentz et al. (2002) assume that contracts are complete and
use an asymmetric information model that stress the role of private information about operating
costs. The main insight of the model is that bundling appear to be a better solution in solving
agency problems when service delivery and cost reducing investments are relatively cheap. The
basic assumption of the model is that the operator privately knows whether operating costs will
be low or high and in this latter situation, he can exert effort during the construction phase
in order to cut these operating costs. As a natural consequence, the operator will have an
information rent.
Under a PPP delivery model, the amount of information rent going to the private partner is
greater the more efficient the asset is. Therefore, the private partner (builder/operator) will
have the incentive to make the right build choice ensuring efficiency at the operational stage,
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without additional costs to the public partner. By contrast, in the traditional procurement
model, compensation should be given to the builder, who has to be incentivized to ensure that
the asset is as efficient as possible. In this situation, in a public’s sector perspective, a PPP is
relatively cheap compared with traditional procurement.
However, in a PPP, the more costly investments are, more information rent the public partner
should leave to the private partner in order to implement the necessary investments. The pub-
lic sector will provide incentives only up to the point, where increasing the information rent
any further, will became to costly. In this situation, a PPP may become too expensive and
traditional procurement is then preferred.
4.5.3 Ownership rights
Another key characteristic of PPP is private ownership, but first a clarification on the concept
of ownership is needed. Ownership should be not interpreted in the legal sense, but meaning
“residual control rights” over an asset. In PPP, the private partner is also the owner, which has
the right to decide all usages of the asset during the life of the contract, even when in the legal
sense, ownership belongs to the public partner (the typical case of concessions).
In addition, investments in infrastructure assets are typically relationship-specific investments.
Assets are build specifically to produce some service and they cannot be readily used for other
purposes. In this situation, all the parties engaged in the deal have more advantages if the
project is brought to completion than if it fails. The specificity inherent to infrastructure as-
sets, reinforces the role of relational contracting, i.e., all the parties involved in the project have
a stake in preserving the continuity of the relationship.
The most commonly used theoretical approach to the issue of ownership rights is contract
incompleteness (see Bennett and Iossa, 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Hart et al., 1997).
Contracts are naturally incomplete, because it is impossible foresee every contingency and if
it was possible, it would be probably very difficult to include all in a contract enforceable by
law. This aspect is emphasized in PPP, given their long-term nature, high complexity and
uncertainty originated by the exposition to a variety of risks and by the involvement of a large
number of stakeholders. Moreover, because PPP are often set up to deliver services, which are
hard to measure and monitor.
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In the presence of relationship-specific investments and contract incompleteness, opportunistic
behaviour by the parties may arise, making use of their bargaining power (Williamson, 1981).
In this context, ownership is a critical feature - the part who is the owner of the asset has a
superior bargaining position in renegotiation and it will affect investment incentives, as empha-
sized by de Bettignies and Ross (2004). Under traditional procurement, the public partner is
the owner and therefore any cost-saving investment performed by the private partner will re-
vert to the public partner. Thus, the private partner has no incentives to seek cost savings. By
contrast, with private ownership (under a PPP) the benefits from cost-saving investments will
revert to the private side, providing the necessary incentives to undertake the investments. Nev-
ertheless, the incentives to cost reduction may become too strong, and may compromise quality.
To illustrate this, Hart et al. (1997) provide an example with prison services. If the contract
concerning service quality is incomplete, then the private partner may deliver a service that fall
below a socially acceptable level if the incentives to cut costs cannot be controlled. By contrast,
under public ownership, any investment in cost-cutting that may compromise service quality
will not be done, ensuring the desired level of quality. As mentioned in Välilä (2005), Hart’s
model also stresses that even if effort to cut costs did not reduce service quality, it could have
an indirect negative impact – “the profitability of cost-cutting may induce the private partner
to focus too much on it and too little on quality improvement”.
Bennett and Iossa (2005) assume a symmetric information model with contract incompleteness.
In their model, the role of the end-of-contract (residual) value of the asset is explicitly considered
and the impact of renegotiations is emphasized. Bennett and Iossa (2005) consider two types
of investments that can be made at the construction phase: both investments improve quality
but one, increases cost at the operational stage (negative externality) and the other reduces the
operational cost (positive externality). Both investments increase the residual value of the asset.
As pointed by Riess (2005), the investment which they call to have a negative externality, could
be desirable from a society’s viewpoint if the benefits of a higher quality public service (for
instance, a safer road) and the increase of the residual value of the asset exceed the sum of
higher construction and operating costs. In this situation, bundling and private ownership is
not optimal and traditional procurement may be better, since the private partner has no incen-
tives to make the investments due to its adverse impact on operating costs.
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With the other investment (positive externality), there is no doubt that bundling offers the best
solution. With private ownership and control rights, investments will be made at the building
stage and the benefits will be internalized by the private entity. Nevertheless, things are not so
clear if control rights are left with the public entity. In this case, to make a cost-saving invest-
ment in the building phase, the private partner will need the agreement of the public partner
and renegotiation will occur where, typically, any benefit will be shared with the public part-
ner. Therefore, control rights should lie with the private partner if the cost and residual value
are more important than the social benefit effect, otherwise, should rest with the public partner.
In a PPP, by the end of the contract two possibilities exist concerning ownership of the asset
– it will rest with the private sector or it will be transferred to the public sector, sometimes
automatically and free of charge (the usual approach). At this purpose, Bennett and Iossa
(2005) show that an automatic transfer clause will prevent investment incentives, given the
unverifiability of investments and residual value (moral hazard), turning it a poor solution. By
contrast, if the private partner expects to transfer the asset to the public partner, receiving a
compensation, this will improve incentives to perform investments.
Besley and Ghatak (2001) particularly address the issue of public goods. In the general frame-
work of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), in the presence of relationship-
specific investments - valuable, only in a specific relationship - if the deal fails, the party who
is the owner gets some benefit while the other party gets nothing. But for public goods the
situation is different and both parties could have some benefit due to positive externalities.
The example cited in Besley and Ghatak (2001) illustrates the case where a private entity – a
non-governmental organization (NGO) – with an educational mandate may get benefits from
improvements in the quality of a school, even if it is not directly involved with its operations,
given the “public” nature of the good. The final result stresses that ownership should rest with
the party that values the benefits generated by the project relatively more, regardless of the
importance of investments or other aspects of the technology. At this purpose, de Bettignies
and Ross (2004) emphasize that if the public partner values the public good more than the
private partner, then the ownership should rest with the public partner irrespective of his level
of efficiency.10
10A result against the PPP superiority based on private ownership.
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4.5.4 Risk transfer
The third key feature separating traditional procurement from PPP is the sharing of project
risks. According to Blanc-Brude et al. (2006), the theoretical PPP literature has been concen-
trated on ownership and bundling and so far, has disregarded the issue of risk transfer, although
this issue is closely linked to the first two.
PPP have long contract periods and usually, difficulties may arise with measuring and moni-
toring some infrastructure assets and the related services to be supplied. These features make
PPP particularly susceptible to uncertainty and risks.
As pointed by Grout (1997, 2005), the main advantage of risk transfer is that this process leads
to a more explicit recognition, quantification and pricing of the risk. Risk does not disappear
but is allocated optimally, to the party best able to deal with it.11 Each partner, for the risk
assumed, will attempt to minimize any negative impact the risk could have on the project,
leading to an improved risk management.
As already mentioned, the contractual structure of a PPP is a feature of major importance in
the risk allocation process. The use of contracts leads the different parties to internalize the
various costs of a PPP project, using a whole-life-cycle approach. Any failure in contract design
may compromise the efficiency gains that could potentially be achieved through PPP.
Also in the same line, it has been emphasized that a genuine risk transfer must occur from the
public sector to the private sector, in order to a PPP generate VfM. Although this is a con-
sensual rule, practical difficulties may arise due to the complexities of the arrangements. For
instance, proper risk transfer is particularly challenging when the infrastructure project involve
partnerships with two different private partners, as the case of the first wave of PPP made by
the Portuguese government in the health sector. In these projects, risks, responsibilities and
benefits had to be shared between two concessionaires, one in charge of the hospital building
and respective maintenance and the other, delivering clinical services.
11By contrast, under traditional procurement methods, the quantification and pricing of risks tend to be
ignored.
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There are many classification schemes to the numerous risks that can be present in infrastru-
cture projects.12 It is essential that the public sector retains some of the risks to make a PPP
financially and economically attractive to private entities, including lenders. Usually, macroe-
conomic and political/legal risks are assumed by the public sector and project-specific risks are
carried by the private sector (e.g. construction and operation risks). Of particular concern is
demand or commercial risk. Arguments can be made for the public sector to carry this risk,
because through its actions, general economic policies or sector-specific policy measures, it is
possible to influence demand. But on the other hand, the private partner should assume at
least, part of this risk, to ensure the right incentives to promote efficiency at the project level.
In practice, what happens is that usually this risk is shared accordingly to a specific formula.
As an illustration, typically for transport projects, a band is defined and within the band the
private entity assumes the risk and has an incentive to seek efficiency, resulting in more profit.
Outside the limits of the band the public sector carries the demand risk, sharing or supporting
losses, and additional gains.
As a final note, concerning risk management, in general the public sector is in a weaker position
than the private partner whenever renegotiations of the initial contracts are necessary. There
is an asymmetry in the public-private relationship due to the particular characteristics of the
public service - once a project starts in the operational phase, the public sector will try to avoid
any disruption of the service and the private partner may act opportunistically to explore this
advantage. The experience with PPP contracts highlights the need to manage the risk in a
strategic way, using a whole-life cycle approach and with insights from the principal-agency
theory and game theory.
4.5.5 A summary - When to use PPP?
Accordingly to the economic theory and the exposition in previous sections, PPP offer a better
solution than traditional procurement when there are synergies between the construction and
operation phases, there is potential for cost saving investments, it is relatively easy to contract
on the service quality, and finally, when efforts to improve productive efficiency through cost
saving investments do not compromise, seriously, service quality and the attainment of public
interest objectives. As a result, economic infrastructure projects are good candidates for PPP.
12Recall Section 2.4.
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However, the practice sometimes is different from the theory and it is possible to find PPP in
sectors where it will be difficult to fulfill all the criteria indicated, like in the case of ICT projects
or core services in health, education or prisons. Although contracts can address some quality
issues, problems may arise when the government cannot fully specify the quality of the output
and in this situation, private partners may be tempted to cut quality in the process of cutting
costs. For instance, in education, the private partner may choose to replace expensive teachers
with cheaper ones; in health care services, concerns are related to the quality of care and to
the possible rejection of patients that are expensive to treat; and in prisons, hiring unqualified
guards to save money may lead to problems of safety and security of prisoners (see Hart et al.,
1997; Riess, 2005).
In addition, transaction cost theory13 suggests that contracting costs are likely to be higher
for projects with high asset specificity, high complexity and uncertainty, low competitiveness
and low government contract management skills, notably, the case of infrastructure projects.
Long-term complete contracts are impossible to write because unforeseen contingencies may ap-
pear during the life of the contractual relationship, and in the presence of relationship-specific
investments, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may arise, as a consequence of a
potential opportunistic behaviour of the parties, increasing transaction costs (Parker and Hart-
ley, 2003; Williamson, 1981).
The first solution to these problems is “vertical integration”, a situation where the governments
choose traditional public provision. In a context of PPP, a possible but inefficient solution is
try to complete the contract – adding incentive and penalty clauses, performance standards
and arbitration options. Another solution is to guarantee effective competition, ideally, ex ante
and ex post competition. While ex ante competition is a much easier condition to satisfy – it
is only necessary to have a large number of qualified bidders at the outset, sharing the same
conditions, problems arise with ex post competition. After winning a bid, the relationship is
developed bilaterally. Relational contracting appears as a different approach to deal with these
contractual difficulties. As cited by Bertelli and Smith (2010), transaction costs in long term
contracts can be lowered by nurturing relationships based on trust and cooperation. Trust and
credibility must be developed between the different network actors, having the effect of reducing
the (expected) opportunism and transaction costs.
13Transaction costs “arise from the costs of seeking out buyers and sellers and arranging, policing and enforcing
agreements or contracts in a world of imperfect information” (Parker and Hartley, 2003).
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As a final note, some key points must be stressed:
• First, PPP allow the expansion of infrastructure assets and services, beyond the gov-
ernment possibilities that usually face budgetary constraints and have a lack of project
management skills;
• Second, concerns appeared with PPP long-term costs and benefits. Because governments
can borrow more cheaply than the private sector, the extra-financing costs with the re-
source to private investors inherent to PPP arrangements, need to be compensated by
savings in other aspects of the project, to justify the option for a PPP scheme. The VfM
must always be demonstrated;
• Third, the PPP choice must be made on the grounds of efficiency and not, as a fiscal
option. According to Välilä (2005), there is a real risk of the PPP option being driven by
political and accounting considerations rather than by economic efficiency considerations.
Summing up, it is possible to conclude that if several conditions are met, a PPP can be more
efficient than traditional public procurement, but the cost of higher efficiency translates into
higher transaction costs, undermining competition. Nevertheless, PPP allow the construction
of important infrastructure assets, otherwise probably not possible due to budget constraints.
Some potential key factors for success include, the public sector ability to develop a proper
institutional framework and the skills / expertise to manage the PPP arrangement over all
the life-cycle. Enough competition should be ensured and an optimal risk allocation should be
pursued.
Portugal is one of the European countries that privileges PPP as a tool for infrastructure deve-
lopment. PPP are used in large projects to develop essential infrastructure assets in transporta-
tion and health, particularly greenfield projects. But although the long history of Portuguese
PPP, few papers have addressed this topic. Next chapter aims to present the Portuguese expe-
rience with PPP, detailing five distinct PPP projects and programmes.
Chapter 5
The PPP Portuguese Experience
The first major infrastructure project developed in Portugal under a Public Private Partner-
ship (PPP) scheme and financed with a Project Finance mechanism was the construction of
the Vasco da Gama bridge that started in 1994. The Portuguese history with PPP had started
approximately two decades ago and yet, there is a scarcity of papers on the topic. Besides
the reports from Tribunal de Contas, the Portuguese Supreme Audit Court, and from the Fi-
nance Ministry, there are few papers focusing the Portuguese experience with PPP, what can
be explained due to information unavailability and data limitations. Notably exceptions are the
papers of Lemos et al. (2004), Marques and Silva (2008), Monteiro (2005, 2007) and Sarmento
(2010). This issue is particularly relevant for Portugal, since PPP appear to be of macroeco-
nomic significance only in the UK, Portugal and Spain, if we consider the European countries
as noticed by Blanc-Brude et al. (2007), and because Portugal is the European country with
more PPP as a percentage of GDP.
This chapter aims to make a balance and critical analysis of the Portuguese experience with
PPP. To accomplish that we focus on particular PPP projects, particularly transport projects.
In addition we develop a method to ascertain the relative efficiency of the SCUT concessions
(shadow toll highways), based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This chapter is organized
as follows: Section 5.1 presents the legal and institutional framework, Section 5.2 describes the
major projects developed under PPP schemes, starting with a general overview and then de-
tailing five distinct projects and programmes, Section 5.3 explains DEA as a tool for measuring
efficiency and performance and we proceed with an application to the SCUT projects. Finally,
some general conclusions are drawn in Section 5.4.
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5.1 Legal and institutional framework
In Portugal, like in other European countries, the legal framework only appeared several years
after the first PPP project, more precisely in 2003. It was the practice and experience with
PPP that dictated the need for a proper and general regulatory framework. Before that, PPP
initiatives were governed by the general legal provisions that were applied to contracts sub-
mitted to the public legal regime (such as public service concessions) and were launched and
regulated through specific legislation, tailored for each project.
The most important Portuguese legal diploma is the Decree Law 86/2003 from 26th April, also
called the PPP Law which had suffered improvements with the Decree Law 141/2006 from 27th
July. These two legal diplomas provide a unified framework to PPP assessment and complement
already existing and avulse sector legislation, for instance, in transportation and in the health
sector.
The Decree Law 86/2003 designed a framework for PPP appraisal, establishing several insti-
tutional rules for risk assessment, including the computation of a Public Sector Comparator
(PSC) for each project. It starts with a definition of a PPP (adapted from art. 2): A PPP
is a long term contractual agreement, in which private entities take the responsibility for the
development of activities to fulfill a collective need. Financing, investment and management
are private sector responsibilities (total or partial). Short-term projects with a time span of 3
years or less, and with investments under 25 million Euros, are excluded.
To complement the definition above, art. 4 and 5, add that: The main goal to achieve with a
PPP is an increase of efficiency in the use of public resources with improvements in quantity
and quality on the service to be provided. Also concerning project responsibilities, the public
sector should act like a controller ensuring the attainment of public interest objectives and the
private sector should take the tasks of project’s financing (total or partially) and management.
More recently, the Decree-Law 141/2006 reviewed the PPP assessment framework, introducing
relevant improvements, particularly to protect the public sector interests. This new legisla-
tion reinforces the articulation between the line ministers involved (finance minister and other
sectoral minister depending on the PPP) and introduces mechanisms to improve the financial
control of the partnership. Some relevant changes were the following: competition in the bid-
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ding stage is now required – projects with only one bidder are interrupted; all the necessary
environmental licences and local authorities permits should be obtained before the launching of
a PPP deal by the government; more transparency is needed in the use of external consultants;
the sharing of refinancing gains and possible indemnities to the private partner in case of unilat-
eral changes of contracts by the government should be contractually predicted.1 In addition, the
modalities for restoration of the financial equilibrium are now specified (see art. 14-C), which
constitutes an important clarification when renegotiation of the deal occurs. Moreover when
the Portuguese experience shows a high incidence of renegotiations with an increased cost for
the government.
Besides the main legal framework provided by the two diplomas mentioned above, public en-
tities should also comply with the Budgetary Law (Law 91/2001) in what concerns financial
expenditure, and with the Code of Public Contracts (Decree-Law 18/2008) in respect to the
procurement phase of the project.
It is worth to mention that the majority of the PPP projects adopt the structure of a Design-
Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) agreement and use the legal instrument of a concession con-
tract, although other possibilities exist, as mentioned in art. 2 from the Decree Law 86/2003.
As a consequence and because there isn’t an universal rule for reporting and accounting the
PPP expenditures, Portugal follows the recommendations of EUROSTAT2 concerning the qual-
ification of the assets. Regarding concession models, the asset is considered private as long as
less than 50% of the project’s revenues come from payments by the public sector. Differently
from the classification of expenditure in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) models, where the
asset is considered off-the-balance-sheet as long as the risk of construction and at least, the risk
of service availability or the risk of demand are transferred to the private entity (Mahony and
Gunnigan, 2009).
Concerning the legal aspects, it should be recalled that the European Commission does not
have a specific legal framework to rule PPP, only offers guidelines. For instance, The Green
paper on PPP (European Commission, 2004) and Guidelines for Successful PPP (European
Commission, 2003), already mentioned in Section 4.1. Recently, a European PPP Expertise
Center was created in 2008, in a joint initiative of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the
1It would be possible to identify changes that are reasonably expected in the short to medium term, including
foreseeable legislative modifications and to include that in contracts.
2EUROSTAT is the statistical office of the European Union.
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European Commission, 30 European Union Members and associated countries. The main goal
is strengthen the ability of the public sector to engage in PPP. To accomplish that, the Center
stimulates the effective sharing of experience and best practices among members, provides sup-
port for project preparation and advisory services to the public sector promoters.
Prior to the decision to adopt a PPP model for the development of any infrastructure project,
several steps are followed according to the Portuguese legal framework. First, a report should be
prepared by the public entity proposing the project under a PPP scheme covering the following
items, as mentioned in Mahony and Gunnigan (2009):
• macro and micro-economic evaluation of the costs, benefits and of the public interest of
the project,
• the political framework of the project regarding the government political program,
• the business model proposed including financing sources and legal arrangements,
• quantification of the PSC to justify the choice of a PPP,
• compliance with the Budget Law regarding multiannual expenditures,
• establishment of a balanced contractual relationship, concerning risk allocation and the
sharing of risks and rewards, within a rigorous definition of contract scope,
• transparency in the public tendering procedure, by establishing careful evaluation criteria
and discipline in the negotiations stage,
• consideration of possible implications if the decision is not to proceed with the PPP route,
• careful definition of all scenarios of possible non-compliance by the private partner, through
the adoption of guarantees, penalties and the right to the termination of the contract.
Concerning the procurement process for PPP, in general two different phases are required: a pre-
procurement phase including planning, design and preparation of tender; and the procurement
phase in itself, involving bidding and negotiation. The procurement phase can be illustrated as
Figure 5.1 highlights.
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Figure 5.1: Procurement Phase for PPP in Portugal
Source: Adapted from Mahony and Gunnigan (2009) and Tribunal de Contas (2008b)
CHAPTER 5. THE PPP PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE 77
Some notes on the Figure 5.1. Given the high values of PPP contracts, the tender procedures
are usually open to public and international competitors, with the tender announcement pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the European Community (OJEC). In the first stage of the
process, the bidders are evaluated based on several criteria, for instance, suitability of competi-
tors and the technical, financial and legal features of the proposal. The best qualified bidders
are chosen to a second stage of negotiations (Short List), which ends with the presentation of
the best and final offer (BAFO). From here, and according to the contracting law, the tender
evaluation committee should choose the most economically advantageous proposal, based on
economic indicators like the Net Present Value, but also performance indicators, the quality of
the services, environmental aspects, technical merits of the solutions, among others.
Attention is now turned to the institutions that in Portugal are involved in PPP. Besides the
obvious role played by the private and public partner, several other institutions participate on
the PPP market, namely:
• Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças (DGTF) – It is an internal control body, which
aims to control the financial administration of the State and to contribute to the economy,
efficiency and effectiveness in public expenses and revenues. In 2007, a particular structure
was created within the DGTF – the Gabinete de Acompanhamento do Sector Empresarial
do Estado, das Parcerias Público-Privadas e das Concessões (GASEPC), that has the
responsibility of monitoring PPP projects using a long term financial planning program,
and of ensuring financial discipline and fiscal sustainability of the partnership through-
out the life cycle of the project. In broader terms, ensuring the affordability of the PPP
project.
• Lenders – Funds for projects’ development may come from several sources, but usually
involve commercial banks and supranational institutions, which often require the inter-
mediation of commercial banks to assume risks, as detailed in Chapter 3. For projects
developed in Portugal, it should be emphasized the role developed by the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB). This Bank assumes particular relevance, given its nature of a
multilateral development bank that provides loans primarily to countries of the European
Union. The EIB provides long term loans to governments in order to develop projects
with substantial investment needs, contributes with its experience in setting up opera-
tions and acts as facilitator to private investment. Using 2003 data, the majority of PPP
projects financed by the EIB were transport projects (around 80%), with the remainder
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in health, education, water and sewerage sectors. Concerning country exposure, Portugal
accounted for 19% of the EIB’s PPP project portfolio, just after the UK with 24%. With
more recent data, in terms of lending volume, all PPP projects accounted for 32% of the
total EIB transport lending in 2010, showing EIB support to PPP programmes, in spite
of the difficult financial environment.
• Parpública – A State firm which acts as a PPP knowledge center and advisor to the Por-
tuguese Finance Minister. Parpública is responsible for monitoring the development of
PPP projects through the collection, analysis and diffusion of information. Also, this PPP
Unit has the tasks of providing expertise to sectoral ministries, perform the evaluation
and appraisal of projects, preparation of tender documentation, evaluation of bids and is
involved in the supervision of contracts that are being renegotiated with private partners.
• Tribunal de Contas – The Portuguese Supreme Court of Auditors is a financial court that
examines the legality of public expenditure and audits the accounts of the State, focusing
on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which the public money was used. It is a
sovereign body, independent, that is not included in the State Administration. The Court
has been developing reports on the impact of PPP in public accounts and thus, making
an important contribution with its recommendations to improve all the PPP framework.
In addition, the supervision of the PPP contracts is a responsibility of different entities depend-
ing on the sector of activity. Thus, InIR – Instituto das infra-estruturas rodoviárias and IMTT
– Instituto da mobilidade e dos transportes terrestres have the responsibility for the supervision
of the private concessionaires, respectively, for road and railway sectors. The InIR’s mission
is to “supervise and oversee the management and operation of the road network, monitoring
compliance with laws and regulations and concession agreements, to ensure the completion of
the National Road Plan and the efficiency, equity, quality and safety of infrastructure, uphold-
ing the users’ rights”. Concerning IMTT, through its unit called URF – Unidade de regulação
ferroviária, develops the main tasks of economic and technical regulation of the activities in
the railway industry with a special focus on the relationship between the infrastructure mana-
gement and the transport operators.3
3Available at http://www.inir.pt/portal/ and http://www.urf.imtt.pt/, accessed on June 1, 2011
CHAPTER 5. THE PPP PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE 79
In what concerns the health sector, monitoring and supervision of the PPP has been committed
to Parcerias.Saúde.
Recently, in 2009, the Lisbon Catholic School of Business & Economics has created the Ob-
servatory of PPP (OPPP). The main purpose of this observatory is to develop systematic and
rigorous studies on the Portuguese PPP that are only available to the adherent members. The
OPPP includes all categories of stakeholders in the PPP market, namely, banks, consultants,
regulators, construction firms, equipment suppliers, government departments and law firms.
Next section presents several of the major Portuguese PPP projects, starting with a general
overview and detailing five distinct projects and programmes.
5.2 Portuguese relevant PPP projects
Portugal is currently the European country with the highest percentage of PPP, either in re-
lation to GDP or in relation to the State Budget (Tribunal de Contas, 2008b). Figure 5.2
highlights this same fact.
Figure 5.2: Average 2000-2005 PPP activity as a percentage of GDP
Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2005)
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PPP projects in Portugal are mostly concentrated in the transport sector (highways and rail-
ways) but more recently, PPP are being developed in other sectors like health. According to
the last report from DGTF (2010), the Portuguese PPP universe in the end of 2009, accounts
120 projects from which 96 are in the operating phase, 18 are in the investment / construction
phase and 6 are in the procurement phase.4 Concerning sectors, the bulk of PPP contracts are
in the transport sector. Similarly to previous years, PPP investments in the road sector lead,
accounting for 41% of the total investment through PPP in 2009. Besides the projects identified
below, several projects related to water supply and sewerage systems were awarded to private
entities by municipal authorities using the PPP model. Table 5.1 lists the major PPP projects
developed in Portugal, based on information from DGTF (2010) report.
Table 5.1: Major PPP projects in Portugal
PPP project Project phase Investment
EUR millions
Lusoponte (Vasco da Gama Bridge) completed / under operation 867
Real toll highways (5 concessions*) completed / under operation 4687
Shadow toll highways (7 concessions) completed / under operation 3211
Real toll highways (8 concessions**) under construction 3564
Real toll highway (Pinhal Interior) tender phase 958
Fertagus Suburban rail service completed / under operation 900
Metro Sul do Tejo tram system under operation 269
High speed railways (PPP1 and PPP2) tender phase 3296
First wave hospitals (Braga, Cascais, Loures) under construction 263
Hospitals (V.F.Xira,Lisboa Oriental, Algarve) tender phase 1622
Emergency and Security - SIRESP under investment 112
Legend: (*) - Norte, Oeste, Brisa, Litoral Centro, Grande Lisboa. (**) - Douro Litoral, AE Transmontana,
Douro Interior, Tunel do Marão, Baixo Tejo, Baixo Alentejo, Litoral Oeste, Algarve Litoral.
Source: DGTF (2010), data referred to December 2009, expressed in current EUR millions
PPP projects projected for the future include the new Lisbon airport, high speed railway links
(TGV), as a part of the EU-TENS,5 the third bridge over the Tagus river and several other
road concession projects. The new Lisbon airport, the TGV and the third bridge in Lisbon are
vast and interrelated projects that will benefit from EU funding which could cover a significant
proportion of the projects’ costs.
4In these numbers are included data on port authorities that adopt the concession regime - 32 projects under
operation.
5The concept of Trans-European Networks (EU-TENS) emerged in conjunction with the idea of a Single
Market. The goal is to develop modern and efficient infrastructure, linking the various regions of Europe, as a
way to promote the freedom of movements inducing economic growth and more employment.
CHAPTER 5. THE PPP PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE 81
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the current crisis in Portugal, all these projects are on hold
and perspectives for the near future do not show a promising picture for new PPP projects. In
face of the difficult conditions internally, Portugal may explore the window of opportunity pro-
vided by some African countries and Brazil, with their potential markets, enjoying the historical
links with these countries. In this respect, the Government Resolution 196/2005, about the co-
operation policy between Portugal and the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, states that
PPP are one of the privileged forms to promote foreign direct investment in those countries.
Typically, risks are higher in developing countries, but at the same time, higher risk usually
implies higher profitability and Portugal can benefit from the past experience based on long-
standing relationships.
Today, more than ever, the choice of the PPP route to develop infrastructure projects is a con-
troversial issue. A great debate started in Portugal, given the heavy cost of these investments,
the actual Portuguese budgetary situation and the potential impact on future generations of
PPP expenditures. At this purpose, it is worth to mention that apparently, PPP choice is seen
by the public opinion as promising or undesirable according to the phase of economic cycle.6
We argue that an objective assessment should be made for each project with the pros and cons
properly evaluated, in an impartial way and free from ideological considerations.
Next, in this section, we conduct a case study research, using mostly qualitative data collected
from documentation review, particularly from the analysis of the Tribunal de Contas reports
and from the Ministry of Finance reports, given the lack of information from another sources.
This approach is similar to that used in studies conducted about the PFI experience in the
UK, where reports from the National Audit Office (NAO) and from the Treasury (HMT) were
used as a fundamental source of information (see Grimsey and Lewis, 2007; Leahy, 2005; Nisar,
2007). An advantage is that, usually, the use of official documents enhance the validity and
reliability of the information.
Case studies are appropriate when the goal is to examine contemporary phenomena within a
real-life context, to gain detailed knowledge of a complex issue (Yin, 2009). In qualitative re-
search the selection of the cases is purposeful rather than random and is done with the aim of
providing an in-depth understanding of the problem under investigation. “Qualitative sampling
6Since the late nineties and for several years, Portugal witnessed a boom in PPP projects, reaching now a
situation in which, any new project is regarded with distrust and sentenced to fail from the start. For that
contributing some of the problems detected in former PPP projects.
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is about appropriateness, purpose and access to good information rather than representative and
random/probability sampling as with quantitative studies” (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 2010).
For our study, we choose PPP projects which are those representative of the Portuguese expe-
rience and have the potential to provide usefully insights about the degree of success achieved
with PPP. The analysis is focused on four PPP developed in the transport sector, given their
relevance in terms of the amounts involved, and we include a fifth case, to mention the pro-
gramme of PPP in the health sector, although the youth of the projects prevent us from drawing
conclusions about the performance of PPP in this sector. Therefore, we focus our analysis in
the following PPP:
1. The Lusoponte concession
2. The programme of SCUT concessions
3. The Fertagus concession
4. The Metro Sul do Tejo concession
5. The PPP programme in the health sector
Choosing this qualitative approach, several limitations should be emphasized from the begin-
ning. First, the case studies analyzed are limited in number, therefore the study is limited
in scope. Second, generalizations are not possible, and recommendations from the comparison
among case studies are limited to the examples used. Third, we based our analysis only on
documentation review, although, mostly official documents. Using these descriptive cases, the
goal is to investigate success factors and the main challenges for each project.
A project’s success is something very difficult to measure. In the words of Pinto and Slevin
(1988), “there are few topics in the field of project management that are so frequently discussed
and yet so rarely agreed upon as the notion of project success”. A simplistic approach to be
used is to measure success as the accomplishment of the budget and time goals, established on
the project plan, and achieving an acceptable level of performance. However, these measures
provide only a partial picture and results may be misleading.
In general, PPP deliver projects on-time and on-budget, in what concerns the construction
phase. If we move to the operational phase, evidence is mixed concerning performance levels
and for some projects, it is still early to make an objective assessment. Next sections develop
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each project. For each PPP, a brief history is presented followed by information about the
construction and operational phase and in the end, the main challenges and problems are ad-
dressed. Specifically focusing the issue of performance in the operational phase, a method to
measure the relative efficiency of the SCUT concessions is developed, based on Data Envelop-
ment Analysis. This method can be extended to include other projects in the transport sector,
but the unavailability of data prevent us from performing a more exhaustive analysis. This
issue is further explored in Section 5.3.
5.2.1 Case study 1 – Lusoponte concession
History and background
To build a much needed second bridge over the Tagus river in Lisbon as a solution to the traffic
congestion on the 25 de Abril bridge and in order to promote the economic development of
the south bank of the river, the Portuguese State awarded a concession in 1994 to the private
partner, Lusoponte, a consortium of Portuguese, British and French companies.
The concession contract celebrated between the State and Lusoponte had fundamentally the
purpose of construction, operation and maintenance of the Vasco da Gama bridge and, as well,
the operation and maintenance (partly) of the 25 de Abril bridge. The project was financed
using a Project Finance (PF) scheme, in a Design - Build - Finance - Operate (DBFO) con-
tract. Typically, as any concession agreement, at the end of the contract, the assets will revert
to the public sector, free of charge. The associated risks of traffic, construction, financing and
operation were responsibilities of the private consortium.
In order to attract private partners to this project, the government had decided to include in
the concession agreement, the operation and maintenance of the 25 de Abril bridge. This in-
clusion had the clear purpose of mitigate the traffic risks of the overall project and in addition,
to allow an effect of cross-subsidization, helping fund construction of the new bridge with the
tolls collected from the old. The term of the concession had a 33 year-old maximum period,
but that could end earlier, if two conditions were cumulatively verified: the integral payment of
the contracted loans and when the volume of accumulated traffic flow in both crossings (with a
beginning date of January, 1996) reaches 2.250 million vehicles.
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The initial concession model was a typical PF, in the sense that the only source for debt repay-
ment and reward all the investors were the cash-flows of the project (the tolls collected in both
bridges). No direct payments to the concessionaire by the government, as compensations, were
initially planned.
Construction phase
The Vasco da Gama bridge had a construction period from February, 1995 to March, 1998. This
project was completed in a very tight schedule in order to allow for easy access to Expo’98, the
Lisbon World Exhibition. Concerning costs, the initial project had a total value of 897 million
Euros financed from the following sources: European Union Cohesion Fund - 319 million Euros
(35%) and not reimbursable; EIB loan - 299 million Euros (33%); toll revenues from the 25 de
Abril bridge - 50 million Euros (6%) and others sources, including sponsor’s equity and State
subsidies - 229 million Euros (26%).7 Of the project’s total cost, about 644 million Euros were
for construction, being the remainder, for maintenance costs of both crossings, payment of ex-
propriated land, re-housing and environmental projects. The construction phase was finished
on time and according to the forecasted budget.
Operational phase
In a study about the competitive advantage, Lemos et al. (2003) mention that the case of
Lusoponte may be considered as a successful project, where all stakeholders ranging from the
shareholders to the users have expressed satisfaction with the project’s quality of service. The
conclusion is derived from the following facts: (i) from the beginning of the project, an Internal
Construction Quality Control Program was implemented allowing the construction phase to end
on budget and on time and at the same time, ensuring safety - the continuous cross checking of
three entities contribute to this achievement; (ii) in the operational phase, this program evolved
to a full quality certification for the company according to ISO 2000; (iii) finally, both partners,
public and private, had a focus on the client needs. On one hand, Lusoponte main concern
was to reduce traffic congestion and accidents in the 25 de Abril bridge, increasing the clients
satisfaction and reducing the associated costs with accidents, yet in the Vasco da Gama bridge,
the goal was to increase safety;8 on the other hand, the public sector had taken measures to
meet the clients requirements and for that, also incurred in additional and significative costs.
7Available at http://www.lusoponte.pt/ accessed on September 16, 2010.
8The two bridges have different characteristics therefore the main concerns regarding the users are also diffe-
rent.
CHAPTER 5. THE PPP PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE 85
Additional issues
As mentioned in Tribunal de Contas (2007), if unilateral modifications of the initial contract
required by the government compromise the profitability of the concessionaire (through sig-
nificative cost increase or loss of revenue), then the concessionaire had the right to request
the restoration of the financial balance. This could be made within the following possibilities:
extension of the contract period, extraordinary increase of tolls, the allocation of financial com-
pensation directly by the government and a combination of the foregoing or otherwise agreed
by the parties.
In the Lusoponte concession, initially, the tolls for each crossing were to be equalized, not taken
into account their distinctive attributes and the type of clients each bridge serves. As a re-
sult, social disturbance emerged, forcing the government to abandon this requirement for the
25 de Abril bridge. In addition, for that crossing, the initial concession model did not foresee
the introduction of a system of discounts for frequent users and the exemption of tolls during
the month of August. Therefore the government had to agree on six compensation packages,
required to restore the financial equilibrium of the concessionaire, in relation to the Base Case,
to cover losses of revenue resulting from the policy of freezing the toll rates in the 25 de Abril
bridge and from the commercial policy followed.
It should be noted that inversely of what happens in the majority of the transport PPP in-
volving traffic projections, for this project, the projections were pessimistic. The explanation
derives from the fact that the construction of the Vasco da Gama bridge was expected to have
a substitution effect on the traffic that usually uses the old bridge. But, because each bridge
serves a distinct type of users and therefore, provides a different service, this substitution effect
did not materialize. For instance, in 1998 when the new bridge started its operations, the real
traffic exceeded the forecasted in approximately 3.6 million vehicles.
Although, the facts that give rise to losses of revenue in the old bridge (freezing of tolls, dis-
counts for frequent users, exemption of tolls in August), were considered in the new financial
agreements, it was verified that the real traffic (being superior to what was expected) had al-
lowed the private partner to benefit from additional revenues and this feature was not properly
considered in the agreements. As emphasized by Tribunal de Contas (2005c), the variable of
real traffic should have been used as a clawback mechanism, allowing the public sector to share
the additional gains obtained by the private consortium. This solution could have been imple-
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mented through the adoption of a system of traffic bands, correcting the amount to be paid to
the private partner.
In 2001, the Portuguese State and Lusoponte signed the Global Financial Rebalance Agreement,
where the main changes on the concession model are the following, according to Tribunal de
Contas (2005c): the concession period is fixed in 35 years, regardless of the volume of traffic in
the two crossings; the assumption of the differentiation principle of the toll rates and commercial
policies to be applied in the two crossings; no obligation of the private consortium to contribute
to the maintenance costs of the 25 de Abril bridge; settlement of new financial conditions, that
lead to a rise on the financial costs (the State agreed to pay biannually until 2019, a direct
compensation to the concessionaire, reaching a global value of 306.22 million Euros).
As a final note, it should be emphasized that the expenditure of public money involved in the
Lusoponte concession amounts to almost 708 million Euros, of which about 408.4 million Euros
(more than half of the public charge) correspond to direct payments, as compensations, to the
private partner, to cope with the unilateral modifications of the initial agreements imposed by
the government. The remaining of 300 million Euros were subsidies and contributions from the
EU. More details on the Lusoponte concession can be found in Lemos et al. (2003, 2004) and
Tribunal de Contas (2000, 2005c, 2007). A summary is presented below.





Duration: Until a maximum of 30 years / changed to 35 years
Goal: Construction / operation and maintenance of the Vasco da Gama
bridge and maintenance of the 25th April bridge
CAPEX: 897.836 million Euros
Financial arrangements: Project Finance
PPP Strengths: • On-time and on-budget construction;
• Vasco da Gama bridge is considered one of the biggest and most
successful engineering projects in Portugal over the last century,
having received international awards;
• Important infrastructure asset, providing an alternative to
the south traffic
PPP Weaknesses: Change of the initial status of a free-standing project
to a subsidized project, increasing the State burden
Supervision: InIR
Legend: CAPEX - capital expenditures (source: http://www.dgtf.pt accessed on April 15, 2011)
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5.2.2 Case study 2 – SCUT concessions
History and background
In Portugal, the construction, operation and maintenance of highway networks have been sys-
tematically outsourced to private entities. Concessionaires were selected through public ten-
dering for construction and operation. Typically the concession period is 30 years, after which
the concessionaire’s rights and operation of the infrastructure asset terminate, being the asset
transferred back to the State. In terms of extension, in December 2010, the Portuguese highway
network encompasses 2737 Km from which, 72% are operated on a real toll scheme, 23% in a
SCUT regime and only 5%, are not subject to tolls.9
The programme of SCUT highways, Portuguese acronym meaning “without charge to the user”,
was started by the Portuguese government in 1997. These highways are subject to a shadow toll
scheme, whereby the government substitutes the final users, making volume-based payments to
the concessionaires. The concession model followed is basically a DBFO agreement, with an un-
derlying PF scheme. The particular characteristic is therefore, that the cash flows of the project
are paid by the State, providing an apparently free service to users of these roads. Nevertheless,
this does not correspond to the reality, as are the taxpayers which ultimately finance the SCUT
projects over the 30-year concession period. The rent paid by the State should compensate the
concessionaires from the operational and financial costs and also provide a remuneration to the
shareholders’ capital.
Payments to the concessionaires are computed based on the actual traffic and through a system
of traffic bands, to mitigate revenue risk. For low traffic volume, the government payment to
the concessionaire, guarantees coverage of basic costs for operation / maintenance and debt ser-
vice for senior loans. In the second traffic band, debt service for subordinated loans is ensured
and finally, profit margins on the sponsor’s equity is only paid after the third traffic band is
reached. In addition, the government pays lower rates when the traffic volume is higher and
the inverse is also true, supporting higher rates for low volumes of traffic. This feature reduces
the overall exposure of the project to demand risk. In addition, there is a system of incentives
and penalties, which is based on the accident rate and on the roads availability.
Recently, affordability issues concerning the SCUT programme were raised, given the significant
cost pressure that it impose on the State Budget. As a consequence, three of the SCUT
9http://www.inir.pt/portal/ accessed on June 1, 2011.
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concessions (Costa da Prata, Grande Porto, Norte Litoral) changed their status to real toll
highways, in October 2010. The idea is to end with the shadow toll regime in a near future.
Based on information from Tribunal de Contas (2003) and DGTF (2009), Table 5.3 presents a
brief summary of the SCUT projects.
Table 5.3: SCUT projects
SCUT project Concession Extension Investment Financial
year (KM*) (EUR millions**) Structure ***
Beira Interior 1999 177.5 628.3 Debt 90.6%; Equity 9,4%
Interior Norte 2000 156.4 504.1 Debt 98%; Equity 2%
Algarve 2000 130.2 228.5 Debt 83%; Equity 17%
Costa da Prata 2000 104.5 320.7 Debt 91%; Equity 9%
Norte Litoral 2001 113.3 318.6 Debt 73%; Equity 24%
Beiras Litoral e Alta 2001 172.6 718.4 Debt 91%; Equity 9%
Grande Porto 2002 54.7 492.5 not available
Legend: (*)- Source: InIR; (**) - Source: DGTF (2010), referred to December 2009, expressed in current
EUR millions (***) Debt: exclusively loans from EIB and other syndicated loans from commercial banks.
Source: Sarmento (2010)
Construction phase
Some SCUT projects have experienced cost overruns and delays, mostly related to environmen-
tal licensing and with unilateral changes imposed by the public authority. These are also the
main reasons leading to contracts’ renegotiations and compensation claims. The majority of the
projects’ problems during the construction phase were a State responsibility. As summarized
in Tribunal de Contas (2007), a large number of the SCUT contracts have been renegotiated as
a way to compensate the concessionaires for risks assumed by the government or for unilateral
changes imposed. In essence, renegotiations were a consequence of changes imposed by the
government, for political reasons or due to pressures of local authorities, of delays in obtaining
environmental approvals, or related to expropriation processes.
Operational phase
The improvement of the national road network has contributed to increase safety. Portugal is
the European country that has had the major decrease in the number of deaths per thousand
highway miles. The number of fatal road accidents in Portugal is steadily decreasing from 265
per million inhabitants in 1990 to 147 in 2003 (-44.5%).10 Other positive aspects are the reduc-
tion of transport costs and especially, of the travel time.
10http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/evasltrat tran/portugal.pdf, accessed
on May 20, 2011.
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More precisely, about the SCUT concessions, given the complexity and financial dimension of
these arrangements, an adequate system of monitoring appears like a critical necessity, with
specialized human resources and in number enough, to follow an evaluation program adapted
to each phase of the concession and established from the outset. However, according to Tri-
bunal de Contas (2003), insufficient human resources, lacking technical skills and coordination
problems between all the entities which are responsible for the supervision of these concessions,
contributed to a deficient monitoring program in the initial operational phase of the projects.
With the establishment in 2007 of InIR, the supervision and regulatory authority for the road
sector, reports are being regularly published on traffic levels and on users’ claims.
Nevertheless, reports on the global operational performance of each private concessionaire are
still lacking, or if they exist, they are not available to the public. In this respect, a model to as-
certain the relative operational performance of each SCUT concession is proposed in Section 5.3.
Additional issues
According to Tribunal de Contas (2008a, 2007), government’s payments – compensations, con-
tributions and rents – to all the road concessionaires, using real tolls or shadow tolls, had
amounted to 1077 million Euros, until June 2007. From this value, about 867 million Euros
correspond to costs with the SCUT concessions, leading to a considerable pressure on the State
Budget. In addition, if we consider all the SCUT projects’ life, the government expenditure
will reach a value near 15560 million Euros (Tribunal de Contas, 2008a).
It is now generally accepted that the affordability assessment was not correctly performed in the
planning stage of these partnerships, creating a burden on future generations. As highlighted
by Monteiro (2007), the programme of SCUT concessions had not been adequately addressed
in budgetary terms, a long term perspective was missing and as a consequence, fiscal problems
were created. In the same line, reinforcing this idea, Sarmento (2010) proposed a financial
analysis of the SCUT concessions, using the PSC. The author compares the Net Present Value
(NPV) of the PPP payments and corporate taxes revenues versus the cost of doing the project
under traditional public procurement. The results confirm that the choice of PPP in the initial
conditions did not add VfM to the public sector. Traditional procurement would have resulted
in much less costs (less two or three billion Euros, depending on the discount rate), even when
considering that public sector tends to be less efficient.
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As a partial solution to this problem, the government decided to replace shadow tolls by real
tolls in all SCUT projects. Nevertheless this solution is not fully adopted yet, and only three
concessionaires changed to real tolls in 2010, Costa da Prata, Grande Porto and Norte Litoral.
Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the preparation and launching of any of these partnerships
took place lacking a general legal framework for PPP, since it only appeared with the publication
of the Decree-Law 86/2003. This fact helps to explain some of the fragilities detected in former
PPP arrangements, as mentioned in Monteiro (2007) and in the Decree-Law 141/2006 preamble.
More details on the SCUT concessions can be found in Sarmento (2010) or Tribunal de Contas
(2003, 2005c,b, 2007, 2008a). A summary of the previous exposition is presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Identification Card - SCUT programme
SUMMARY
Identification: SCUT programme (Algarve, Beira Interior, Beiras Litoral e Alta,
Costa da Prata, Grande Porto, Interior Norte and Norte Litoral)
Concession year: 1999 - 2002
Contract type: DBFO
Duration: 30 years
Goal: Construction and operation of near 910 Km of the national road network
CAPEX: 4748.76 million Euros
Financial arrangements: Shadow toll regime - the State substitutes the users paying tariff payments
to the concessionaires based on the actual traffic
(measured in a system of traffic bands)
PPP Strengths: • Improvement of the road national system;
•Reduction of the accidents rate and of the travel time
PPP Weaknesses: • Large delays associated with the absence of environmental approvals;
• A clear definition of the projects’ objectives was missing,
leading to subsequent unilateral changes, by the government;
• No careful initial appraisal, neither the development
of a PSC, for each project, leading to affordability problems
Supervision: InIR
Legend: CAPEX - capital expenditures (source: http://www.dgtf.pt accessed on April 15, 2011)
5.2.3 Case study 3 – Fertagus concession
History and background
In June 1999 the Portuguese State granted a concession to Fertagus, a private consortium en-
titled of running the railway link between the two sides of the river Tagus in Lisbon. This
concession has been attributed for the suburban transport of passengers during a period of 30
years, with the possibility of being renewable. The decision to make a PPP only to the opera-
tional phase of the railway was made because the State had supported almost half of the rail
infrastructure cost, that amounted to near 500 million Euros, of which about 260 million Euros
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were covered by the EU Cohesion Fund. Therefore, the solution adopted was that all the railway
infrastructure was a State responsibility and only the operations of the North - South link were
attributed to a private entity. Following this option, two different international tenders were
developed: one to obtain the rolling material by CP - Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses and the
other, to the operational phase of the project.
Concerning this last tender, from the three proposals presented, Fertagus was selected being
the most advantageous proposal, according to the evaluation committee. The estimated pri-
vate cost of the project had reached 127,4 million Euros, from which 103,5 million Euros were
provided by a bank syndicate with a tenor of 20 years and with the remainder, as equity (23,9
million Euros). From here resulting a high leverage ratio, typical to this kind of deals.
The initial model of this PPP was based on a system of traffic bands, which was the main
reference to the risk sharing mechanism between the public and the private partner. The mech-
anism used to mitigate demand risk is basically a government guarantee to the private partner
and usually works as follows: if the revenue falls below the lower band, the government pays
the concessionaire the difference between the revenues guaranteed and collected and, similarly,
if the revenue is above the upper band, the concessionaire pays the government the difference
between the collected and guaranteed revenue.
In the particular case of the Fertagus concession, the concessionaire has to pay an operational
tariff to REFER – Rede Ferroviária Nacional, which includes the rent of stations, an occupation
tariff for the use of railway complexes (parking, repairing and maintenance of rolling stock) and
the infrastructure use. But these payments are only due whenever traffic volume exceeds mini-
mum defined levels. If such levels are not met, which has been the case, the State substitutes
the concessionaire in its payment obligation.
Although, initially the project was expected to be financially self-sustainable using PF tech-
niques, and the State financial support only foreseeable in a scenario of low demand, the oper-
ational phase has showed that the forecasts of demand were over-optimistic. Thus, the traffic
volume never reached the lower limit of the lower band defined, throughout all the first years of
operations and as a result, in January 2001 the concessionaire required a renegotiation of the
original contract.
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According to DGTF (2010) this trend suffered a reversion in 2007, from this year onwards the
railway link faces high levels of demand exceeding the initial estimates. In these situations, the
concessionaire pays to the State the surplus on the revenue earned over the initial projections
of demand. Nevertheless, this does not translate into “real” payments to the State, but con-
tributes to a minor financial effort in the public sector side.
Operational phase
Based on information from Tribunal de Contas (2002, 2005a), we may conclude that the Ferta-
gus concession is a notable example of good performance, delivering services with high standards
of reliability and quality. In general, it is emphasized the good performance in terms of quality
of service, measured with regard to punctuality, comfort and security. Moreover, the results
of surveys applied to users, made by a specialized company, have revealed high levels of satis-
faction. Between 2000 and 2004, on a scale of 1 to 5, the Global Index of Satisfaction always
varied between 4.2 and 4.4, with no attributes having a negative rating. Only in the beginning
of the operations, some complaints appeared concerning the number and quality of the related
transport services which provide links to the train stations, particularly in the southern shore
of the Tagus river.
In the same line, reinforcing the Fertagus good quality of service, the reports from INTF11
which had the task of verify the service levels and evaluate the strict compliance of the con-
cessionaire with the contract terms - particularly focusing on the quality parameters - points
out the good results presented. These reports of reliability and punctuality prepared by the
INTF provide the basis from which incentives and penalties are computed and then applied to
the concessionaire. Finally, in July 2007, Fertagus was the first Portuguese railway operator to
receive the “Certificate in Railway Security”. It was a consequence of the Integrated System for
Quality and Security implemented in Fertagus, meeting all the requirements of EU legislation.
Additional issues
According to Tribunal de Contas (2007), the State cost involved with the “deficit” of real traffic
when compared with the initial traffic projections, reached 55 million Euros. In addition, State
costs with advisors involved in the renegotiation of the original contract, were greater than 1.1
million Euros and the government’s spending with the new concession contract, signed in 2005,
11Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferroviário that was the former regulatory railway entity and has been
recently changed to IMTT - Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terrestres, more specifically to its URF -
Unidade de regulação ferroviária.
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should reach 57.6 million Euros. Furthermore, under the new contract, a leasing operation
involving the rolling stock acquisition by the State will amount to approximately 86 million
Euros. Nevertheless, the new agreement is more balanced concerning the risk sharing mech-
anisms and more transparent in the responsibilities’ allocation. Some of the positive aspects
to be emphasized are the following: abandonment of the system of traffic bands and the full
assumption of the demand risk by the concessionaire, more realistic traffic projections, sharing
of additional revenue gains, reduction of the concession period, revenues from non-core activi-
ties of the concessionaire will also be considered for future agreements on the financial balance,
penalties were increased to deal with possible flaws or defective performance of contractual
obligations. More details on the Fertagus concession can be found in Tribunal de Contas (2002,
2005a,c, 2007). Table 5.5 illustrates the key points.




Contract type: Operational phase
Duration: 11 years (renewable)
Goal: Operation of the railway link North - South
Investment cost*: 900 million Euros
Financial arrangements: Project Finance
PPP Strengths: • Good performance in terms of quality of service
(punctuality, comfort and security);
• High satisfaction levels by users;
• Positive aspects on the environment (fewer carbon
emissions and indirectly, reducing traffic congestions)
PPP Weaknesses: • Over - optimistic traffic projections in the initial phase;
• Change of the initial status of a free-standing project
to a subsidized project, increasing the State burden
Supervision: URF / IMTT
*http://www.dgtf.pt accessed on April 15, 2011
5.2.4 Case study 4 – Metro Sul do Tejo concession
History and background
Metro Sul do Tejo - MST is a light (above-ground) rail transit system operating in the south
bank of the Tagus river. The 30-year concession was awarded to the private consortium MTS
- Metro Transportes do Sul, in 2002, headed by the Grupo Barraqueiro and also including the
companies Teixeira Duarte SA, Mota-Engil SGB, Sopol SA, Siemens SA, Siemens AG and
MECI SA, as important shareholders.
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The concession assumes a DBFO model for the design, construction, supply of equipment and
rolling stock, operation, maintenance and upgrade of the entire MST network. The concession
period started on July 2002, with a 3-year period for the construction phase, followed by 27
years of commercial operations. The concession agreement includes the construction of the
Long Duration Infrastructures (LDI) and all the works necessary for urban rehabilitation. The
MST network is projected on three phases. The first phase, in the municipalities of Almada
and Seixal, consists of 3 lines with 13.5 kilometers, linking Corroios to Cova da Piedade, Cova
da Piedade to Universidade, and Cacilhas to Cova da Piedade. The construction period of the
first phase is not ended yet, although some lines are already operating (the inauguration date
was on May, 2007). The project includes two additional phases, where the rail system will be
extended to the municipalities of Barreiro and Moita.
The first phase of the project development was financed through a State component for the
acquisition of lands, rails, stations and other project facilities, that amounts to 265 million
Euros, provided either by national (72%) and EU funding (28%). The private partner took
the responsibility for financing the rolling material and the ticketing systems, reaching a value
near to 55 million Euros. In this contract, private partner revenues include, besides the State
reimbursement of the investment on LDI and operating subsidies to cover traffic deficits, the
right to all the revenues from the concessionary services and from advertising in the shopping
and parking areas of the MST facilities.
Thus and according to Tribunal de Contas (2005c), the vital and distinctive feature of a conces-
sion, the assumption of operational risk by the concessionaire almost does not exist in this PPP
model, since the traffic risk is, in practice, transferred back to the public partner. The MST
concession contract represents a model of PPP not self-sustainable from a financial standpoint,
since its feasibility depends entirely of a government guarantee, which leads the State to bear
the costs in case of low volume of traffic. More specifically and similarly to the Fertagus project,
traffic risk is handled through a system of bands, that virtually eliminates the concessionaire’s
exposure to demand risk – the State pays a subsidy to support the operational deficits if traffic
volume is in the lower band. Moreover, if the traffic volume does not reach the threshold of the
lower band in three consecutive years, then the concessionaire has the right to terminate the
contract, fact that occurring, will have severe financial consequences to the State.
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Construction phase
Initially it was expected to have the construction phase ended in 2005, but the project faced
several delays and cost overruns. The first problem was with the environmental impact licence.
Problems to obtain environmental approval, originated delays in construction and an extra cost
of 3,6 millions Euros. Another adverse factor was the unavailability of the municipal lands
required to the construction workplaces, that caused significant postponements to the sched-
uled work and therefore also, the State duty to compensate the concessionaire. All the works
were interrupted for at last 16 months and as a consequence, in December 2004, a monitoring
committee was formed, in order to renegotiate the concession contract with the MST, since it
was at a standstill, due to articulation problems with the local authorities.
These successive delays had serious consequences on the construction costs and on the com-
pensations required by the MST as indemnities for the late beginning of the commercial phase.
Several additional works and changes of the original contract terms were imposed by the public
sector, in order to satisfy some of the requirements of the Almada municipality and solve the
impasse created. Globally, these factors led to a set of claims reaching a total amount of nearly
68 million Euros requested by the MST - which was payed in 2009 - and to a global delay of
three years.
Operational phase
Concerning the operational phase, it is not possible to perform a global assessment about the
quality of the services provided, because the construction phase is still in execution and the
rail system is only operating partially. The first data available indicate that the number of
passengers is far from the goal of 28 millions passengers per year, but is increasing and has not
stabilized yet (it is around 600.000 passengers per month, from data available in May, 2009).
Concerning the users’ satisfaction, the balance seems to be positive, as it is, moreover, the bal-
ance in terms of reliability of the system - number of failures, efficiency and punctuality. Some
of the advantages pointed by the users are comfort, travel speed and it is an environmental
friendly system. The problems pointed are related with the lack of security and parking areas.
Additional issues
As reported in Tribunal de Contas (2007), the State cost will probably reach 300 million Euros,
with the construction of parking areas in the city of Almada being the largest share of the
additional costs. In a public sector perspective, it is essential to perform a cost-benefit analysis
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to all the claims of systematic “additional works” from the local authorities and populations,
avoiding that way, the negative impact that successive changes bring to the public accounts. An
additional factor increasing the uncertainty inherent to public sector future payments is that
the renegotiated contract involves the State compensation to the private partner as a result of
the “real” traffic and for that purpose, lack any forecasts for such charges.
According to Tribunal de Contas (2006), we may summarize the MST problems with the fol-
lowing causes: first, the multiplicity of agents in the public sector side concerning project
negotiations, involving three successive governments; second, deficient articulation between the
different entities involved in the project; third, the absence of a legal framework for PPP when
the initial contract was settled and finally, the conduct of local authorities that tried to obtain
additional benefits affecting the normal project development. More details on the MST con-
cession can be found in Tribunal de Contas (2005c, 2006). As a summary, Table 5.6 shows the
main characteristics of the MST concession.
Table 5.6: Identification Card - Metro Sul do Tejo concession
SUMMARY




Goal: Design, construction, supply of equipment and rolling stock,
operation, maintenance and upgrade of the entire MST network
CAPEX: 320,649 million Euros
Financial arrangements: State component, 265 million Euros for LDI and private financing
of 55 million Euros, for rolling material and ticketing systems.
The State pays a subsidy to cover traffic deficits (through a band system)
Private revenues include concessionary services and advertising.
PPP Strengths: • Good performance in terms of the quality of service,
• Positive aspects on the environment (fewer carbon
emissions and indirectly, reduction of traffic congestions)
PPP Weaknesses: • Several delays and cost overruns in the construction phase
due to additional works, environmental approvals,
and expropriation processes;
•Deficient articulation with the local authorities
Supervision: IMTT
Legend: CAPEX - capital expenditures (source: http://www.dgtf.pt accessed on April 15, 2011)
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5.2.5 Case study 5 – PPP in the health sector
History and background
The Portuguese government has widened its PPP activity to include the health sector, by
launching tenders for projects related to the construction, operation and maintenance of pub-
lic hospitals. The programme of the first wave hospitals was launched in 2001, including the
hospitals of Loures, Cascais, Braga, Sintra and Vila Franca de Xira. The PPP model used
was complex and innovative, implying two different partnerships: one responsible for the con-
struction and management of the hospital facilities, with a time horizon of 30 years and the
other, responsible for providing clinical services, for a much shorter period (usually 10 years).
Portugal was a pioneer in the introduction of this model, because although the UK already used
PPP in the health sector, their model encompasses only the component of the hospital building
(construction and operation / maintenance).
From the beginning it was clear that this kind of partnerships were far from easy to structure,
as the arrangement implies risks, responsibilities and payments involving two different conces-
sionaires, one providing the hospital accommodation for a long period and another providing
clinical services, with a much shorter time horizon. As already mentioned, core services in health
seem not to be a suitable sector for the PPP model, because this sector is characterized by a
high degree of uncertainty associated with the rapid advances in technology and in the medical
science. In situations of high complexity and uncertainty is difficult to define completely the
output specifications from the outset, a pre-requisite for the PPP contracts.
In 2002, it was announced the second wave of PPP hospitals, with 5 hospitals: Algarve, Évora,
Guarda, Póvoa do Varzim / Vila do Conde and Vila Nova de Gaia, to replace the existing
ones. A salient feature of these PPP is that they envisage the private partner only to manage
hospital facilities, adopting the UK model. As mentioned in Monteiro (2005), with this ex-
tensive programme of 10 hospitals, an annual payment of around 0.5 percent of the GDP was
initially predicted. At the same time, because these hospitals are expected to be more efficient
and replace spending on old hospitals, they could help restrain public expenditures within the
public health care service (Serviço Nacional de Saúde). Figure 5.3 illustrates the PPP health
programme.
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Figure 5.3: PPP programme in health
Source: Simões (2004)
Without international references and because it had been the first Portuguese experience in
the health sector, this programme faced several challenges. First, delays in tender procedures,
mainly in the bids assessment, which lasted between 11 to 23 months, when the initial fore-
casted period was only 5 months. Second, an excessive bureaucratic charge with some rigidity
in contractual specifications. Third, the tender for the Sintra hospital was canceled and in the
case of Loures, the State extinguished the first tender. Four years later, a new tender procedure
was launched for the same project but with a reduced private sector interest, lacking an effec-
tive competition. Several rules exist to sustain bidders interest. For instance, efforts to keep
bidding costs low, production of clear bidding requirements and a reasonable schedule for all
the process. The Portuguese health programme failed in all these aspects. In addition, costs
with advisors to develop the health programme achieved the value of 20 million Euros. But
also the positive aspects of the programme should be mentioned – the health PPP programme
was the first to use systematically the PSC (Moreno, 2010).
From the first PPP programme in health, the Cascais hospital started its operations in 2010,
but Braga and Loures are still in the construction phase, and Vila Franca de Xira in the tender
phase. According to DGTF (2010), two second wave hospitals namely, Lisboa Oriental and
Central do Algarve are in the tender phase. More details on the PPP programme in the health
sector can be found in Simões (2004) and Tribunal de Contas (2009b).
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5.3 A relative assessment of the SCUT operational performance
Performance and efficiency are difficult to measure. In this section, Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) is described as a potential tool to access the relative performance of homogeneous units
and a practical application is developed using data on the SCUT projects.
DEA is a non-parametric approach based on the idea of technical efficiency, measured by the
ratio of output to input. It allows the identification of the efficient and inefficient units in a
comparison of each unit with its peers (within the group). This programming technique was
developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and since then it has been used to assess efficiency in areas
such as health, prisons, courts, schools and universities and more recently, transit and even
banking.
Following closely the exposition of Santos and Dul (2000), in DEA, efficiency (hj) of a specific
decision making unit (DMUj) is defined by the ratio of the weighted sum of its N outputs (ynj)






where, xmj is the mth input; ynj is the nth output; vnj and umj are the weights chosen for
each DMUj , in order to maximize its efficiency hj . Several restrictions should be added to
the maximization problem: first, weights must be strictly positive; second, for scaling purposes
efficiencies must not exceed 1 or 100%, and finally, to avoid an infinite number of possible
solutions the denominator of the previous equation, must be 1 or 100%. As a summary, the












≤ 1, for j = 1, ..., J (5.4)
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M∑
m=1
umjxmj = 1 (5.5)
The advantages of DEA include its ability to accommodate a multiplicity of inputs and out-
puts (that may be expressed in very different units) and no prior establishment of rules for the
weights are necessary. DEA compares the relative performance of each DMU with the “best”
performance. In addition, DEA allows constant returns to scale, as well as, decreasing and
increasing returns to scale.12
In contrast, several limitations may be pointed, namely, the results sensitiveness to the selection
of inputs and outputs, it is not possible to test for the best specification and the number of
efficient DMU on the frontier tends to increase with the number of inputs and outputs variables
(Berg, 2010). As a rule of thumb, usually is required that J > 3.(N + M), with J as the total
number of DMU.
Since 1992, when the first papers applying DEA to public transportation appeared, this tech-
nique has been increasingly popular for comparing transit organizations with each other. We
propose to apply DEA to compare the relative efficiency of each SCUT concession with its peers.
With this goal, next section details the models and variables used, Section 5.3.2 presents the
results obtained.
5.3.1 The model
The right choice of the inputs and outputs is critical for the DEA model and naturally some
connection between the input and output may exist. Following similar works on transport
systems (Barnum et al., 2007; Santos, 2008) and taking into account the data availability, the
following inputs and outputs were chosen, combined in two different models, to measure the
relative operational efficiency of the SCUT concessions, for the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010:
• OPEX/Km - is the amount of the operational expenses divided by the number of Kilo-
meters;
12Constant returns to scale implies that if we increase inputs by λ, outputs increases by that same proportional
change. If output increases by less than that proportional change, we have decreasing returns to scale and the
inverse, leads to increasing returns to scale.
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• DAT/KM - is the daily average traffic (in an annual basis) divided by the number of
Kilometers, as a proxy for the number of users;
• Satisfaction Index - measured by the inverse of the number of claims received.
Data were obtained for each SCUT concession and year, from Relatório de Reclamações 2010
(INIR, 2010) and from the Case Base of the SCUT concessions, also from InIR. We use the
estimated value of the operational costs drawn from the projects’ Case Base, because actual
values of the operational costs are not publicly available. Although it was not a very accurate
procedure limiting our results interpretation, the DEA analysis was developed in order to give
an idea of the scope and range of this method and providing useful insights about the relative
performance level. The first model purposed is the following:
Figure 5.4: DEA - Model 1
Because the data available is related to 7 concessions, and better results are provided when the
total number of DMU, at least, triplicate the number of variables, the model was re-estimated
using only one input and one output (Figure 5.5). Several other inputs and outputs may be
considered, for instance, capital expenditures (CAPEX) as an example of input or the accident
rate, as an output. But, the consequence of increasing the number of variables, is that the
optimization routine will put the majority of the DMU on the efficiency frontier, preventing a
proper analysis.
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Figure 5.5: DEA - Model 2
In both models constant returns to scale were assumed and an input orientation, meaning that
the models searched the minimization of inputs for the given level of outputs. The other pos-
sibility was to choose output orientation, where the goal is to maximize outputs maintaining
constant the level of inputs. In what concerns the SCUT projects or any other public transport
system, reduction of the operational costs assume particular relevance, justifying our choice.
5.3.2 Results
All the results were obtained using STATA 11 statistical software. For the first model, using one
input (OPEX/km) and two outputs (DAT/Km and Satisfaction index), the following results
are obtained.
Table 5.7: Efficiency level of the SCUT concessions - Model 1
Model 1 2008 2009 2010
Rank Efficiency Rank Efficiency Rank Efficiency
Norte Litoral 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000
Interior Norte 7 0.154 7 0.517 7 0.642
Grande Porto 4 0.788 4 0.863 4 0.855
Costa da Prata 3 0.923 3 0.991 3 0.992
Beiras Litoral e Alta 6 0.256 6 0.590 5 0.847
Beira Interior 1 1.000 5 0.751 6 0.696
Algarve 5 0.697 1 1.000 1 1.000
Taking into account the SCUT universe, the most efficient concession in all the years is the
Norte Litoral, achieving the score of 1 or 100% and the less efficient, is the Interior Norte, when
compared with “its peers”. Considering only one input, operational costs per Km, and one
output, the number of users per km, the results of Table 5.8 are obtained.
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Table 5.8: Efficiency level of the SCUT concessions - Model 2
Model 2 2008 2009 2010
Rank Efficiency Rank Efficiency Rank Efficiency
Norte Litoral 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000
Interior Norte 7 0.137 7 0.108 7 0.123
Grande Porto 3 0.788 3 0.863 3 0.855
Costa da Prata 2 0.923 2 0.991 2 0.992
Beiras Litoral e Alta 5 0.244 5 0.250 5 0.255
Beira Interior 6 0.192 6 0.198 6 0.206
Algarve 4 0.697 4 0.733 4 0.748
A consistent pattern is showed in the three years under analysis, the rank is the same across
years with some minor changes in the efficiency scores attributed to each SCUT. More efficiency
appears in the Norte Litoral, Costa da Prata and Grande Porto concessions, notably the ones
that change their status to real tolls highways in October, 2010. Less efficiency is exhibited by
the Interior Norte. A close analysis of the inputs and outputs highlights explanations for the
results provided by the DEA analysis.
Figure 5.6: Operational costs per KM
The operational costs are higher for the Grande Porto concession, they are twice the value of
the second more expensive concession in operational terms, Costa da Prata or Interior Norte,
depending on the year we choose to perform the analysis. But at the same time, Grande Porto
serves a larger pool of users, as the next figure shows.
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Figure 5.7: Users per KM
In respect to the number of claims, in general, 2009 records higher numbers (Figure 5.8). Costa
da Prata has the higher number of claims in this year (106). If we move to 2010, then the
highest level of claims is reached by the Norte Litoral concession. A more detailed analysis
reveals that Beira Interior has just one claim in 2008, what explains the efficiency score of
100% in 2008. This outlier observation has affected the results obtained by the DEA analysis.
Since DEA is an extreme point technique, outliers arising from potential measurement errors
can cause significant problems.
Figure 5.8: Number of claims
Using a particular ratio or indicator to access performance levels, may be misleading and inac-
curate. In addition, the choice of what ratio or indicator to use, may be a problem and usually
depends on the entity performing the analysis. DEA has the advantage of providing an overall
and objective measure of the relative efficiency of each DMU, among similar units. Our analysis
of the SCUT concessions, allow the identification of the Norte Litoral as the most efficient. But
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of particular concern should be the SCUT with the lowest scores, namely Interior Norte and
Beira Interior. A careful analysis of the underlying reasons for that scores should be developed,
in order to implement plans of action to improve the operational performance.
This empirical exercise showed a possibility to measure efficiency in the SCUT concessions (an
universe of seven PPP), but can be extended to include more road concessions, and even further
to different sectors, as long as, the availability of data will permit. Next section summarizes
the main conclusions about the Portuguese experience.
5.4 Main conclusions
The description of the five PPP projects and programmes stresses important key issues. Al-
though, it is worth to recall, that generalizations to the Portuguese PPP universe are not
possible and only conclusions about the particular projects under analysis could be drawn.
First, it is not possible to know whether these projects could have achieved these or better re-
sults using a different procurement route. Nevertheless, as noted by Tribunal de Contas (2009a),
several projects undertaken directly by the Portuguese government face important delays and
significant cost overruns. In a study of five projects, it was found that cost overruns vary from
25% and 295%, above the cost plan agreed at financial close, and face delays from 1,4 to 4,6
years.
Second, as a general perception and similarly to what happens in other European countries (for
instance, the United Kingdom), PPP seem to perform well in the construction phase compared
to traditional public procurement. Monteiro (2005) argues that the Portuguese history with
PPP shows their effectiveness in rapidly developing infrastructure assets and in improving the
quality of services. In general, PPP are perceived as providing effectiveness in the provision of
good-quality infrastructure and services. But efficiency is not always assured and affordability
is not guaranteed.
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From our previous analysis this idea is reinforced. The mentioned effectiveness comes at the
expenses of some public sector inability to deal in the long run with these partnerships. On
one hand, given the long tenor of such projects, long-term budgeting is necessary to correctly
evaluate the fiscal implications (affordability is a key concern) and on the other hand, it is es-
sential to manage the long term relationship between the public and the private partner, using
the appropriate level of monitoring and sanctioning and also, performing an in-depth analysis
of the costs and benefits to any changes of the original agreements. To accomplish this, it is
necessary to create specific institutions focused on PPP deals, in order to develop the necessary
expertise, know-how and to retain the long experience of Portugal with PPP. This aspect is
also systematically mentioned in Tribunal de Contas Reports and remains unsolved, see for
instance, Tribunal de Contas (2009b) when is mentioned that Portugal used an experimentalist
approach with all the health PPP programme. At this purpose, Moreno (2010) stresses that
although Portugal has some institutional structures to deal with PPP arrangements, a truly
PPP agency does not exist, with the capacity to cover all the Portuguese PPP universe.
Concerning the transport PPP projects under analysis, traffic risk mitigation is still a chal-
lenging aspect. As emphasized by Estache et al. (2007), particularly for transport projects,
forecasts of revenues, traffic and economic activity continue “to be overoptimistic, so that best
case scenarios often continue to be sold as Base Case scenarios, helping to justify the invest-
ment decisions”. Following this general trend, overoptimistic traffic projections were used in the
Fertagus and Metro Sul do Tejo concessions, being the Lusoponte a notable exception. There-
fore, payments to the concessionaires achieved higher levels than what was firstly envisaged.
For transport projects it is not possible to establish from the outset take-or-pay or fixed-price
contracts, differently to project financing in other sectors. As a result, demand risk is a critical
issue in all projects. Even with reasonable forecasts, demand can be severely affected by fac-
tors like competition from other transport modes, changing usage patterns and macroeconomic
conditions (e.g., fuel prices). Demand risk can be hedged through contracts with a flexible
duration or, as used in the Portuguese PPP model, through government guarantees implicit in
the definition of a system of traffic bands.
Several institutional improvements are being developed, particularly in the procurement process
with the development of a gateway process (explained below), the enhancement of competition
and making the PSC computation mandatory for all the projects, as a critical test to proceed
to the PPP route. In addition, an integrated information system to deal with PPP in all their
life cycle is under development. The main improvements are detailed next.
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• In the early days of PPP projects, Portugal does not had a system to control PPP com-
mitments creating, as a consequence, budgetary problems. More recently, Portugal devel-
oped an appropriate assessment methodology, mentioned in Monteiro (2007) as a gateway
process, allowing a more consistent approach to PPP appraisal and affordability. More
precisely, the Finance Minister has the power to stop or suspend a PPP project or pro-
gramme, if some conditions are not met and this is done at specific stages (the “gates”)
of preparing and negotiating the project. Typically, the approval or rejection by the Fi-
nance Minister is required at the end of the pre-procurement phase and at the end of
the procurement phase. Hence, the project only proceed in each stage, if the criteria of
efficiency and fiscal sustainability are met. In addition, for each possible renegotiation,
the Finance Minister has to approve the renegotiated contract. For more details on the
Portuguese gateway process, see Monteiro (2007).
• Competition is now ensured in PPP projects. The procurement phase involves an in-
ternational public tender, with procedures similar to those used in major public works,
including advertising obligations. It should be emphasized that the PSC is the limit value
for contracting, if all bids exceed this threshold, the government has the right to cancel
the call and as already mentioned, projects with only one bidder are cancelled.
• An information system is being developed by DGTF and Parpública, with the goal to col-
lect all the relevant information about the Portuguese PPP universe. This database will
constitute on a very short term, a valuable tool for studying and disseminating regular
information on this subject.
A positive aspect of PPP is that this form of procurement, typically, has high visibility when
compared with other procurement methods. A fundamental contribution to the enhancement of
all the PPP framework is given by the Tribunal de Contas Reports, ensuring more transparency
on projects contracted in PPP schemes with a higher disclosure of information, when compared
to other major projects undertaken directly by the State. Additionally, the high leverage levels
of the majority of PPP lead to a more careful project evaluation and risk assessment, particu-
larly from lenders.
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As a final note, recently governments and their PPP policies are in the “line of fire” of the
public opinion as a consequence of the deficit crisis. In this scenario, an objective perspective
must be adopted, far from ideological considerations. PPP exhibit several successful stories,
particularly when their choice is based on efficiency and effectiveness criteria, and not as a fiscal
instrument. While it is true that the option to structure a project under a PPP is appealing to
the government as a mechanism to alleviate it from some of its traditional tasks, it is equally
true that this option brings increased responsibilities and new challenges on the management
and control of such arrangements.
Apart from the Portuguese reality, which country factors foster PPP development? The answer
to this question is the gist of the next chapter.
Chapter 6
Determinants of PPP in
infrastructure
The main goal of this chapter is to perform an empirical analysis of the cross-country determi-
nants of agents participation and of investments in infrastructure Public Private Partnerships
(PPP) in developing countries. More specifically, the role of different risk dimensions is analyzed
and the risk reduction effect of the participation of Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) is
explored.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 discusses the background and justifications for
the empirical study proposed. Section 6.2 highlights the recent trends on infrastructure PPP
to developing countries. Section 6.3 presents the hypotheses to be tested and proxies used as
measures of different risk attributes. In Section 6.4, we discuss the methodology presenting the
econometric models. Section 6.5 is devoted to the data and variables. Section 6.6 shows the
results, comparing our findings with related studies. Finally, Section 6.7 presents a summary,
as well as, suggestions for further research.
6.1 Introduction and background
Good quality infrastructure assets and services are crucial for countries’ competitiveness, eco-
nomic growth and to improve the living standards of the population. Particularly for deve-
loping countries and transition economies, access to affordable infrastructure services, such as
electricity and drinking water, is an important determinant of the welfare level of a country’s
population. But in these countries, the infrastructure gap is more pronounced, with huge
infrastructure investment needs and lacking the necessary financial resources.
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It is widely recognized that much more investment will be needed in developing countries, to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), specifically, the goal of reducing poverty.1
In this respect, the private sector investment has a fundamental role to play, inducing economic
growth and poverty reduction. As mentioned before, the private sector involvement will bring
more funds, expertise and efficiency to the development of projects in several essential areas,
like energy, telecommunications, transport (roads, tunnels, bridges, railways, airports) and wa-
ter/sanitation.
One way of increasing the private participation in infrastructure projects is through PPP. These
partnerships are a worldwide phenomenon, spread in developed countries, but also in developing
ones. Nevertheless, the implementation of PPP in these countries is a challenging task, facing
several limitations. For instance, according to Pessoa (2006), many developing countries face
problems in adopting an adequate regulatory framework, have underdeveloped capital markets
and non-competitive industries and are dependent from investments made by a few of interna-
tional and large companies, resulting in a lack of negotiation power. Therefore, political, legal,
social, economic and financial risks may be even more important in developing countries than
in developed ones and the same conclusion seems to be evident about the participation of MDB
in PPP arrangements, for those countries.
As explained in Section 3.3, the participation of MDB in infrastructure projects plays a crucial
role, enabling fund raising, particularly from private agents, and acting like an additional guar-
antee for the viability of the project (mechanism of risk reduction and credit enhancement).
Concerning developing countries, these features are even more relevant. At this purpose, Sorge
and Gadanecz (2004) add, that some of the important benefits that arise from the special rela-
tionship between MDB and the host governments, include “the resolution of any problems that
might arise in the regulatory or policy environment and put a project in danger. It can also
ensure collateral protection in countries where the legal system is not very reliable”.
From the combination of developing countries risks with the risks that are inherent to infrastru-
cture investments we may conclude, at first glance, that such ventures were not appealing for
1The MDG were established in 2000, when leaders of countries from the entire world committed to devote
every effort in order to achieve eight development goals by 2015. They include reducing extreme poverty and
hunger, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, achieve universal primary education, fighting disease
epidemics and developing a global partnership for development (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium Development
Goals, accessed on February 19, 2010).
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private investors. But the reality shows another picture. Since the 1990’s there has been a huge
rise in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other types of investment in infrastructure, at a
global level, but also in developing and transition economies. According to Fay et al. (2010),
FDI flows to developing countries, related to infrastructure, accounted for about one-third of all
flows in the early 1990s. Ramamurti and Doh (2004) present the following explanations to this
exponential growth - the end of natural monopolies making regulation less needed, the prospect
of quick profits for first-movers and the use of Project Finance mechanisms to reduce the risks.
Another aspect mentioned by those authors is the adoption of favorable legal measures and the
end of outright expropriations, creating a new climate for FDI.
From all the previous exposition, some questions emerge concerning infrastructure PPP in de-
veloping countries: (1) Which risk is the more influential affecting the degree of private sector
participation in a PPP? (2) What country factors affect the probability of a MDB participation
in a PPP? (3) What are the main determinants of the number of PPP projects? (4) What are
the main drivers of the amount of PPP investments?
Next figure highlights the framework purposed for the empirical study, assessing the determi-
nants of infrastructure PPP in developing countries.
Figure 6.1: Empirical study framework
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The empirical study is developed of the cross-country determinants of private sector and MDB
participation in PPP, using data between 1990 and 2007, from the World Bank’s Private Partic-
ipation in Infrastructure Database (PPI), available at http://ppi.worldbank.org. The purpose
is to test empirically how different risk dimensions affect the agents’ participation. In addition,
to explore these issues further and ascertain the risk mitigant effect of MDB participation in
PPP arrangements, the same explanatory variables are tested to explain the total number of
PPP projects (per country/year); the number of PPP projects with MDB participation (per
country/year); the investment value of PPP projects (per country/year); and the financial sup-
port provided by MDB to PPP projects (per country/year).
While there have been some studies examining the determinants of FDI to developing countries
(see Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, 2005; Singh and Jun, 1995), or of
MDB flows (Neumayer, 2003), few empirical studies address the particular topic of infrastru-
cture projects. Related literature also includes the study of the risk reduction effect of the
participation of MDB on the credit spreads of infrastructure loans (Kleimeier and Megginson,
2000; Sorge and Gadanecz, 2004).
Particularly focusing on the number and investments’ value of PPP projects to developing coun-
tries, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical attempts are provided by Banerjee et al.
(2006) and Hammami et al. (2006). Both studies examine the effects of several institutional
variables on the number of projects and their value. Therefore, using these studies as a starting
point, we extend their work in several directions.
• First, only projects that share the main characteristics of PPP are considered and not,
the full database available. Projects that are management and lease contracts and full
privatizations are therefore excluded.2
• Second, more recent data is used, from 1990 to 2007, in the expectation that the use of
more recent data will add positively to the research;
• Third, new explanatory variables (indicators of the degree of social and financial develop-
ment of a country) are considered, as well as, new methodological approaches.
2This aspect was also emphasized by Pessoa (2008), mentioning that not all forms of private sector involvement
in public provision are PPP.
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Finally and not yet studied, as far as we know, the main contribution of the empirical study
is the identification of which risk factors are more relevant in determining the private sector
participation in infrastructure PPP, as well as, the MDB participation in such projects.
The goal is to test simultaneously a vast variety of variables, proxies for the different risk di-
mensions of a country, in an attempt to provide a more complete “picture” of the drivers of
infrastructure flows and of the participation of the different agents to developing / emerging
markets. Such an aggregate analysis is relevant because different risk dimensions interact with
each other. If we focus on a particular dimension, the results will be probably misleading and
inaccurate.
In a context of a worldwide financial crisis, these topics are gaining relevance and are of ma-
jor importance to all engaged in the PPP markets, particularly governments, private sector
investors, MDB and the population in general. Two controversial trends emerge, on one hand,
infrastructure investments are seen as a stimulus to economies given their effects on productivity
and linkages with other sectors (usually integrate “anti-crisis packages” promoted by govern-
ments), and on the other hand, increasing pressures exist on governments to reduce the fiscal
deficit, impairing spending on infrastructure. In addition, focusing emerging markets, interna-
tional banks are adopting a more conservative attitude, retreating to preserve capital. In this
scenario, MDB are being called to fill this financial gap and a more active role is now required,
creating more effective partnerships with the private sector.
Next section presents the recent trends in infrastructure PPP to developing countries, including
a brief reference to the effects of the recent financial crisis, although outside the time span of
our empirical analysis.
6.2 Trends in infrastructure PPP
Recent trends on infrastructure financial flows report that private investment (contrary to pub-
lic investment) is growing rapidly throughout the world, but especially in emerging markets
and developing countries. Some numbers and figures to illustrate this idea are given next (see
Fay et al., 2010; Forrester and Tillett, 1998; Ramamurti and Doh, 2004).
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As a general trend, private participation in infrastructure has increased steadily since the 1990s,
with a six-year hiatus as a result of the Asian crisis, recovering and reaching a peak in 2007.
According to the PPI Database, in the past the peak of the private infrastructure boom was
1997, thereafter a number of factors led to a reduction in the number and amount of projects,
namely, the financial crisis of 1997-98, the slowdown in economic activity, the bursting of the
dot-com and telecommunications bubbles and also, the fact that privatization was a one-time
phenomenon. More recently and after a downward trend from 1998 to 2003, private investment
in infrastructure projects increase from 2004 to 2007. Investments became more concentrated
in sectors like telecommunications and energy who lead the recovery, followed by transport with
investments stabilized over the last three years. The sector with a traditionally minor expres-
sion is still the water and sewerage sector (see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: Total PPP investments* per year and sector
* in current US$ millions
Source: Based on PPI Database
Geographically, after several years of the Latin America and the Caribbean dominance, from
1996 until 2002, investments from 2003 onwards, are more evenly spread across all developing
regions (see Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.3: Total PPP investments* per year and region
* in current US$ millions
Source: Based on PPI Database
Nevertheless, the balance between regions exhibited in the last figure, hide huge differences con-
cerning countries. The top six countries had accounted for about half of private infrastructure
flows in the last few years, reaching near 60% in 2008, as illustrated in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Geographical concentration of investments to infrastructure projects in 2008
Source: World Bank and PPIAF
The so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China, plus Mexico and Turkey, all
emerging economies, have concentrated investments over the last years. Izaguirre (2010) ex-
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plains that one of the consequences of the recent financial crisis, is that the number of projects
has shrunk although overall financial flows have remained relatively steady, but investments
were concentrated in these emerging countries. Moreover, if the BRIC countries, plus Turkey,
were excluded, investments would have fallen by 32% in 2009, comparing to 2008.
The total count of infrastructure PPP projects also raised from 2004 to 2007, accompanying
the investment values. Particularly about MDB participation in the total number of projects,
the rate of participation as oscillated between 26% in 1991 and 6% in 2004 and 2007, with an
average annual value of 13% during the period of 1990-2007 (see Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: Number of PPP projects
Source: Based on PPI Database
Distinguishing between MDB, the more active role is played by the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC) and by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), with a par-
ticipation in 176 (32% of the total count of projects with MDB participation) and 84 (15%
of the total) projects, respectively, from 1990 to 2007, as highlighted by Figure 6.6. The IFC
belongs to the World Bank Group and its main activity is to provide financial support (loans
and advisory services) to private sector in less developed countries. Yet MIGA, also a member
of the World Bank Group, has the main activity of providing guarantees to projects financially
and economically viable and that are consistent with the development objectives of the countries.
CHAPTER 6. DETERMINANTS OF PPP IN INFRASTRUCTURE 117
Figure 6.6: Number of PPP projects with MDB support
Source: Based on PPI Database
Although outside of the time span of the present empirical study, it should be mentioned that
the environment for PPP projects has been impacted by the recent financial crisis, particularly
through a selectivity effect, concerning the type of projects and countries where to invest, and
through more difficult and stringent financial conditions. As a result, some planned projects
are still being delayed, restructured, or, to a lesser extent, canceled. Albeit this environment,
global investment commitments to new PPP projects in developing countries exhibit a growth
trend, as it is possible to see in next figures 6.7 and 6.8.
Figure 6.7: Recent evolution on PPP flows* by sector
* in current US$ millions
Source: Based on PPI Database
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Among sectors, only energy had investment growth for all project sizes, thanks to the activity
in new power plants. Transport continues to be the sector most affected by the crisis. Ac-
cording to Izaguirre (2010), transport had the largest share of projects delayed, canceled, or at
risk of delay by the end of 2009. This is not surprising given the decline in global demand for
transport, which is a sector particularly correlated with economic activity, which slowed in 2009.
It should be emphasized that these investment levels are attributed to just a few economies.
Large projects developed in emerging countries like India and China, have boosted the totals,
the vast majority of developing countries remains affected by the crisis. If large projects (US$ 1
billion or more) were excluded, almost all developing regions would have seen investment decline
in 2009. Europe and Central Asia is the most affected region. South Asia was the exception,
thanks to the strong activity in India. Latin America was also an exception. There is also
evidence that new projects continue to be postponed and canceled because of the financial
crisis.
Figure 6.8: Recent evolution on PPP flows* by region
* in current US$ millions
Source: Based on PPI Database
In the same line of what was mentioned in Section 3.6, concerning the prospects for infrastru-
cture finance, the World Bank in its “September 2010 - PPI data update note 38” (World
Bank, 2010) presents more details about the recent trends on infrastructure PPP. A summary
is presented below:
• Investment in new projects fell in the first quarter of 2010, but remained strong and
selective. In the first quarter of 2010, 53 projects with investment commitments of US$22.6
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billion reached financial or contractual closure in 21 developing countries. While this
investment represents a 25% drop from the level reported in the first quarter of 2009, it
is the second highest of any first quarter since 1995;
• Investment growth in projects continues to be concentrated in the largest developing
economies, particularly India, which accounted for more than half of investment in the
first quarter of 2010. Three other large economies (Brazil, China, and Turkey) saw lower
investment in this quarter than in the same quarter of 2009. The remaining developing
countries saw some investment growth, however, it is too soon to assess whether this
recovery will continue and reverse the trend of declining investment in these countries;
• Large projects account for most of the investment in new projects - investment is concen-
trated in projects of US$1 billion or more. As a conclusion, the average project size grew
from US$146 million in 2004 to US$457 million in the first quarter of 2010;
• Liquidity and other financial market conditions have improved, but they remain more
stringent than before the global financial crisis. While infrastructure projects are raising
financing, they continue to face financial markets with reduced liquidity and tougher
conditions (lower debt/equity ratios, shorter tenors, and more conservative structures).
Greater project selectivity is also expected to continue;
• As a consequence, local State-owned banks and multilateral agencies continue to be key
financiers. Given the lack of liquidity from commercial banks that would normally take
part in loan syndications, this growing participation by local public banks and multilateral
financing institutions is not surprising. Nevertheless, these institutions are unlikely to have
the capacity to fully replace commercial sources of financing;
• The impact of the financial crisis on project delay or cancellation has diminished. By the
end of the first quarter of 2010, projects representing 9% of total investment had, due to
the crisis, been delayed (6%) or canceled (2%) or were at risk of being delayed (1%) if
financing was not arranged in the coming months;
• Greenfield projects continue to be best able to raise debt. Within the greenfield category,
energy projects, particularly power plants, have raised the most debt since 2008. Conces-
sions, by contrast, have not been able to raise much financing. Many reached contractual
closure (with the concession contract being signed and the private operator taking over
the assets) with the agreement that funding would be raised later. But many of the con-
cessions, reaching contractual closure in 2008 and 2009, experienced delays in securing
required financing;
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• Despite the more difficult environment, developing country governments remain commit-
ted to their PPP programs - by the first quarter of 2010, 61 developing countries had
around 440 projects that were seeking financing, had been awarded and had yet to start
looking for finance, or were in the final tender stage. Those projects involve investment
commitments of US$174 billion.
Developing countries risks, assessed in several dimensions (political, legal, economic, financial,
social), are critical to measure the attractiveness of a country to private agents and interna-
tional institutions. Such evaluation by these agents affect the development of partnerships with
governments and the implementation of infrastructure projects. In Section 6.3 this issue is
detailed, as the main framework for the empirical analysis that follows.
6.3 Conceptual framework and hypothesis development
A fundamental prerequisite for PPP is private sector involvement. But is important to ascer-
tain, what factors determine the degree of such involvement, and moreover, which country risk
is the more influential, affecting such involvement.
Moreover, risks are enhanced for infrastructure PPP developed in emerging countries and the
involvement of MDB plays an important “enabling” function acting like a mechanism of risk
reduction. Essentially, the involvement of multilateral organizations (financial institutions and
export credit agencies) provides a third-party guarantee, increasing the creditworthiness of the
arrangement. Therefore, in addition to the primary lending function, MDB also have a catalyz-
ing function of private funds, which assumes particular relevance in times of financial distress.
At this purpose, it is also relevant to determine what country factors are more important in
explaining the MDB participation in a project.
In the empirical analysis that follows, the question how the political, legal, social, economic and
financial environment in host countries influence risk perceptions and hence, the participation
of the private sector and of MDB in infrastructure PPP, is answered. In addition, the effect of
the same risk factors on the number and value of PPP projects is also explored.
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Political Risk
We expect to find a clear relationship between the participation of private sector and MDB in
PPP arrangements and the political risk of a country. More precisely, private sector prefers to
invest in politically stable countries and MDB should participated in PPP more frequently for
projects developed in countries characterized by high political risk - the higher the political risk
of a country, the higher the probability of a PPP to be structured with MDB participation and
inversely, the lower the degree of private sector involvement.
Hypothesis 1 - The probability of having a PPP with a MDB participation is positively related
to the level of political risk.
Hypothesis 2 - The degree of private sector participation in a PPP is negatively related to the
level of political risk.
As proxies for the level of political risk that may affect infrastructure investments, we use
measures of the democratic regime (related to the access to government offices: elections and
their competitiveness) and of democratic governance, meaning the process whereby government
make and implement legally binding decisions, all drawn from Beck et al. (2000). Political risk
is higher for countries where governments do not exhibit political checks and balances3 or that
restrains electoral competition. Therefore, the variables used are:
• Index of Political Competitiveness, a variable that characterize the competitiveness of
elections. It measures the number of parties competing in elections and range from 1
(low) to 7 (high competitiveness). More political competitiveness leads to a reduction of
the political risk of a country, with more transparent and accountable governments, which
are pre-requisites for PPP to be successful.
• Checks - The quality of governance affects a country’s ability to benefit from international
capital flows. A key element in the description of any political system is the number of
decision makers whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed and it is gen-
erally accepted that countries with multiple decision makers may offer greater protection
to investors from arbitrary government actions - as measure of government accountability
3Checks and Balances is a system of distribution of powers among the executive, legislative and judi-
cial branches of government, used to balance the powers and prevent one branch to obtain power in excess
(http://law.yourdictionary.com/checks-and-balances, accessed on January 10, 2011).
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the variable checks is used. This variable assumes the value 1, for countries where legisla-
tures are not competitively elected (only the executive wields a check), and increase with
the number of veto players in the system.
• Political System - An additional measure of the relationship of the executive and legislative
branches. Countries are classified as direct presidential (0), strong president elected by
assembly (1) or parliamentary (2).
Legal Risk
A PPP is, in essence, a bundle of contracts - financial and non-financial contracts. Typically
these contracts are naturally incomplete and prone to opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, pri-
vate investors must ensure they have legal rights and that the local law enforcement is efficient.
It is expected that countries with strong legal protection will be able to raise more long-term
private capital to develop infrastructure projects and the participation of MDB with its effect
of “umbrella” will be less important for these countries, thus:
Hypothesis 3 - The probability of having a PPP with MDB participation is positively related to
the level of legal risk.
Hypothesis 4 - The degree of private sector participation in a PPP is negatively related to the
level of legal risk.
As proxies for the level of legal development, the next variables are used:4
• Creditor rights index - We measure the creditor rights in the country in which the project is
located based on LaPorta et al. (1998) index and expanded by Djankov et al. (2007). The
authors show that legal creditor rights are an important determinant of private credit
development. The creditor rights index varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4
(strong creditor rights).
• Contract enforcement days - The number of calendar days to resolve a payment dispute
through courts, also from Djankov et al. (2007). LaPorta et al. (1998) emphasizes the
importance of legal enforcement as well the quality of the laws on the books (measured
by the creditor rights index). Both measures of the quality of the legal system matters
and provide a complementary analysis (laws on the books and its applicability).
4Similarly to previous empirical studies of Esty and Megginson (2003), Gatti et al. (2008) or Subramanian
et al. (2008), testing legal variables.
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• Legal origin - A dummy variable that identifies a country’s legal origin. This variable was
first proposed by LaPorta et al. (1998) with four possibilities - English, French, German
and Nordic - and was expanded by Djankov et al. (2007), adding a fifth category - Socialist
(transition).5 A link between the origin of a country’s legal tradition and the operation of
its financial system was first established by LaPorta et al. (1998). The authors have found
that countries with common law legal institutions provide better protection to creditors
than do countries with civil law institutions. More recently, reinforcing this idea, Beck
et al. (2004) empirically demonstrate that countries with civil law provide creditors with
weaker legal rights and, as a consequence, firms face higher obstacles in contracting for
external finance than firms in other countries.
Economic and Financial Risks
The macroeconomic environment can also affect project’ risks and the participation of private
sector and MDB in PPP, thus:
Hypothesis 5 - The probability of having a PPP with MDB participation is positively related to
the level of economic and financial risks.
Hypothesis 6 - The degree of private sector participation in a PPP is lower for countries with
higher economic and financial risks.
In general, economic and financial risks assessments improve for countries with larger economic
size (GDP), lower inflation, low external debt and more developed financial markets. Each
determinant of economic and financial development derives from the theoretical literature, for
instance, Altunbas and Gadanecz (2003), Cantor and Packer (1996) or Eichengreen and Mody
(2000), found that the following macroeconomic fundamentals are important as explanatory
variables of the capital flows to emerging markets:
• Real GDP per capita and economic growth, used to measure the evolution of the country’s
wealth.
5The English legal origin includes the common law of England, and the former colonies, U.S., Australia and
Canada. The French legal origin includes the civil law of France and also, countries Napoleon conquered (including
Portugal and Spain) and former colonies. The German legal origin includes the laws of the Germanic countries in
Central Europe, but also countries in East Asia. The Nordic legal origin - laws of the four Scandinavian countries.
And the Socialist legal origin - for the new countries that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union, plus
Mongolia. The Socialist category does not apply to countries that have gone back to their pre-communist legal
systems, where they were assigned to their pre-war legal systems (Djankov et al., 2007).
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• Inflation rate and international reserves. As Cantor and Packer (1996) argue, a high rate
of inflation points to structural problems in the government’s finances and is a focus of
instability. Therefore a controlled inflation and the existence of significative international
reserves are indicators of a country macroeconomic stability.
• External debt and general government balance. It is expected that governments with
large deficits and high debt burden will be more interested in PPP to solve infrastructure
problems. But at the same time, these two variables are a focus of economic instability
increasing the risk level of a country. A higher debt burden imply a higher risk of default
and the weight of the burden increases as a country’s external debt rises relative to its
foreign currency earnings (exports of goods and services). In addition, governments with
large and structural deficits increase foreign indebtedness, which may become unsustain-
able over time.
• Fuel exports as a measure of a country’s natural resources. As mentioned in Rose-
Ackerman and Tobin (2005), the existence of natural resources is expected to attract much
more investment regardless of other relevant factors, and this is also true for infrastructure
projects.
• Population. An additional factor that should be accounted for is the dimension of the
market. Concerning PPP, it is an important feature of the attractiveness of a project
to the private sector, specifically, if projects are to be financed also with user charges.
Therefore, PPP tend to be more common in larger markets.
Linking infrastructure development more effectively with private finance markets helps to lever-
age and mobilize more capital. By contrast, underdeveloped financial markets makes the private
participation in infrastructure projects relatively more difficult, particularly, as reported by Iza-
guirre (2010), when domestic investors are becoming more prominent as a major source of funds
to infrastructure projects. In addition and as mentioned by Delmon (2007), the provision of new
risk mitigation instruments by MDB and the deepening of local capital markets also contribute
to the sustainability of PPP. There is no single measure of financial development, but we use
the following, most commonly used and drawn from Beck et al. (2009):6
• Liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP - is a traditional measure of financial
depth and measure the size of the financial intermediary sector relative the size of the
economy. This indicator shows the degree to which the financial sector mobilizes domestic
savings - larger depth should reflect greater financial development.
6See, for instance, Esty (2003b).
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• Financial claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial insti-
tutions divided by gross domestic product (GDP) - countries with higher private credit
to GDP, usually have higher rates of economic growth;
• And finally, the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money and
central bank assets. This is a measure of the relative importance of commercial versus
central banks. It has been shown that countries where commercial banks have a higher
role in financial intermediation (rather than central banks) also face a higher degree of
financial development.
Social Risks
As a final dimension to be assessed in its importance for PPP projects, measures of human
development are included, that we roughly call “social factors”. It is expected that proxies for
human development should have an effect in infrastructure projects, particularly in explaining
MDB participation, given their mission as development agencies, although that effect should not
be so clear concerning private sector participation. Nevertheless, some empirical studies have
showed that civil freedom may encourage foreign direct investment (see Harms and Ursprung,
2002).
Hypothesis 7 - The probability of having a PPP with MDB participation is higher for countries
with higher respect for human rights and civil liberties.
Hypothesis 8 - The degree of private participation in a PPP is higher for countries with higher
respect for human rights and civil liberties.
Besides the traditional measure of per capita income, as a proxy of well-being and economic
development (already included in the economic variables), two proxies for human rights and
social development are drawn from the “Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset”
and an additional measure of civil liberties, from the survey “Freedom in the world”:
• Empowerment Rights Index - This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of
Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers’ Rights, Political Participation and Freedom of
Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10
(full government respect for these five rights).
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• Physical Integrity Rights Index - This is an additive index constructed from the Torture,
Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment and Disappearance indicators. It ranges
from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for
these four rights).
• Civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest
degree of freedom and seven the lowest.
In addition, to ascertain whether sectoral and regional differences have an effect on the agents’
participation on PPP projects, we consider the next dummies:
• Dummies for regions - East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America
and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa (the reference sector), South Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa;
• Dummies for sectors - energy, telecommunications, transport and water/ sewerage as the
base sector.
Finally, time dummies are included in all regressions to capture potential time-specific effects.
For simplicity reasons, the previous hypotheses development do not include the reference to the
number and value of PPP projects, but:
• all the hypotheses concerning the probability of MDB participation should be extended
to include, the number of projects with MDB participation and the amount of financial
support provided by those agencies, which can be considered additional measures of MDB
involvement. In general the higher the risk, the higher the probability of a MDB partic-
ipate in PPP and therefore, the higher the number of projects with MDB participation
and the financial support provided, with the exception of the social risk dimension. In this
risk dimension, we expect that countries that respect more human rights will benefit with
more involvement of MDB, meaning lower social risk associated with higher involvement.
• all the hypotheses developed concerning the degree of private sector participation should
be extended to include the total number of PPP projects and the investment value of PPP
projects, that are inversely related to the overall level of a country risk, expressed in the
different dimensions (political, legal, social, economic and financial).
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As a summary from the previous exposition, Table 6.1 highlights the empirical study that fol-
lows and the structure used in the next sections, concerning the methodology and the discussion
of the results. More details on the variables are presented in Section 6.5.
Table 6.1: Regressions summary
Dependent variable Explanatory variables Unit of Number of
Type Description observation observations
• Proxies for political, legal,
Fractional Degree of private economic, financial and The
variable sector participation social risks PPP 2095
0 ≤ y ≤ 1 in a PPP project • MDB dummy project
• Sector dummies
• Time dummies
• Proxies for political, legal,
Binary y = 1 if the MDB economic, financial and The 2095
variable participate in the social risks PPP
y = 0 or y = 1 PPP project, • Sector dummies project
y = 0 otherwise • Time dummies
Count variable Number of PPP projects • Proxies for political, legal,
y = 0, 1, 2 · · · in a country economic, financial and Country/year 481
(discrete values) for a given year social risks
• Time dummies
Count variable Number of PPP projects • Proxies for political, legal,
y = 0, 1, 2 · · · with MDB participation economic, financial and Country/year 481
(discrete values) in a country social risks
for a given year • Time dummies
Continuous and Real dollar value • Proxies for political, legal,
nonnegative of PPP investments economic, financial and Country/year 732
variable in a country social risks
y ≥ 0 for a given year • Time dummies
Continuous and Real dollar value of • Proxies for political, legal,
nonnegative MDB financial support economic, financial and Country/year 732
variable to PPP in a country social risks
y ≥ 0 for a given year • Time dummies
Next section presents the appropriate econometric models given the nature of the variables
under study, and some methodological issues are explored.
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6.4 Methodology
The models used in all regressions are limited dependent variable models, given the particular
characteristics of the dependent variable.7 The estimation method is, in general, Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for all the models, and exceptionally when appropriate, Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS).
6.4.1 Binary and Fractional variables
First, when the problem consists of describing the probability of the participation of a MDB




1 with probability p
0 with probability 1− p
(6.1)
The simplest alternative is to use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) with OLS regression,
but it has some drawbacks namely, the possibility of the predicted probabilities exceed one or
to be less than zero and the assumption that the partial effect of any explanatory variable is
constant. Moreover, the LPM will, by definition, produce heteroscedasticity in the error term,
although this is by far a less important drawback than the others mentioned before, because
variances can be estimated consistently. Nevertheless, the LPM may be used as a starting point
and as an exploratory tool.
More proper models are the Probit and Logit that belong to the class of binary response models.
The choice of one of these models will guarantee that the predicted values will be in the 0–1
interval. Either the Probit or the Logit are binary response models of the form,
P (y = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + · · ·+ βkxk) (6.2)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) and G(.) is a function taking on values strictly between zero and
one, 0 < G(z) < 1, for all real numbers z. In the Probit model, G(.) is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function (cdf), which is expressed as the integral,
7This section is based on Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Wooldridge (2002) and Wooldridge (2003).
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where φ(z) is the standard normal density,
φ(z) = (2π)−1/2exp(−z2/2) (6.4)
An alternative choice could be the logistic distribution function and therefore,
G(z) = exp(z)/[1 + exp(z)] = Λ(z) (6.5)
In order to estimate the parameters, a likelihood function is maximized. The coefficients βj
for j = 1, 2, . . . , k, give the signs of the partial effects of each xj on the response probability,
but not their magnitude. Therefore, the interpretation of their value is not as straightforward
as in the LPM.
For the purpose of study the probability of having a PPP with MDB participation, depending
on the proxies for different risks, we use the three methods mentioned above, although the
LPM only as an exploratory tool, given its limitations. If we have to choose between Logit and
Probit models, it is important to note that both distributions are similar except for the tails.
Therefore, for intermediate values of x′β the probabilities of both distributions are similar. Nev-
ertheless, as measures of goodness of fit of the models, we should look to the maximum value
of the likelihood function that indicates the best model to choose or compare the pseudo−R2
of the models. It is also possible to do the evaluation by comparing the fitted and actual values
using the pseudo − R2 and the percentage of observations correctly classified. High values of
these measures indicate a good fit of the model.
Second, the dependent y, the degree of private participation is a fractional response variable,
ranging from 0–1. We use the generalized linear models (GLM) approach, first proposed by
Papke and Wooldridge (1996), with robust standard errors. Several functional forms for the
conditional mean of y that enforce the conceptual requirement that E(y|x) is in the unit interval,
may be used. We have,
E(y|x) = G(z) (6.6)
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where G(.) is a known nonlinear function satisfying 0 < G(.) < 1. Recently Ramalho et al.
(2011), compare different models, estimators and specification tests, to deal with fractional
response variables. Particularly in this work, alternative nonlinear conditional mean specifi-
cations are tested: Logit, Probit, Loglog, Complementary Loglog (Cloglog) and Cauchy. In
addition, the authors discuss the option between one-part models and two-part models, this
last option is more appropriate for situations where the number of observations at one or both
boundaries occur with too large frequency, justifying the rationale for two different mechanisms.
In this work, the observed values verify 0 < y ≤ 1, with a large proportion of observations
with y = 1. Therefore, we consider appropriate to use one model to explain the binary variable
y∗ = 1 if y = 1 and y∗ = 0 if 0 < y < 1, while another model will be used to explain the
fractional 0 < y < 1.
As mentioned in Ramalho et al. (2011), while the logistic and standard normal specifications
for G(.) are symmetric about the point 0.5 and consequently approach 0 and 1 at the same rate,
the Complementary Loglog model is not symmetric and increases sharply when G(.) is near 1,
making this last model the more appropriate to fit our data, as we will discuss in Section 6.6.1.
The extreme minimum distribution function underlying the Complementary Loglog model is
given by,
G(z) = 1− exp(−exp(z)) (6.7)
Because estimates from the different models proposed for binary and fractional variables are
not directly comparable, interest lies in the estimation of marginal effects. The marginal effects
differ with the point of evaluation x and differ with different choices of G(.), for the Logit
specification the marginal effect for continuous variables is given by,
∂E(y|x)
∂xj
= Λ(β0 + x′β)[1− Λ(β0 + x′β)]βj (6.8)
while for the Probit specification is,
∂E(y|x)
∂xj
= φ(β0 + x′β)βj (6.9)
and for the Complementary Loglog is,
∂E(y|x)
∂xj
= exp(−exp(β0 + x′β))exp(β0 + x′β)βj (6.10)
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In respect to dummy variables, a finite-difference method is used computing the marginal effect
by comparing the conditional mean with and without that dummy variable equal to one. The




= E[y|d = 1]− E[y|d = 0] (6.11)
In this work, we use AME - average marginal effects, that show the average response of all
individuals. The marginal effect is obtained for each observation and next, the sample average
of individual marginal effects is computed to obtain the overall marginal effect. As mentioned
in Ramalho et al. (2011), the estimation of average sample effects (AME) seems to be much
more robust to misspecification of the functional form, especially when Logit and Probit models
are employed.
6.4.2 Count variables
The number of PPP arrangements per country and year is used, considering on one hand, all
the projects and on the other hand, just projects with MDB participation - in both situations,
we have count variables that only take nonnegative integer values.
To model these variables, the first natural choice is to use the Poisson regression model. The
Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability for the
number of occurrences of the event, with a probability mass function,
Pr[Y = y] =
e−µµy
y!
, y = 0, 1, 2, . . . (6.12)
where µ is the intensity or rate parameter and it can be shown that E[Y ] = µ and var[Y ] = µ.
A regression model specifies the parameter µ to vary across individuals according to a specific
function of regressor vector x and parameter vector β. The usual Poisson specification is
µ = exp(x′β), which has the advantage of ensuring that the mean µ > 0. The density of the
Poisson regression model is therefore,
f(y|x,β) = e−exp(β0+x′β)exp(β0 + x′β)y/y! (6.13)
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In practical applications, the Poisson regression model is considered usually too restrictive. The
Poisson key assumption of “mean equal to variance”, called the equidispersion property, is often
violated. Typically, for count data the variance exceeds the mean (overdispersion) and as such,
it is necessary to use alternative models. For instance, Negative Binomial models lead to better
results.
The Negative Binomial model is an example of a continuous mixture model. Consider the
distribution of a random count y that is Poisson, conditional on the parameter λ, so that
f(y|λ) = exp(−λ)λy/y! . Suppose that the parameter λ is random, rather than being a com-
pletely deterministic function of regressors x. In particular, let λ = µv, where µ is a determin-
istic function of x, for example exp(x′β) and v > 0 is independent and identically distributed
(iid) with density g(v|α). The marginal density of y, unconditional on the random parameter





where g(v|α) is called the mixing distribution and α denotes the unknown parameter of the
mixing distribution. The integration defines an “average” distribution. For some specific choices
of f(.) and g(.), the integral will have an explicit or closed-form solution. Considering that f(y|λ)
is the Poisson density and g(v) is the gamma density, g(v) = vδ−1e−vδδδ/Γ(δ), with δ, v > 0,









and after some simplifications, follows,











where α = 1/δ and Γ(.) denotes the gamma integral which specializes to a factorial for an
integer argument. The first two moments of the negative binomial distribution are,
E[y|µ, α] = µ, (6.17)
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var[y|µ, α] = µ(1 + αµ). (6.18)
The variance exceeds the mean, since α > 0 and µ > 0. As mentioned in Cameron and Trivedi
(2005), Negative Binomial models can be very useful in applied work, with the necessary flexi-
bility to provide a good fit to many types of count data.
In this empirical work, when the dependent variable is the total number of PPP projects per
country and year, the minimum value recorded is one. In this situation the standard Poisson
and Negative Binomial models are not proper choices, because the estimation procedures will
try to fit the models by including probabilities for zero values. One possibility is to use Zero
Truncated Models that allow a more accurate fit by using a probability model that does not
include the zero values. It is possible to consider our data as an example of truncation, because
information is only available for countries that register the number of PPP projects. The data
are truncated from below at zero and we only observe y = y∗ if y > 0.8
Truncation leads to inconsistent parameter estimates unless the likelihood function is properly
modified. For the situation of zero truncation, let f(y|θ) denote the density function and
F (y|θ) = Pr[Y ≤ y] denote the cumulative distribution function of the discrete random variable,
where θ is a parameter vector. If realizations of y less than the positive integer 1 are omitted,
the ensuing zero-truncated density is given by,
f(y|θ, y ≥ 1) = f(y|θ)
1− F (0|θ)
, y = 1, 2, . . . (6.19)
If we consider f(y|µ, y ≥ 1) = e−µµy/[y!(1−exp(−µ))], then we have a Zero-Truncated Poisson
model. Particularly in what concerns our data, as some evidence of overdispersion appear, Zero
Truncated Negative Binomial models seem to be a better option.
A different problem that may arise with count data is the excess zeros problem, i.e., the presence
of more zeros in the data than predicted by count models such as Poisson or Negative Binomial
models. To deal with this situation, two approaches may be followed.
8Cameron and Trivedi (2005) provide an additional example with the number of visits to a health clinic, where
data are only available for people who visited the health clinic.
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The first is to use a Two-Part model, separating the zeros from the positives counts and there-
fore using two different models, a binary choice model to explain the zero vs the nonzero values
and a zero-truncated model for the second part (two-part models are further detailed in next
section).
The second approach is to use a modified count model called zero-inflated model. This sup-
plements a count density f2(.) with a binary process with density f1(.). If the binary process
takes value 0, with probability f1(0), then y = 0. If the binary process takes value 1, with
probability f1(1), then y takes count values 0, 1, 2, · · · from the count density f2(.). This lets
zero counts occur in two ways: as a realization of the binary process and as a realization of
the count process when the binary random variable takes value 1, differing this way from a
Two-Part model. The density is,
g(y) =
{
f1(0) + (1− f1(0))f2(0) if y = 0
(1− f1(0))f2(y) if y ≥ 1
(6.20)
where f1(.) is a Logit model and f2(.) is a Poisson or Negative Binomial density. In economet-
rics, this model is much less used than the Two-Part model, although it is capable of modeling
data with few zeros.
Another possibility is to use Ordered Response models, modelling the count variable as multi-
nomial data. Ordered multinomial models are a generalization of binary choice models. There
are several possible outcomes (mutually exclusive) and the alternatives follow a natural order.
The underlying relationship to be characterized is,
y∗ = x′β + u (6.21)
where y∗ is a latent (unobservable) variable. There are m alternatives and the dependent vari-
able y is defined to take the value j if the jth alternative is taken, j = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
For a m-alternative ordered model, the categories of response can be observed as,
y = j if αj−1 < y∗ ≤ αj , (6.22)
with α0 = −∞ and αm = ∞. Different values of α are the increasing and unknown thresholds,
which are also parameters to be estimated. And then,
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Pr[y = j] = Pr[αj−1 < y∗ ≤ αj ]
= Pr[αj−1 < x′β + u ≤ αj ]
= Pr[αj−1 − x′β < u ≤ αj − x′β]
= G(αj − x′β)−G(αj−1 − x′β)
(6.23)
If u is standard normal distributed, then G(.) is the standard normal cdf and we have an Or-
dered Probit Model. While for the Ordered Logit Model, u is logistic distributed and G(.)
is the logistic distribution. The sign of the parameters β can be immediately interpreted as
determining whether or not the latent variable y∗ increases with the regressor.
For multinomial data the interpretation of the results should be made with particular care.
The marginal effect is not measured as usually, as the impact on a single conditional mean of
the change in a regressor, instead there is a separate marginal effect on the probability of each
outcome, and these marginal effects sum to zero since probabilities sum to one. To obtain the
marginal effects in the probabilities,
∂Pr[y = j])
∂xj
= [G′(αj−1 − x′β)−G′(αj − x′β)]βj , (6.24)
where G′ denotes the derivative of G(.) and the term in braces can be positive or negative.
These models are widely used to count data with few categories and have the advantage that
it is more informative to do the analysis directly in terms of the probabilities of the different
outcomes, instead of using a standard regression framework.
6.4.3 Nonnegative continuous variables
When the dependent variable is the real dollar value of the investments in infrastructure projects
(per country and year) and the real amount of support provided by MDB for these same coun-
tries/years, the response variables are nonnegative, partly continuous and assume the value zero
with positive probability.
In this situation, it is appropriate to use “corner solution models”, if we consider that the zero
outcome is the result of a maximization process, or otherwise, to use “two-part models” or
“sample selection models”, if we assume that the decision to invest is a completely different
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process from the mechanism explaining the levels of investment. A critical factor influencing
the choice of the model is the interpretation placed upon the observed zeros.9
Tobit is usually the starting point. The standard Tobit model has a censoring value at zero,
and the latent variable is linear in regressors with an additive error term, normally distributed
and homoscedastic. Thus,
y∗ = β0 + x′β + ε, where ε|x ∼ Normal(0, σ2) (6.25)
The observed y is defined,
y =
{
y∗ if y∗ > 0
0 if y∗ ≤ 0, (6.26)
where – means that y is observed to be missing (no particular value of y is necessarily observed
when y∗ ≤ 0).
Nevertheless, because the Tobit model relies on strong assumptions of normality and ho-
moscedasticity of the error term, better results are often provided by more general models,
namely, Two-Part models or using Heckman sample selection models. There are many different
situations where the problem at study may be seen as a two-part decision, of first to engage
in an activity and then deciding the level of the activity. If we expect independence between
these two parts, a Two-Part model is the better choice. Alternatively, if the same factors that
influence one part are expected to influence the other, with decisions intertwined, then the
suitable model is the bivariate sample selection model.
A Two-Part model is appealing because it is possible to explain y with two different mecha-
nisms: a Probit or a Logit model to explain the probability of y = 0 versus y > 0 and a second
process, to explain “how much” y using only the positive outcomes. As such, we have a model
that specifies the censoring mechanism and a model for the outcome conditional on the outcome
being observed.
9Using OLS is not a good option, because similarly to the LPM for binary responses, we may get negative
predicted values for y and OLS implies constant partial effects.
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If we define a binary indicator variable d = 1 for participants in the activity under study, and
d = 0 for non-participants, the Two-Part model is given by,
f(y|x) =
{
Pr[d = 0|x] if y = 0
Pr[d = 1|x]f(y|d = 1,x) if y > 0 (6.27)
for some choice of density f(.), although proper choices of f(.) should ensure positive values for
the participants, for instance, the log-normal. Usually, the same regressors appear in both parts
of the model and concerning the estimation, the two parts are assumed to be independent: first,
with all the observations, a binary choice model is estimated; second, using only observations
with y > 0, the parameters of the density f(y|d = 1,x) are estimated.
Concerning the bivariate sample selection model (or type 2 Tobit or just, Heckman sample
selection model), a joint distribution for the censoring mechanism and outcome is considered.
In this specification, a censoring latent variable differs from the latent variable generating the
outcome of interest. The model includes a participation equation,
y1 =
{
1 if y∗1 > 0
0 if y∗1 ≤ 0
(6.28)






− if y∗1 ≤ 0
(6.29)
In this formulation, y2 is observed when y∗1 > 0, and no particular value of y2 is necessarily
observed when y∗1 ≤ 0. For the latent variables, we have linear models with additive errors,
according to,
y∗1 = β01 + x1
′β1 + ε1
y∗2 = β02 + x2
′β2 + ε2
(6.30)
where x1,x2 are vectors of explanatory variables. And the conditional mean in the sample
selectivity model is,
E[y2|x1,x2, y∗1 > 0] = E[β02 + x2′β2 + ε2|β01 + x1′β1 + ε1 > 0]
= β02 + x2′β2 + E[ε2|ε1 > −(β01 + x1′β1)]
(6.31)
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If the errors ε1 and ε2 are independent in (6.31), then the last term simplifies to E[ε2] = 0,
and OLS regression of y2 on x2 will give a consistent estimate of β2 (assumption made in a
Two-Part model). However, any correlation between the two errors means that the conditional
mean is no longer β02 + x2′β2 and is necessary to account for selection. With the additional
assumption that the correlated errors are joint normally distributed and homoscedastic, the
unknown parameters can be estimated through MLE. Yet, this is still a strong assumption
and an alternative estimation procedure that relies on weaker distributional assumptions is the
Heckman two-step procedure or Heckit estimator. From the previous expression, when ε1 and
ε2 are correlated and jointly normally distributed, it implies that,
ε2 = σ12ε1 + ξ (6.32)
where ξ is independent from ε1. After some simplifications, the conditional mean becomes,
E[y2|x1,x2, y∗1 > 0] = β02 + x2′β2 + σ12λ(β01 + x1′β1), (6.33)
where λ(z) = φ(z)/Φ(z), is the inverse Mills ratio. Heckman assumes (6.33) without explicitly
imposing the normal distribution for the error term and noting that (6.33) is a linear function
of the parameters (β02,β2, σ12) that can be estimated by OLS, if the response λ(.) is observed.
However, this is not the case, because λ(.) depends on the unknown parameters (β01,β1).
Therefore the author proposes a two-step procedure which allows β̂1 to be obtained by a first-
step Probit regression of y1 on x1. The second step is to estimate the following model by OLS,
using the positive values of y2,
y2 = β02 + x2′β2 + σ12λ(β01 + x1′β̂1) + v (6.34)
where v is an error term and λ(β01 + x1′β̂1) = φ(β01 + x1′β̂1)/Φ(β01 + x1′β̂1) is the estimated
inverse Mills ratio. Testing for correlation between the errors is to test if σ12 = 0 and in the
presence of correlation, sample selection correction is needed.
This is a more general framework, because the error terms do not need to follow a normal
distribution. The main advantages of this model include its simplicity, the wider applicability
and the fact that requires weaker distributional assumptions than using MLE. Nevertheless,
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Heckman’s two-step procedure faces two different complications. First, because it is a two-step
method, variances need to be corrected and second, identification problems may arise, because
exactly the same regressors are used, x1 = x2, and the observation that the inverse Mills ratio
term λ(.), is approximately linear over a wide range of its argument, leads to multicollinearity
problems. The first problem is automatically solved by STATA and concerning the second, a
multicollinearity diagnostic should be performed.
Next section details our data and variables. In addition, the summary statistics are shown, as
well as the expected effect of the independent variables on y.
6.5 Data and Variables
In this study the dependent variables were constructed from the PPI Project Database (World
Bank), available on-line at http://ppi.worldbank.org, using projects developed in low- and
middle-income countries that reached financial closure from 1990 – 2007. We collect data
on 96 different countries, also classified in six regions - East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the database, infrastructure projects are classified into
four sectors - energy (electricity and natural gas), telecommunications, transport (railways, air-
ports, toll roads and seaports), and water / sewerage. In addition, projects are classified into
four broad categories of private participation: management and lease contracts, concessions,
greenfield projects and divestitures.
For the purpose of this work, only concessions, greenfield projects and partial divestitures are
used - types of private participation that could be considered PPP, sharing the key characte-
ristics of long term nature of the relationship, distribution of risks between the public and the
private partner, bundling of different project phases and private finance.
For the explanatory variables, the first set of data pertains to the political systems, where all
the indicators are drawn from Beck et al. (2000). The second set of data includes proxies for the
quality and enforceability of the legal system and are computed for 129 countries by Djankov
et al. (2007), expanding the former data set of LaPorta et al. (1998) only available for 49 coun-
tries. Concerning macroeconomic data, all the variables are available from the World Bank’s
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World Development Indicators. Proxies for a country’s level of financial development are taken
from Beck et al. (2009), available in the World Bank’s Financial Development Database, and
finally, proxies to measure the degree of social development of a country and respect for human
rights are from “The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset”, available on-line at
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp, and from the survey “Freedom in the world”, available
on-line at http://www.freedomhouse.org.
The explanatory variables capture several country attributes that are expected to have a signi-
ficative effect on infrastructure investments through PPP, on the number of projects developed
and in the participation level of the agents. The variables were chosen to minimize collinearity
problems and to maximize the number of nonmissing observations. It should be noted that
several other variables were tested, namely, corruption in the political dimension, religion in
the social dimension, and even proxies for a “geographical dimension”, but were excluded due
to problems on data availability.
The independent variables are:
• Political System - presidential(0), assembly-elected presidential (1) or parliamentary (2);
• Index of Political Competitiveness, which varies from 1 (low) to 7 (high competitiveness);
• Checks - number of governmental checks and balances, which varies from 1 to 18;
• Creditor rights - An aggregate index, which varies from the value 0 for weak creditor rights to 4, meaning
strong creditor rights;
• Contract enforcement days - the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts, presented
in logs and levels;
• Legal origin - English, French, German and Socialist. Three dummies are used, being the French civil law
the reference;
• Physical Integrity Rights Index, it ranges from 0 (no government respect) to 8 (full government respect);
• Empowerment Rights Index, it ranges from 0 (no government respect) to 10 (full government respect);
• Civil liberties, which varies from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (the lowest);
• Deposit money bank assets, divided by the sum of deposit money and central bank assets;
• Liquid liabilities to GDP;
• Private Credit to GDP;
• General government balance (percent of GDP);
• External debt (percent of total exports);
• Economic growth - GDP growth (annual %);
• Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports);
• Real GDP per capita - constant 2000 US$, presented in logs and levels;
• Inflation Rate (annual percent change, GDP deflator);
• Population, total, presented in logs and levels;
• Reserves (in months of imports).
• MDB dummy - a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the PPP project has a MDB participation and
takes the value 0, otherwise. Only considered for the regression on the degree of private participation.
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Table 6.2 includes information about which variables are associated with each of the risks con-
sidered and their expected effect on the dependent variable.
Table 6.2: Expected effect of the explanatory variables on y
Dependent variable
Effect Probability of Degree of
Explanatory variables on a country a PPP with a MDB private
risk level participation (1) participation (2)
Political Risk
Political System - - +
Index of Political Competitiveness - - +
Checks (number) - - +
Legal Risk
Creditor rights - - +
Contract enforcement days (ln) + + -
Legal origin dummy (base: French) - - +
Social Risk
Physical Integrity Index - + +
Empowerment Index - + +
Civil liberties + - -
Financial Risk
Deposit money bank assets - - +
Liquid liabilities to GDP - - +
Private credit to GDP - - +
Economic Risk
Government balance to GDP + + -
External debt to total exports + + -
Economic growth - - +
Fuel exports - - +
Real GDP per capita (ln) - - +
Inflation Rate + + -
Population (ln) - - +
International reserves - - +
MDB dummy - +
Legend: (1) including the number of projects with MDB participation and the amount of financial
support provided by MDB; (2) including the number of PPP projects and their investment value.
For practical purposes and in order to match all the available information on the dependent
and independent variables, three different databases were constructed:
• The first has the unit of observation, the project, with 2095 observations and is used to ex-
plain the degree of private sector participation and the probability of a MDB participation
in the project;
• The second concerns the total count of projects and the count of projects with MDB
participation. Information was collected from 1990 to 2007, per country and year, with a
total of 481 observations;
• The third collects information on PPP investments in infrastructure, per country/year,
and in addition, on the amount of financial support provided by MDB, per country/year,
with a total of 732 observations.
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The last two databases constitute panel data, where observations were collected on the same
developing countries over 1990 to 2007, resulting in two unbalanced panels, since for some
countries data are only available for a smaller interval of time.10 Therefore, a basic panel data
method is used, namely the pooled approach, with clustered robust variances. The indepen-
dence assumption of all the observations is relaxed and only independence between clusters
(countries) is required.
Table 6.3 gives the general summary statistics for the larger database where the information
for the dummies variables is also included (except time).
Table 6.3: Summary statistics
Variable Number of Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
observations
Degree of private participation 2095 0.880 0.247 0 1
MDB participation 2095 0.151 0.358 0 1
Political system 2095 0.611 0.885 0 2
Index Political Competitiveness 2095 6.860 0.556 1 7
Checks (number) 2095 4.599 3.620 1 18
Creditor rights 2095 1.550 0.943 0 4
Contract enforcement days (number) 2095 456.623 173.732 27 1459
Contract enforcement days (ln) 2095 6.065 0.349 3.296 7.286
English legal origin dummy 2095 0.286 0.452 0 1
French legal origin dummy 2095 0.630 0.483 0 1
German legal origin dummy 2095 0.034 0.182 0 1
Socialist legal origin dummy 2095 0.050 0.218 0 1
Physical Integrity Index 2095 3.311 2.196 0 8
Empowerment Index 2095 6.783 2.481 0 10
Civil liberties 2095 3.484 1.016 1 7
Deposit money bank assets 2095 0.857 0.122 0.124 1
Liquid liabilities to GDP 2095 0.428 0.241 0.076 1.295
Private credit to GDP 2095 0.379 0.307 0.028 1.660
General gov. balance /GDP (%) 2095 -2.278 4.446 -29.546 18.03534
External debt to total exports 2095 27.576 22.172 0.776 117.8147
Economic growth (%) 2095 4.510 3.670 -13.127 18.28661
Fuel exports (%) 2095 11.340 16.031 0 99.6565
Real GDP per capita 2095 2741.839 2088.723 126.1494 8699.013
Real GDP per capita (ln) 2095 7.534 0.968 4.837 9.071
Inflation Rate 2095 42.218 285.741 -23.479 6836.881
Population (103) 2095 189000 320000 1914.607 1110000
Population (ln) 2095 17.933 1.527 14.465 20.828
International reserves (months) 2095 5.206 2.393 0.372 13.833
Energy sector dummy 2095 0.418 0.493 0 1
Telecom sector dummy 2095 0.179 0.383 0 1
Transport sector dummy 2095 0.299 0.458 0 1
Water sector dummy 2095 0.105 0.306 0 1
East Asia and Pacific dummy 2095 0.174 0.379 0 1
Europe and Central Asia dummy 2095 0.111 0.314 0 1
Latin America & Caribbean dummy 2095 0.474 0.499 0 1
Middle East & North Africa dummy 2095 0.022 0.148 0 1
South Asia dummy 2095 0.152 0.359 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 2095 0.065 0.247 0 1
10For information on which countries are included in each database, see the Data Appendix.
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6.6 Results
All the regressions were performed using the statistical software STATA 11. Two preliminary
notes: first, because correlation was expected among the observations within each country, clus-
tered robust standard errors were used when possible, relaxing the independence assumption
and only requiring observations to be not correlated between countries (clusters) and allowing
for heteroscedasticity of unknown form between clusters. Second, because collinearity may cause
problems turning the regression coefficients unreliable, a collinearity diagnostic was performed
using the VIF (variance inflation factor) measure available in STATA.11
For the three databases, the results of the collinearity diagnostic performed reveal that region
dummies show high levels of collinearity with VIF measures above 10, deserving correction.
Therefore the regional dummies were excluded to improve the results accuracy. As already
mentioned, the PPI database covers projects awarded in low and middle-income countries and
these same countries are also classified in six regions (East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa). Further, the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies
in low, middle or high income countries is gross national income (GNI) per capita, that was
considered to be the best single indicator of economic capacity and progress. As a consequence,
it was not surprising that regional dummies face high levels of collinearity with other measures
of a country’s economic and financial development, because besides the geographical dimension
also to classify countries in one of these regions, an economic dimension was considered. In
addition, neighboring developing / emerging countries usually present similarities in terms of
institutional and social development.
For clarity purposes, the discussion of the results is divided in four sections. The first two sec-
tions exploring the findings concerning the determinants of agents’ participation (private sector
and MDB) in infrastructure PPP to developing countries. Next, the identification of which risk
factors affect the number of PPP projects and the number of PPP with participation of MDB
and finally, the same analysis concerning which risk factors influence overall investment flows
and “aid” flows, expressed in financial support amounts provided by MDB to PPP.
11VIF is an indicator of how much of the inflation of the standard error could be caused by collinearity. As a
rule of thumb, values above 10 should be a cause of concern and must be corrected.
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6.6.1 The degree of private sector participation in PPP
The variable to be explained is the degree of private sector participation, which exhibits a
highly asymmetric distribution, presenting a negative skewness measure of -2.22. This is be-
cause 72.6% of the observations are y = 1, and as such, the degree of private participation is
under 100% for the remaining 27.4% of the observations in the sample.
The classical fractional response models (Logit, Probit, Cloglog) do not predict y = 1 but in
practice one can consider that if the fitted values are very close to one, that corresponds to
entirely private participation. Alternatively, Two-Part models can be used. One binary model
to explain 1 versus not 1, and a classical fractional response model to explain the remaining
27.4% of the observations.
While theoretically the interpretation of y = 1 vs y < 1 is not completely straightforward,
because it seems that a higher or lesser degree of private sector participation is the result of a
utility maximization process by private investors, a closer analysis of the database reveals that
observations with y = 1 are mostly concentrated in emerging countries (e.g. 15.6% of these
projects are developed in Brazil, 13.4% in India and 10.4% in Argentina). As already men-
tioned the database includes projects developed in low and middle income countries, but strong
asymmetries exist among countries and we may say that two different realities are covered with
this data - on one hand, the database includes emerging economies and on the other hand, it
includes the poorer developing countries. Without surprises, private investors prefer stronger
commitments with emerging countries (y = 1). This rationale gives support to our choice of a
Two-Part model.
Therefore, we use a classical fractional model, namely the Cloglog, and a Two-Part model,
encompassing a Probit (dy) and a Fractional Cloglog (y < 1). The results of the regressions on
the degree of private sector participation in infrastructure projects are presented in Table 6.4.
This table presents the first set of regressions in columns 1 to 3 using the full specifications
of the models mentioned. After these results, restricted models were estimated using only the
variables that showed a t-statistic above 1, |t| > 1. For this second set of regressions, results
are displayed in columns 4 to 6.
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Table 6.4: Determinants of the degree of private sector participation in PPP infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: Fractional Two Part Fractional Two Part (rest)
Degree of private Cloglog dy y < 1 Cloglog (rest) dy y < 1
participation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Political system -0.028 -0.048 0.004
(-0.61) (-0.70) (0.07)
Index Political Competitiveness 0.036 -0.016 0.127 0.152*
(0.74) (-0.23) (1.49) (1.86)
Checks (number) 0.024** 0.029** 0.009 0.026*** 0.030**
(2.48) (2.14) (0.49) (3.27) (2.41)
Creditor rights -0.056* -0.087* -0.005 -0.072** -0.092**
(-1.72) (-1.85) (-0.11) (-2.43) (-2.12)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.080 0.213* -0.071 0.245**
(0.97) (1.86) (-0.65) (2.23)
English legal origin dummy 0.211** 0.370*** -0.003 0.162* 0.331*** 0.011
(2.25) (2.75) (-0.02) (1.91) (2.77) (0.09)
German legal origin dummy -0.480*** -0.831*** -0.101 -0.416*** -0.931*** -0.150
(-3.66) (-4.18) (-0.60) (-3.84) (-5.34) (-1.14)
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.371*** -0.324* -0.468** -0.419*** -0.371** -0.509***
(-2.76) (-1.74) (-1.97) (-3.45) (-2.29) (-2.73)
Physical Integrity Index -0.035** -0.049** -0.019 -0.033** -0.044*
(-2.12) (-2.05) (-0.77) (-2.25) (-1.88)
Empowerment Index -0.010 0.007 -0.037* -0.031*
(-0.70) (0.33) (-1.65) (-1.75)
Civil liberties -0.028 -0.009 -0.078 -0.072*
(-0.75) (-0.18) (-1.51) (-1.72)
Deposit money bank assets -0.109 -0.293 0.180
(-0.45) (-0.82) (0.44)
Liquid liabilities to GDP -0.284 -0.558* 0.110 -0.425*** -0.720***
(-1.29) (-1.71) (0.37) (-3.59) (-3.80)
Private credit to GDP -0.113 0.001 -0.264 -0.167
(-0.66) (0.00) (-1.09) (-1.13)
General gov. balance to GDP 0.002 0.012 -0.005 0.011
(0.27) (1.32) (-0.54) (1.33)
External debt to total exports 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004*
(1.47) (0.63) (1.59) (0.41) (1.77)
Economic growth 0.006 0.009 -0.000
(0.78) (0.77) (-0.03)
Fuel exports -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004
(-3.07) (-2.84) (-1.33) (-3.15) (-3.53) (-1.31)
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.131*** 0.104* 0.143** 0.148*** 0.121*** 0.132**
(3.11) (1.68) (2.34) (4.75) (2.64) (2.51)
Inflation rate -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(-0.47) (-0.13) (0.33)
Population (ln) -0.094*** -0.132*** -0.061 -0.064** -0.124*** -0.046
(-2.99) (-3.02) (-1.29) (-2.54) (-3.42) (-1.57)
International reserves 0.008 0.009 0.002
(0.72) (0.57) (0.10)
MDB dummy 0.153** 0.184** 0.159* 0.151** 0.179** 0.183**
(2.46) (2.01) (1.80) (2.46) (1.96) (2.04)
Energy sector dummy -0.075 -0.313*** 0.257** -0.036 -0.307*** 0.268**
(-0.99) (-2.92) (2.03) (-0.47) (-2.89) (2.16)
Telecom sector dummy 0.178** 0.061 0.374** 0.194** 0.080 0.428***
(1.97) (0.48) (2.53) (2.20) (0.64) (2.97)
Transport sector dummy 0.127 0.159 0.104 0.154* 0.163 0.135
(1.60) (1.42) (0.72) (1.91) (1.46) (0.92)
Time dummies jointly not jointly jointly not not jointly not
significant significant** significant included significant*** included
Constant 1.312 1.682 0.025 1.045** 0.985 -1.136
(1.60) (1.42) (0.02) (2.05) (1.15) (-1.36)
Number of observations 2095 2095 574 2095 2095 574
Log-Likelihood Value -625.32 -1133.28 -287.97 -633.86 -1135.02 -291.05
Correlation(y yhat)2 8.12% 8.58% 15.06% 6.70% 8.40% 12.03%
BIC 1579.48 2595.40 849.10 1390.08 2522.41 683.74
LR testa 0.9292 0.9677 1.0000
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level. Robust t statistics in parentheses
a p-values of the LR statistic comparing the full model specification with the restricted specification.
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Where not directly provided by the statistical software, a measure of goodness-of-fit was com-
puted through the square of the correlation between the observed response and the predicted
response, what constitutes a general measure of the predictive power of the models.
It is worth to mention that concerning the fractional models, different specifications were also
tried, like Logit and Probit. However testing for model adequacy, through the test known as the
linktest, the Cloglog provides the best results with evidence of no misspecification, exhibiting a
p-value=0.809 for the model in column (1) and a p-value=0.732 for the model in column (3).12
This is not a surprising result, as already mentioned in Section 6.4, the Complementary Loglog
model is not symmetric and increases sharply when G(.) is near 1, providing the best fit to our
data.
The estimates from the models show a consistent pattern and for almost all the variables, the
sign of the effect is according to what was expected (see Table 6.2). Goodness-of-fit measures
indicate that a Two-Part Model is better when compared with the “one-part” model, exhibit-
ing a higher squared correlation between fitted and actual values. In respect to the Two-Part
model, it should be noted that very different results are obtained for y = 1, meaning entirely
private participation, and for y < 1, which gives support to the use of this method. In addition,
given the high proportion of observations with y = 1 in the sample, strong similarities exist
in the results between the “one-part” model and the Probit model, used to explain 1 vs not 1
(column 1 and 2).
The analysis of the results shows that the number of checks and balances is an important de-
terminant of the degree of private sector participation, which is higher for countries with better
governance quality. The empirical evidence also shows that countries with an English legal
origin tend to attract more private sector participation. The legal protection provided by the
common law of England is rewarded face to the French civil law system (the omitted class in the
regressions). Following Djankov et al. (2007) and LaPorta et al. (1998), among others, common
law systems tend to provide better protection to private investors. By contrast, countries with
German and Socialist legal origins are penalized when compared with countries with a French
legal origin.
12Linktest is a STATA procedure that performs a test for model specification. The idea behind linktest is that
if the model is properly specified, one should not be able to find any additional predictors that are statistically
significant. In addition, the adequacy of the link function is also tested.
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In addition, private sector participation in PPP projects is higher for countries with higher
GDP per capita and with less population, pointing to the fact that a higher degree of private
sector participation occurs for projects developed in richer, but smaller markets. The market
dimension is an important determinant of investment as shown by Neumayer (2003), Neumayer
and Spess (2005) and Singh and Jun (1995). In these studies, population and GDP per capita
are important determinants of foreign direct investment to developing countries. But contrary
to what was expected, our results show the Population variable with the wrong sign. This
coefficient is negative, suggesting that there is a bias favouring small countries in what concerns
the degree of private sector involvement in PPP. A possible explanation is that some of the
biggest countries are also characterized by poor policies and inversely, good governance and an
adequate institutional framework tend to be more common in small countries, which face less
ethnic conflicts and fractionalization.13
MDB involvement in PPP, as expected, is an economically and statistically important deter-
minant of the degree of private sector participation. If a project have a MDB participation,
this will have an effect of “umbrella” for all the project, acting like a mechanism of risk reduc-
tion, providing guarantees and as a sign of creditworthiness to private lenders, increasing their
willingness to participate in the project.
Results for the sector dummies show that private sector participation is higher for telecommu-
nications projects, when compared with the water and sewerage sector, although with a degree
of participation not achieving 100%. A possible explanation is that usually that kind of projects
need advanced and innovative technologies, requiring the expertise of the private sector. Sec-
tors like energy and water tend to be “more public”, given the politically sensitiveness of the
goods to be provided. Interestingly, we may see that the energy sector coefficient change its
sign in the two-parts of the model. For private sector involvement under 100%, energy projects
are preferred over water and sewerage projects, and the opposite pattern is showed for private
participation achieving 100%.
After these results, we rerun the models using only the explanatory variables that present |t| > 1,
see columns 4 to 6 of Table 6.4. The LR tests performed comparing the full specification of
the models with these restricted versions, show that the βj associated with the variables not
included in the restricted specifications, may be considered not significantly different from zero
(all the p-values above 90%).
13The existence of conflicting interests that tend to fractionalize a society and is a focus of instability, riots
and disturbances.
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For the restricted models, results are very similar with those obtained with the full specifica-
tions. In general, the variables maintain their sign and the coefficients are of the same order of
magnitude, albeit reinforcing their statistical significance. Slightly unexpected is the sign and
significance of the coefficient on Liquid liabilities to GDP. Our results point to higher private
sector participation in projects developed in countries that mobilize few domestic savings. An
explanation could rest in the fact that private sector participation in infrastructure projects is
essentially external participation and is the answer to overcome a lack of lending capacity in
the home country.14
In addition, legal proxies as Creditor rights and Contract enforcement days, reinforce the sta-
tistical significance but maintain the wrong sign. Private sector participation is higher for
countries with apparently poor legal environments. A possible interpretation to these results is
presented by Subramanian et al. (2008), that show that Project Finance (PF) is mostly used in
countries with weaker laws protecting investors. The organizational structure and the web of
legal and financial contracts inherent to the arrangements provide a substitute for poor investor
protection. This analysis may be extended, for the same reasons, to PPP arrangements (using
PF mechanisms or not).
Next we turn our attention to the computation of average marginal effects (AME). Contrary to
what happens with linear regression models, with nonlinear models the coefficients βj , do not
have a direct interpretation as the marginal effect - with nonlinear models, the marginal effects
are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates and levels of the explanatory variables. It
should be noted that for dummy independent variables, the AME gives the discrete change
rather than the marginal effect, i.e., for binary variables computes the discrete change when
the variable changes from 0 to 1 (see Equation 6.11). Table 6.5 presents the average marginal
effects to the statistically relevant variables.
14Esty (2003b) had already noted that international banks are more likely to finance projects in countries with
less developed financial systems.
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Table 6.5: Average Marginal Effects for the degree of private participation in PPP infrastructure
projects
Dependent variable: Average Marginal Effect
degree of private Fractional Fractional Two-Part Model (rest.)
participation Cloglog Cloglog (rest.) Probit Cloglog
Checks (number) 0.0056 0.0062 0.0091
Index Political Competitiveness 0.0532
Creditor rights -0.0129 -0.0169 -0.0280
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.0749
English legal origin dummy 0.0464 0.0365 0.0964
German legal origin dummy -0.1358 -0.1173 -0.3281
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.1013 -0.1184 -0.1229 -0.1703
Physical Integrity Index -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0133
Empowerment Index -0.0110
Civil liberties -0.0254
Liquid liabilities to GDP -0.1000 -0.2198
External debt to total exports 0.0012
Fuel exports -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0024
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.0304 0.0349 0.0368 0.0463
Population (ln) -0.0218 -0.0150 -0.0378
MDB dummy 0.0333 0.0335 0.0527 0.0645
Energy sector dummy -0.0954 0.0942
Telecom sector dummy 0.0385 0.0423 0.1486
Transport sector dummy 0.0350
From the table above, it is possible to see that, using as reference the Complementary loglog
model (full specification):
• If a project has a MDB’ participation, then the percentage points of private sector in-
volvement increases on average by approximately 3.3%, all else held constant;
• If a country has an English legal origin, then the percentage points of private sector
participation increases on average by 4.6%, comparing to French legal origin countries,
while for German and Socialist legal origin countries, decreases on average by 13.6% and
10.1%, respectively, holding all other factors fixed;
• A 1% increase in Population, reduces on average the percentage points of private sector
participation by 2%, all else held constant;
• If Liquid liabilities to GDP increases on average by 0.1, the percentage points of private
sector participation will be reduced by 1%, all else held constant (restricted model).
Next, we test the effectiveness of each risk dimension through the joint nullity of the proxies
associated with each risk. To accomplish that, Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests were performed
with the full specifications of the Cloglog and of the Two-Part model (columns 1 to 3 from
Table 6.4). It should be mentioned that the results are conditioned by the proxies used in
this analysis, different proxies for each risk dimension could lead to different results. With this
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caveat duly noted, the LR tests show that particularly relevant to explain the degree of private
sector participation appear the legal and economic dimensions, as well as, sector dummies, cor-
roborating our previous insights. In addition, the Probit model reveals that only the political
and social dimensions are statistically negligible, distinguishing between y = 1 and y < 1 and
as already mentioned, more similarities exist between the “one part” model (Cloglog) and the
Probit model, given that near 73% of the observations are 1. LR tests are presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Likelihood Ratio tests for the degree of private sector participation in PPP infrastructure
projects
Dependent variable: Fractional Two-Part Model
Degree of private Cloglog Probit Cloglog
participation (N=2095) (N=2095) (N=574)
Risk dimensions:
Political LR chi2(3) = 4.39 LR chi2(3) = 4.66 LR chi2(3) = 0.90
(0.2222) (0.1983) (0.8251)
Legal LR chi2(5) = 16.38*** LR chi2(5) = 36.12*** LR chi2(5) = 1.63
(0.0058) (0.0000) (0.8975)
Social LR chi2(3) = 2.49 LR chi2(3) = 4.44 LR chi2(3) = 1.11
(0.4765) ( 0.2181) ( 0.7739)
Financial LR chi2(3) = 4.65 LR chi2(3) = 8.77** LR chi2(3) = 0.47
(0.1989) (0.0325) (0.9264)
Economic LR chi2(8) = 19.91** LR chi2(8) = 22.93*** LR chi2(8) = 4.86
(0.0107) (0.0035) (0.7725)
Sector dummies LR chi2(3) = 11.72*** LR chi2(3) = 44.23*** LR chi2(3) = 2.87
( 0.0084) ( 0.0000) ( 0.4115)
Time dummies LR chi2(16) = 11.09 LR chi2(16) = 31.27** LR chi2(16) = 4.43
( 0.8037) (0.0124) (0.9979)
Legend: p-values in brackets
6.6.2 The probability of a MDB participation in PPP
In this section, the variable to be explained is a binary variable - MDB participation in a PPP
project. It is worth to mention that in the database, this variable is zero to 84.9% of the PPP
projects (1779 observations of the total sample). MDB participate only in 316 PPP projects
(15.1%), what is in line to our previous exposition in Section 6.2.
Table 6.7 presents the results of the regressions on the probability of structuring a PPP with
a MDB participation. Again, each column presents a different specification: Logit, Probit and
LPM (only as a benchmark). In column 4, the results of a restricted Logit model are showed.
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Table 6.7: Determinants of MDB participation in PPP infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: LOGIT
MDB participation LOGIT PROBIT LPM rest. model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political system 0.020 0.013 0.011
(0.17) (0.20) (0.62)
Index Political Competitiveness 0.090 0.050 0.009
(0.71) (0.72) (0.57)
Checks (number) -0.047 -0.026* -0.002 -0.039
(-1.54) (-1.66) (-0.75) (-1.18)
Creditor rights -0.191* -0.106* -0.032** -0.198**
(-1.87) (-1.91) (-2.13) (-2.01)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.378*** 0.215*** 0.068*** 0.397***
(2.85) (2.90) (2.96) (3.13)
English legal origin dummy 0.080 0.045 0.021 0.067
(0.32) (0.31) (0.57) (0.31)
German legal origin dummy -0.592* -0.324* -0.104** -0.648**
(-1.93) (-1.87) (-2.39) (-2.55)
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.989** -0.486** -0.106* -1.114***
(-2.55) (-2.35) (-1.90) (-3.67)
Physical Integrity Index 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.03) (0.05) (0.32)
Empowerment Index -0.090** -0.048** -0.012* -0.086*
(-2.06) (-1.98) (-1.89) (-1.78)
Civil liberties -0.206* -0.104 -0.025* -0.187*
(-1.67) (-1.48) (-1.73) (-1.68)
Deposit money bank assets 0.203 0.064 -0.007
(0.32) (0.18) (-0.07)
Liquid liabilities to GDP 0.278 0.026 -0.008
(0.33) (0.06) (-0.09)
Private credit to GDP -1.414** -0.680** -0.135** -1.177***
(-2.29) (-2.19) (-2.04) (-3.71)
General government balance to GDP 0.027 0.016 0.003 0.021
(1.22) (1.38) (1.22) (1.14)
External debt to total exports 0.005 0.002 0.000
(0.96) (0.83) (0.58)
Economic growth 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.05) (0.15) (-0.28)
Fuel exports -0.006 -0.003* -0.001* -0.007**
(-1.52) (-1.65) (-1.68) (-2.10)
Real GDP per capita (ln) -0.318*** -0.172*** -0.046*** -0.228**
(-2.96) (-2.84) (-3.08) (-2.56)
Inflation rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.85) (-0.97) (-1.43)
Population (ln) -0.368*** -0.202*** -0.052*** -0.322***
(-4.03) (-3.79) (-3.87) (-5.25)
International reserves -0.072* -0.034* -0.008* -0.075*
(-1.93) (-1.66) (-1.79) (-1.85)
Energy sector dummy 0.030 0.030 0.004
(0.07) (0.12) (0.08)
Telecom sector dummy -0.235 -0.117 -0.026
(-0.56) (-0.49) (-0.53)
Transport sector dummy 0.017 -0.001 0.003
(0.05) (-0.00) (0.07)
Time dummies jointly jointly jointly jointly
significant** significant** significant** significant***
Constant 5.763** 3.022** 1.198*** 4.597***
(2.14) (2.03) (3.19) (2.86)
Number of observations 2095 2095 2095 2095
Log-Likelihood Value -804.27 -805.42 -730.41 -806.56
Percent correctly predicted 84.82% 84.77% 84.63%
(Pseudo) R-Squared 9.49% 9.36% 8.20% 9.23%
BIC 1929.72 1932.02 1782.00 1850.19
LR testa 0.9493
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level.
a p-values of the LR statistic comparing the full model specification with the restricted specification.
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses.
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The qualitative results of Logit and Probit specifications (column 1 and 2) are very similar with
goodness-of-fit measures very close - percent correctly predicted around 85% and Pseudo R-
Squared around 9.5%. In addition, in what concerns model specification, both models seem to
be appropriate to model our data. The linktest performed show no evidence of misspecification
problems either for the Logit and Probit models.
In general, the signs of the coefficients are accordingly to what was expected. The main results
point to a strong support of the economic dimension, meaning that economic risk seems to be
the most relevant factor. As expected, richer (measured by GDP per capita) and more populous
countries tend to have projects with lower participation of MDB. These findings are according
to Neumayer (2003) results - in a study of aid flows from regional multilateral development
banks, the author reported that are the countries with lower per capita income that received
more aid flows and a bias towards less populous countries was evident. Concerning international
reserves, the lower the level of a country’s reserves, more difficult will be the access to inter-
national loans. Therefore, if a country is in a fragile payment position this will be translated
to increased difficulties in borrowing from external sources, making a MDB participation more
needed. Our results corroborate this idea, the probability of a MDB participation in a PPP is
higher for countries with lower international reserves.
The legal dimension is the other important driver of MDB participation. Accordingly to our
results, countries with higher legal risk measured by the index of creditor rights and the num-
ber of days to enforce a contract, have a higher probability of a MDB participation in a PPP
project. In addition, there is evidence that the legal origin of a country matters.
In the financial dimension, more developed financial countries, as measured by private credit
to GDP, have a lower probability of MDB participation in PPP projects, as expected. Where
the domestic financial and capital markets are relatively underdeveloped, the capacity for local
financing of large scale private investments will be constrained, therefore, a relatively higher
probability of MDB participation will be expected, other things being equal.
In what concerns human rights variables, statistically significant appear the Empowerment index
and the Civil liberties measure, although exhibiting controversial signs. On one hand, countries
that show a higher Empowerment Index, also have a lower probability of a MDB participation
in a PPP, thus, MDB participation seems to be a response to the level of social risk. On the
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other hand, the coefficient on Civil liberties indicates that MDB involvement may be considered
as a way of reward countries that prove to respect more human rights, like initially expected.
In respect to the time dummies, there is evidence of the time explaining the probability of MDB
participation (individual coefficients not reported).
After these conclusions, we run a restricted form of the Logit model using only the potential
statistical significant variables, with |t| > 1 (column 4 of Table 6.7). The results are very close
to the results obtained with the full specification and in addition, the LR test performed shows
that the restricted model is not rejected (p-value=0.9493).
Table 6.8 presents the average marginal effects to the statistically relevant variables, allowing
comparisons between models, what is not possible with the results of the Table 6.7.
Table 6.8: Average Marginal Effects for the probability of MDB participation in PPP infrastructure
projects
Dependent variable: Average Marginal Effect
MDB participation LOGIT PROBIT LOGIT (rest.)
Creditor rights -0.0223 -0.0225 -0.0232
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.0441 0.0457 0.0465
English legal origin dummy 0.0095 0.0096 0.0079
German legal origin dummy -0.0587 -0.0595 -0.0633
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.0876 -0.0828 -0.0954
Empowerment Index -0.0106 -0.0103 -0.0101
Civil liberties -0.0241 -0.0218
Private credit to GDP -0.1653 -0.1445 -0.1379
Fuel exports -0.0007 -0.0008
Real GDP per capita (ln) -0.0371 -0.0366 -0.0267
Population (ln) -0.0430 -0.0429 -0.0377
International reserves -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0087
The results show that, in general, the magnitude of the effect is very small and more precisely
for the Logit (Model 1):
• Increasing real GDP per capita in 1%, decreases on average the probability of MDB
participation by 3.7%, approximately, all else held constant;
• If the number of days to enforce a contract increases by 1%, the probability of a MDB
participation increases on average by approximately 4.4%, ceteris paribus;
• If a country is 1% more populous, the probability of a MDB to participate in a PPP
infrastructure project is on average 4.3% less, approximately, holding all other factors
fixed;
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• Particularly significant is the magnitude of the Private credit to GDP coefficient - if this
variable increases by 0.1 (more developed financial countries), this will reduce the prob-
ability of a MDB participation in about 1.7%, on average, controlling for all the other
relevant factors.
Taking into account all the aspects previously mentioned concerning this type of analysis, LR
tests were performed using Logit full specification, to assess the overall significance of each risk
dimension, as well as the dummies relevance (results are presented in Table 6.9). As already
noted, the conclusions of this analysis rely crucially on the proxies used for each risk dimension.
Table 6.9: Likelihood Ratio tests for MDB participation in PPP infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: LOGIT
MDB participation Full model
(N=2095)
Risk dimensions:
Political LR chi2(3) = 2.18
(0.5363)
Legal LR chi2(5) = 19.47***
(0.0016)
Social LR chi2(3) = 6.14
(0.1052)
Financial LR chi2(3) = 13.53***
(0.0036)
Economic LR chi2(8) = 43.53***
(0.0000)
Sector dummies LR chi2(3) = 2.04
(0.5641)
Time dummies LR chi2(16) = 27.28**
(0.0385)
Legend: p-values in brackets
The economic, legal and financial risk dimensions appear as the most relevant, to explain
the probability of a MDB participation in a PPP, confirming our hypotheses 3 and 5 (see Sec-
tion 6.3). By contrast, the political environment does not play a determinant role explaining the
MDB participation (rejecting the hypothesis 1) and more importantly, human rights variables
jointly seem do not matter in explaining the probability of a MDB involvement in a project,
contradicting the idea that their participation is higher for countries that are more socially
responsible, given their role as “development” banks (rejecting the hypothesis 7). Nevertheless,
it should be noted that individually, some of these variables have a statistically significant effect
as already discussed.
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6.6.3 Determinants of the number of PPP projects
In this section, the dependent variable is the number of projects per country and year, and
additionally, the number of projects with MDB participation per country and year. Some de-
scriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics for the number of projects
Dependent variable Number of Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
observations
Number of projects 481 4.3555 43.9671 4.8841 37.4656 1 68
Number of projects with MDB 481 0.7838 1.5115 3.1441 17.3718 0 9
As it is possible to see, the data to be used as the dependent variables in the next regressions,
are overdispersed, situation where the variance is significantly larger than the mean. To cor-
roborate this conclusion, the following figures present the frequency distributions of the two
variables (see the figures below). Both distributions have long right tails. For y as the number
of projects, the natural starting point is one with the proportion of ones achieving 36.6% of the
total, and in addition, 90% of all the observations are under 10 (Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.9: Histogram of the number of PPP projects
When we consider y as the number of projects with MDB participation, the data show a peak
in zero with 52.6% of the total, and 97% of the observations are under 3 (see Figure 6.10).
Given the fact that the majority of the observations are concentrated in the lower values of
the distributions, it is possible to create categories for the dependent variables, allowing the
application of ordered response models, namely, Probit and Logit. These models allow more
flexibility, as they do not impose strong assumptions in the underlying distribution of the counts,
feature which constitutes their main advantage.
CHAPTER 6. DETERMINANTS OF PPP IN INFRASTRUCTURE 156
Figure 6.10: Histogram of the number of PPP projects with MDB
First of all, some grouping of counts is done in order to limit the number of categories. For y
as the total number of projects per country and year, the original 30 categories were reduced
to just 11, ignoring the higher frequencies that collectively account for less than 10% of the
number of projects. It should be noted that the last 12 original categories, for total count of
projects ranging from 19 to 68, the observations in each category are just 2 or 1, and are here
assembled in one class (>10). See Table 6.11.
Table 6.11: Frequency distribution for the total number of projects
Ordered data
Number of Freq. Percent Cum.
Projects
1 176 36.59 36.59
2 96 19.96 56.55
3 57 11.85 68.4
4 35 7.28 75.68
5 23 4.78 80.46
6 12 2.49 82.95
7 8 1.66 84.62
8 10 2.08 86.69
9 12 2.49 89.19
10 7 1.46 90.64
>10 45 9.36 100
Total 481 100
In respect to y as the number of projects with MDB participation per country and year, from
the original 10 categories (counts ranging from 0 to 9), four classes were created, as follows:
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Table 6.12: Frequency distribution for the number of projects with MDB participation
Ordered data
Number Projects Freq. Percent Cum.
with MDB
0 253 52.6 52.6
1 148 30.77 83.37
2 52 10.81 94.18
>=3 28 5.82 100
Total 481 100
Table 6.13 presents the results of the regressions on the total number of projects per country
and year. As a starting point, Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit models (column 1 and 2) are
used. In addition, the Zero Truncated Negative Binomial (ZTNB) model is also a good can-
didate to fit count data when zeros are not observed due to the sampling process.15 However,
because convergence problems appeared with the full specification of the ZTNB, it was only
possible to compute restricted forms of this model (column 3 and 5). Column 4 presents also a
restricted form of the Ordered Probit model for comparisons purposes.
Both models, Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit, provide similar results concerning the sign
and significance of the coefficients. In addition, measures of goodness of fit (pseudo − R2 or
BIC) are very close and the same conclusion is obtained concerning the fitted probabilities (re-
sults in next Table 6.14). Nevertheless, the Ordered Probit seems to provide a better fit to the
data. When the ZTNB model is used, no particular improvement is achieved in respect to the
statistically relevant variables, although the squared correlation between the fitted and actual
values is higher (62,17%) for this model.
In addition, comparing the results of column 1 and 3 with the restricted specifications (col-
umn 4 and 5), it is possible to see strong similarities among the results. For these restricted
forms, we included only the variables that exhibit |t| > 1 in the first set of regressions. In
general, the variables and time dummies (jointly) maintain their statistical significance, with
the exception of Private Credit to GDP that gains statistical relevance in the restricted ver-
sion – countries with more developed financial systems foster the number of infrastructure PPP.
15Concerning Zero Truncated models, our choice rest on the ZTNB. The LR test performed shows evidence of
overdispersion, providing support to the superiority of the ZTNB specification over the Zero Truncated Poisson.
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Table 6.13: Determinants of the number of PPP infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: Ordered Ordered ZTNBa Ord PROBIT ZTNBa
Number of projects PROBIT LOGIT rest. model 1 rest. model rest. model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political system 0.047 0.075 -0.077
(0.31) (0.25) (-0.41)
Index Political Competitiveness 0.047 0.101 0.135* 0.141*
(0.52) (0.67) (1.72) (1.94)
Checks (number) 0.077** 0.128** 0.070*** 0.105*** 0.069***
(2.42) (2.20) (3.63) (3.83) (3.79)
Creditor rights -0.124 -0.226 -0.108* -0.122 -0.117
(-1.60) (-1.56) (-1.70) (-1.60) (-1.49)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.231* 0.417* 0.210 0.220 0.221
(1.73) (1.77) (1.26) (1.47) (1.23)
English legal origin dummy 0.010 0.026 -0.044 0.022 -0.076
(0.04) (0.06) (-0.19) (0.12) (-0.42)
German legal origin dummy -0.582 -1.110 -0.495 -0.446 -0.491
(-1.36) (-1.32) (-1.00) (-1.05) (-1.10)
Socialist legal origin dummy 0.505* 0.899* 0.502* 0.394 0.475*
(1.78) (1.78) (1.79) (1.60) (1.74)
Physical Integrity Index 0.011 0.009
(0.22) (0.10)
Empowerment Index 0.011 0.016
(0.34) (0.28)
Civil liberties -0.055 -0.113
(-0.48) (-0.55)
Deposit money bank assets 0.204 0.308 -0.094
(0.40) (0.34) (-0.19)
Liquid liabilities to GDP 0.215 0.502 0.407
(0.28) (0.35) (0.60)
Private credit to GDP 0.596 0.926 0.492 0.823** 0.716**
(1.15) (0.97) (1.11) (2.40) (2.23)
General gov. balance to GDP -0.063*** -0.112*** -0.058*** -0.066*** -0.056***
(-4.51) (-4.03) (-4.17) (-4.47) (-3.91)
External debt to total exports 0.010 0.015 0.007 0.011 0.008
(1.31) (1.13) (1.56) (1.35) (1.57)
Economic growth 0.032** 0.064*** 0.025* 0.034** 0.026*
(2.45) (2.80) (1.89) (2.55) (1.84)
Fuel exports -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.32)
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.412*** 0.743*** 0.525*** 0.448*** 0.510***
(3.08) (3.16) (5.51) (3.89) (4.97)
Inflation rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.18)
Population (ln) 0.560*** 0.987*** 0.550*** 0.531*** 0.539***
(7.02) (6.25) (9.62) (7.29) (9.66)
International reserves 0.067* 0.113* 0.053* 0.063* 0.054
(1.86) (1.71) (1.71) (1.65) (1.56)
Time dummies jointly jointly jointly jointly jointly
significant*** significant*** significant*** significant*** significant***
Constant -15.537*** -15.470***
(-9.88) (-10.11)
Number of observations 481 481 481 481 481
Log-likelihood value -748.46 -748.71 -887.37 -750.68 -888.33
Pseudo R-Squared 17.86% 17.83% 16.76% 17.61% 16.67%
Correlation(y yhat)2 36.76% 34.95% 62.17% 36.99% 60.64%
BIC 1793.37 1793.86 2003.24 1742.22 1974.30
LR testb 0.8808 0.8588
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level.
a Zero Truncated Negative Binomial.
b p-values of the LR statistic comparing the full model specification with the restricted specification.
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses.
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A more detailed analysis of the results reveals a strong support of the economic variables in
explaining the number of PPP projects per country and year. More precisely richer, larger
markets and with more prospects of economic growth are more appealing to the development of
PPP. All these results are in line with what was expected and moreover, confirm the previous in-
sights of Hammami et al. (2006) that also stress the importance of these economic variables. In
addition, governments facing high deficit levels are more interested in PPP for the development
of infrastructure projects, otherwise unaffordable, but this is a factor of economic instability
and high deficit levels may become unsustainable over time. Therefore, a negative sign on this
coefficient means that these countries are penalized – the number of PPP projects is decreasing
with the deficit level.
Concerning the institutional environment, the number of checks and balances is also an impor-
tant determinant of the total count of PPP, that shows an increasing trend for more accountable
and more transparent governments. As expected, these countries provide a better environment
for the development of such partnerships.
Sightly unexpected is the sign of the legal variables, but these results may be interpreted fol-
lowing the empirical analysis of Subramanian et al. (2008), already mentioned in Section 6.6.1,
where the weak legal environment is circumvented by the contractual structure inherent to PPP.
In respect to time-dummies, there is a strong support of the importance of time-specific global
shocks that appear as systemic drivers of the number of PPP projects developed. Although
the individual coefficients are not reported, they are mostly statistically significant and show a
positive sign, meaning an increasing trend on the total number of projects when compared with
the base year of 1990, and reflecting periods of both boom and crisis, as the previous Figure 6.5
highlighted.
Table 6.14 presents the predicted probabilities for each of the outcomes. Comparing these val-
ues with the sample frequencies of Table 6.11, expressed as a percentage, the reported values
are very close. Higher probabilities are attached to the first categories, where the most likely
category is y = 1 with a probability of 36%, interpreted as the probability for a country to have
just one PPP project per year.
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Table 6.14: Predicted probabilities for the number of projects
Outcome Average Probability
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Pr (number=1) 0.363 0.359
Pr (number=2) 0.187 0.186
Pr (number=3) 0.122 0.120
Pr (number=4) 0.077 0.077
Pr (number=5) 0.051 0.051
Pr (number=6) 0.027 0.027
Pr (number=7) 0.018 0.018
Pr (number=8) 0.023 0.023
Pr (number=9) 0.028 0.028
Pr (number=10) 0.016 0.017
Pr (number>10) 0.088 0.092
Total 1.000 1.000
The average marginal effects computed for the Ordered Probit (Model 1) are given in Table 6.15.
As already mentioned, for ordered response models, the computation of AME is done for each
outcome. It allows answer to the question of what is the effect on the probabilities of having
different counts of PPP projects per country/year, if one regressor increases by one unit, while
holding the other factors unchanged.
Table 6.15: Average Marginal Effects for the Number of PPP projects
Dependent variable: ORDERED PROBIT (Model 1)
Number of projects Pr(y = 1) Pr(y = 2) Pr(y = 3) Pr(y = 4) Pr(y = 5) Pr(y = 6)
Checks (number) -0.0199 -0.0003 0.0022 0.0024 0.0021 0.0013
Contract enforcement days (ln) -0.0598 -0.0010 0.0067 0.0073 0.0062 0.0038
General gov. balance to GDP 0.0163 0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0010
Economic growth -0.0084 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0005
Real GDP per capita (ln) -0.1069 -0.0018 0.0119 0.0130 0.0111 0.0068
Population (ln) -0.1453 -0.0024 0.0162 0.0177 0.0151 0.0092
International reserves -0.0174 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0021 0.0018 0.0011
Pr(y = 7) Pr(y = 8) Pr(y = 9) Pr(y = 10) Pr(y > 10) TOTAL
Checks (number) 0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 0.0024 0.0075 0.00
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.0027 0.0036 0.0049 0.0073 0.0226 0.00
General gov. balance to GDP -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0061 0.00
Economic growth 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0032 0.00
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.0048 0.0065 0.0087 0.0130 0.0404 0.00
Population (ln) 0.0066 0.0089 0.0118 0.0177 0.0549 0.00
International reserves 0.0008 0.0011 0.0014 0.0021 0.0066 0.00
The analysis of the AME presented above confirms our previous analysis. Variables like Checks,
Economic growth, Real GDP per capita, Population and International Reserves only present
negative signs for the probabilities of y = 1 and y = 2, what means that increasing these
variables will increase the probability for higher counts of projects. Countries with more ac-
countable governments and with an economic environment characterized by lower risk, increase
the likelihood of a greater number of PPP projects being developed. The deficit level has the
opposite effect.
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To highlight if the same factors that drive the number of PPP projects developed per coun-
try/year, are the same that influence the number of projects with MDB participation, we run
the same regressions (Ordered models) and a standard Negative Binomial regression. Results
are presented in Table 6.16. In addition, columns 4 and 5, present restricted specifications of
these models.
The analysis of the results across the full specifications (column 1 to 3) shows a consistent
pattern, comparing coefficients, their statistical significance and measures of goodness-of-fit of
the models, with an apparent superiority of the standard Negative Binomial regression, if we
consider the Pseudo − R2 or the measure of squared correlation. If the analysis is focused in
the LL value or BIC, then the Ordered Probit is preferred.
For the restricted models, comparing column 4 to 5 of Table 6.16, very close results are pre-
sented. If we compare with specifications of the full model (1 and 3), economic variables that
seem to gain statistical relevance include External debt, Economic growth and Fuel exports.
In general, the results show that still particularly relevant are the economic variables, explain-
ing the number of projects with MDB participation. Nevertheless, factors that are important
economic determinants of the probability of the MDB participation in PPP, such as Real GDP
per capita or Population, do not have an important explaining role in this context (recall Sec-
tion 6.6.2).
If we compare these results with the determinants of the total count of projects, no significant
match appear - variables that are statistically relevant and of the same order of magnitude,
just include Contract enforcement days and Economic growth. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that indicators of macroeconomic stability like Inflation or Fuel exports, appear more relevant
in explaining the number of projects in which MDB participate than in explaining the total
count of projects. In addition and as expected, governments facing higher debt levels, choose
to develop more PPP with the participation of MDB, in an effort to attract private funding.
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Table 6.16: Determinants of the number of PPP infrastructure projects with MDB
Dependent variable: Ordered Ordered Negative Ord. Probit Neg. Binomial
Number of projects Probit Logit Binomial rest. model rest. model
with MDB participation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political system -0.001 0.000 -0.029
(-0.01) (0.00) (-0.24)
Index Political Competitiveness 0.025 0.031 0.091
(0.33) (0.24) (0.93)
Checks (number) 0.015 0.022 0.029 0.042*
(0.55) (0.45) (1.04) (1.75)
Creditor rights -0.098 -0.191 -0.119 -0.111* -0.123
(-1.29) (-1.32) (-1.50) (-1.92) (-1.59)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.241** 0.376* 0.248** 0.306** 0.260**
(2.14) (1.90) (2.04) (2.43) (2.15)
English legal origin dummy -0.070 -0.096 -0.096 -0.145
(-0.33) (-0.26) (-0.40) (-0.67)
German legal origin dummy -0.354 -0.483 -0.549 -0.488
(-0.98) (-0.75) (-1.34) (-1.28)
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.069 -0.147 -0.157 -0.158
(-0.30) (-0.38) (-0.60) (-0.76)
Physical Integrity Index 0.013 0.026 0.018
(0.30) (0.32) (0.37)
Empowerment Index 0.019 0.032 -0.003
(0.49) (0.46) (-0.07)
Civil liberties -0.034 -0.045 -0.027
(-0.33) (-0.25) (-0.26)
Deposit money bank assets 0.240 0.375 0.103
(0.58) (0.54) (0.23)
Liquid liabilities to GDP 0.015 -0.120 0.106
(0.03) (-0.14) (0.19)
Private credit to GDP -0.508 -0.750 -0.665* -0.285 -0.549*
(-1.52) (-1.24) (-1.83) (-1.17) (-1.66)
General government balance to GDP -0.017 -0.027 -0.026* -0.005 -0.024
(-1.32) (-1.12) (-1.67) (-0.44) (-1.49)
External debt to total exports 0.016** 0.029** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.015***
(2.04) (2.11) (3.22) (3.16) (3.42)
Economic growth 0.031* 0.051 0.034* 0.035** 0.036*
(1.74) (1.64) (1.93) (1.97) (1.92)
Fuel exports -0.006* -0.011* -0.007* -0.007*** -0.008**
(-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.91) (-2.65) (-2.41)
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.073 0.105 0.151 0.190*
(0.76) (0.62) (1.46) (1.94)
Inflation rate -0.000* -0.001* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000**
(-1.89) (-1.89) (-2.70) (-1.46) (-2.30)
Population (ln) 0.072 0.100 0.118 0.097
(0.88) (0.69) (1.29) (1.38)
International reserves 0.026 0.043 0.024
(0.90) (0.82) (0.83)
Time dummies jointly jointly jointly jointly jointly
significant** significant* significant** significant** significant**
Constant -6.370*** -5.716***
(-2.84) (-3.94)
Number of observations 481 481 481 481 481
Log likelihood value -481.77 -484.27 -527.33 -486.37 -528.45
Pseudo R-Squared 9.49% 9.02% 10.27% 8.63% 10.08%
Correlation(y yhat)2 18.56% 18.11% 28.09% 16.80% 27.85%
BIC 1216.76 1221.75 1301.69 1139.49 1254.52
LR testa 0.8182 0.9729
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level.
a p-values of the LR statistic comparing the full model specification with the restricted specification.
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses.
Predicted probabilities for each of the four outcomes are given in Table 6.17. Comparing these
values with the sample frequencies of Table 6.12 show that the average predicted probabilities
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are within 0.05 of the sample frequencies for each outcome. The most likely category is y = 0
with a probability of 52%, meaning that the highest probability is for no MDB participation in
a PPP project.
Table 6.17: Predicted probabilities for the number of projects with MDB participation
Outcome Average Probability
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Pr (y = 0) 0.524 0.522
Pr (y = 1) 0.306 0.306
Pr (y = 2) 0.113 0.113
Pr (y ≥ 3) 0.057 0.059
Total 1.000 1.000
The computation of average marginal effects, only to the statistically relevant variables, high-
lights that all the coefficients have a very small magnitude, except Contract enforcement days.
Table 6.18: Average Marginal Effects for the Number of PPP projects with MDB
Dependent variable: ORDERED PROBIT (Model 1)
Number of projects Pr (y = 0) Pr (y = 1) Pr (y = 2) Pr (y ≥ 3) TOTAL
with MDB participation
Contract enforcement days (ln) -0.0835 0.0308 0.0291 0.0236 0.00
External debt to total exports -0.0056 0.0021 0.0020 0.0016 0.00
Economic growth -0.0109 0.0040 0.0038 0.0031 0.00
Fuel exports 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.00
Inflation Rate 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
Taking into consideration the constraints inherent to this analysis, Table 6.19 presents a sum-
mary of the LR tests performed with the Ordered Probit model.16
Table 6.19: Likelihood Ratio tests for the number of projects
LR tests Dependent variable
(Ordered Probit Number of PPP Number of projects
- full model) projects with MDB participation
N=481
Risk dimensions:
Political LR chi2(3) = 7.69* LR chi2(3) = 0.43
(0.0529) (0.9348)
Legal LR chi2(5)= 11.72** LR chi2(5) = 7.43
(0.0388) (0.1904)
Social LR chi2(3) = 1.21 LR chi2(3)= 1.08
(0.7494) (0.7820)
Financial LR chi2(3) = 11.08** LR chi2(3) = 3.43
(0.0113) (0.3296)
Economic LR chi2(8)= 134.14*** LR chi2(8)= 29.54***
(0.0000) (0.0003)
Time Dummies LR chi2(16) = 63.27*** LR chi2(16) = 27.62**
(0.0000) (0.0351)
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level, p-values in brackets
16The constrains mentioned in Section 6.6.1 are extensive to all the similar analyses.
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The results show evidence in favor of all the risk dimensions as important determinants of
the total number of projects, with the exception of the social risk dimension. Particularly
relevant appear to be the economic dimension, as well as, time-specific dummies. Concerning
the number of projects in which MDB participate, evidence favors also economic variables and
the time-effect.
6.6.4 Determinants of investments in PPP
In this section a step ahead is given for a deeper analysis of PPP determinants, by using as
dependent variables the total value of investments and the total amount of MDB financial
support per country and year (all expressed in real terms). Some descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 6.20.
Table 6.20: Descriptive statistics for PPP investments and MDB financial support
Dependent Number of Mean Std. Dev. Skewness kurtosis Min Max
variable (*) observations
Investment 732 37838.81 577121 18.44 375.14 0 12900000
Investment (y>0) 679 40792.35 599153 17.76 347.86 0.15 12900000
ln (investment) 679 4.95 2.24 0.41 5.01 -1.88 16.38
MDB support 732 33.34 162.17 19.62 464.92 0 3944.79
MDB support (y>0) 286 85.34 250.99 12.96 197.22 0.28 3944.79
ln (MDB support) 286 3.46 1.46 -0.38 3.61 -1.28 8.28
Legend: (*) Expressed in real USD values
When y is the dollar value of investments in PPP projects, we have to consider the following:
• investment values are zero for 53 observations (7.24% of the sample);
• the positive values are very right-skewed and with the logarithmic transformation, skew-
ness is reduced from 17.76 to 0.41 and the kurtosis is 5.01, more close to the normal value
of 3.
Similar considerations can be made concerning the amount of financial support provided by
MDB. The majority of the sample observations assume the zero value (60.93% of the 732 ob-
servations) and the positive values are very heavily skewed with nonnormal kurtosis. After the
logarithmic transformation, the variable is almost symmetrically distributed and has negligible
nonnormal kurtosis.
A more detailed analysis of our data reveals that the majority of investments are channeled
to countries like, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Chile, Argentina, Indonesia, Philippines, Russian
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Federation, Poland, among others. The private sector is more interested in financing infrastru-
cture PPP in emerging countries, that possess important advantages for the attractiveness of
private investment. Among the advantages are the dimension of the market and the fact that
they are undertaking economic and political reforms, namely restructuring their economies
along market-oriented lines and increasing the openness to trade. In essence, these countries
offer major opportunities for private sector investors as they are the world’s fastest growing
economies.
By contrast, the zero investment values are concentrated mostly in poor countries of the Sub-
Saharan Africa region (34% of the zero values). Many low-income countries are virtually over-
looked with respect to private capital flows. Thus, investment flows exhibit a strong geographical
distortion. The higher risk associated with these economies, as well as, their weak economic
and institutional environments do not encourage private investors to enter in long-term and
risky arrangements, like infrastructure PPP.
In what concerns the financial support provided by MDB, the majority of the flows are registered
to emerging countries, like Brazil, Chile, India and Philippines. Although it may be surprising
at a first glance, because their development role implies a focus on the poorer countries. A more
accurate analysis leads to the conclusion that are the emerging countries that mostly need capi-
tal to finance their development and their infrastructure projects, relying in multilateral lenders.
Investments in PPP are conditioned by two sequential decisions. The first is the investors’
decision as to whether or not to invest in a country and these countries are evaluated based
on a number of relevant socioeconomic and country characteristic indicators, depending on the
motives of the investors, that for private investors will be purely, profit maximization. The
second decision has to do with “how much” to invest into the selected countries. Concerning
the “financial support” provided by MDB, a two-step decision process may be also considered.
First, based on the intrinsic characteristics of a country, the decision is taken of whether or not
to provide support and next, the decision on the amount of support.
Based on the previous exposition, theoretically a Two-Part model or Heckman selection mo-
dels seem to be appropriate to model the dependent variables. Table 6.21 presents the results
obtained through the regression of the proxies for the different risk dimensions, on the real
dollar value of investments in PPP. Different specifications were used, namely, a Tobit model,
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a Two-Part model and Heckman selection model estimated by MLE, assuming a joint normal
distribution for the unobservables of the two-parts.
Table 6.21: Determinants of investments in PPP
Dependent variable: Tobit Two-Part Model Heckman MLE
Real Dollar value y>0 dy y>0 dy
of investments (ln) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political system -0.278** -0.068 -0.359** -0.073 -0.366
(-2.22) (-0.57) (-1.96) (-0.53) (-1.50)
Index Political Competitiveness 0.296*** 0.158 0.193* 0.161 0.199
(3.03) (1.53) (1.81) (1.53) (1.09)
Checks (number) -0.040 -0.034 -0.054 -0.034 -0.056
(-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.58)
Creditor rights 0.007 -0.042 0.076 -0.041 0.077
(0.08) (-0.62) (0.69) (-0.61) (0.68)
Contract enforcement days (ln) -0.255 -0.245 -0.026 -0.245 -0.022
(-1.49) (-1.59) (-0.14) (-1.63) (-0.11)
English legal origin dummy 0.204 -0.132 0.673* -0.124 0.682
(0.84) (-0.61) (1.76) (-0.46) (1.62)
German legal origin dummy 0.520 0.380 0.288 0.382 0.287
(1.41) (1.01) (0.55) (1.03) (0.55)
Socialist legal origin dummy 0.506 0.785* 0.104 0.782* 0.115
(1.62) (1.76) (0.35) (1.77) (0.26)
Physical Integrity Index -0.022 -0.027 0.010 -0.027 0.011
(-0.40) (-0.55) (0.16) (-0.55) (0.16)
Empowerment Index 0.062 0.085* -0.001 0.084* -0.002
(1.37) (1.92) (-0.02) (1.89) (-0.03)
Civil liberties 0.203* 0.166 0.103 0.166* 0.100
(1.85) (1.62) (0.70) (1.68) (0.61)
Deposit money bank assets 0.552 0.493 0.274 0.495 0.283
(0.95) (0.95) (0.37) (0.96) (0.37)
Liquid liabilities to GDP 0.774 1.109* -0.654 1.105** -0.659
(1.25) (1.99) (-0.61) (2.05) (-0.61)
Private credit to GDP 0.635 0.493 0.085 0.493 0.080
(1.22) (1.13) (0.08) (1.17) (0.08)
General government balance to GDP -0.113*** -0.083*** -0.056** -0.083*** -0.056**
(-6.61) (-5.80) (-2.18) (-4.63) (-2.06)
External debt to total exports -0.001 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.010
(-0.19) (-0.20) (1.25) (-0.20) (1.17)
Economic growth 0.016 -0.001 0.018 -0.000 0.018
(0.71) (-0.03) (0.76) (-0.02) (0.71)
Fuel exports 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005
(1.44) (0.85) (0.62) (0.82) (0.63)
Real GDP per capita (ln) 1.368*** 1.093*** 0.658*** 1.100*** 0.657***
(11.72) (7.71) (3.42) (6.55) (3.39)
Inflation rate -0.001* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.89) (-1.79) (-0.85) (-1.44) (-0.85)
Population (ln) 1.296*** 1.064*** 0.549*** 1.069*** 0.551***
(14.60) (9.58) (3.74) (9.27) (3.44)
International reserves 0.092*** 0.058* 0.103** 0.058* 0.102*
(2.77) (1.83) (1.99) (1.95) (1.71)
Time dummies jointly jointly jointly jointly jointly
significant*** significant*** significant*** significant*** significant***
Constant -31.381*** -23.843*** -14.916*** -24.006*** -14.985***
(-14.06) (-11.59) (-3.66) (-8.17) (-3.46)
Number of observationsa 732 679 705 732 732
Log-likelihood value -1503.90 -1192.95 -131.53 -1324.47
(Pseudo) R-Squared 15.62% 60.64% 30.08%
BIC 3271.63 2640.19 512.27 3123.83
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level.
a When estimating the Probit of the Two-Part model, the 1994-dummy variable was dropped and 27 observations were
not used due to collinearity problems.
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses, except for Tobit.
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The dependent variable is used in logs rather than levels, due to the fact that the methods used
rely mostly in the normal distribution of the data. However, the log transformation does not
exist for observations equal to zero. To overcome this problem we follow the approach proposed
by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) in what concerns Tobit estimation. The adjustment used is to
change the values of zero, to very small values, very close to zero, but that allow the use of
ln(y).17 The Two-Part or Sample selection models are more appropriate because they use the
zero observations without needing further adjustments.
The general analysis of Table 6.21 confirm that a country’s economic conditions are fundamen-
tal in attracting PPP investments. Particularly, richer countries with larger markets attract
more funds and macroeconomic stability is also important, as a controlled inflation and more
reserves lead to a positive effect on investments through PPP. In addition, countries with higher
deficits are penalized with lower investments through PPP.
Concerning the political environment, the higher the elections competitiveness, the higher the
propensity for PPP investments. As expected, more transparent and accountable governments
will create a more favorable environment for those projects. Sightly unusual is the sign and
significance of the Political system coefficient, because it seems that more democratic regimes
do not encourage infrastructure investments through PPP. Usually, democracy facilitates the
adoption of market-oriented reforms, in which we include the choice of PPP to develop critical
infrastructure projects in emerging countries.
Another controversial result is related to the civil liberties measure, that ranges from 1 for
countries with complete freedom to 7, for those with no freedom. Apparently, more civil lib-
erties are associated with lower investments in infrastructure projects. A possible explanation
for this result is provided by Banerjee et al. (2006), who claim that more civil rights usually
imply that projects to proceed must ensure civic approval, what in turn will increase the transac-
tion costs and further increase the already lengthy process of structuring an infrastructure PPP.
Time dummies appear statistically relevant in all specifications. Not surprisingly time-specific
events are systematic drivers of investment flows to infrastructure PPP.
17All censored observations of ln(y) are set to an amount slightly smaller than the minimum noncensored value
of ln(y). This is not the most advisable procedure, although it consists in small variations from the original data.
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These findings are supported by Hammami et al. (2006), who had found that larger markets,
stable inflation and more political competitiveness lead to more PPP investments. In addition,
a significant time effect was also reported.
If we focus our analysis in the Two-part model, more interesting conclusions can be drawn. In
this specification (column 2 and 3), y is modelled first as a Probit regression for y = 0 versus
y 6= 0 and next, the positive values are modelled with another distribution (using OLS, in this
case). It is worth mention that the Probit model fits the data quite well, achieving 93.33% of
observations correctly classified.
Therefore, in column 3, the results stress the importance of the institutional quality and of legal
systems, that matter mostly for the decision whether to invest or not. Besides the importance
of the political proxies mentioned before, it is also possible to see that countries with an English
legal origin are rewarded with higher investments than French civil law countries. Column 2
highlights that for positive values of y, more developed financial systems and countries that
respect more human rights (measured by the empowerment index) benefit with more invest-
ments. The economic variables, already mentioned, maintain in general their importance in the
“two parts” of the model.
When we drop the assumption of independence of the two parts of the model, an alternative
model can be used - the sample selection model estimated through MLE (Heckman MLE).
In this specification, the same variables were used in both equations (selection equation and
outcome equation). Columns 4 and 5 exhibit the results.
Comparing the results from the Two-Part Model and Heckman MLE, similar coefficient esti-
mates were obtained in the two equations with almost the same statistical significance achieved.
The log likelihood of the two models is respectively, -1324.48 vs -1324.47 and in addition the LR
test of independence of the equations obtained with Heckman MLE, gives a p-value of 0.89. As
such, the estimated correlation between the errors of the two-parts, is not significantly different
from zero and the hypothesis that the two parts are independent cannot be rejected.
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A two-step estimation was also performed using Heckit, but the same qualitative results were
obtained and no apparent improvement was achieved (for convenience, results are not reported).
Testing the hypothesis of independence of the errors, through the coefficient of lambda (the er-
ror covariance σ12, in Equation 6.34), the z-statistic is 0.16 with a p-value of 0.88. Thus, we do
not reject the independence of ε1 and ε2 in Equation 6.31, reinforcing the empirical evidence
that favors the choice of a Two-Part Model.
Because multicollinearity problems may arise in the Heckman two-step procedure, given that ex-
actly the same regressors are used in both equations for y∗1 and y
∗
2, a collinearity diagnostic was
performed with the inverse Mills ratio term λ(.) and the other regressors. No serious problems
were detected that worth correction, because all the VIF values are small (Mean VIF=1.97).
Summing up, we may say that the unobserved factors that explain the selection process are
independent from the unobserved factors that explain the amount of investment and hence, the
simpler Two-Part model is preferred over more complex formulations.
For comparisons purposes, also the classical Tobit model is presented in column 1. The results
point in the same direction as the previous ones, but we must be careful in the interpretation
of Tobit estimates given its fragility to misspecifications of the error distribution.
In order to investigate if the same factors that influence the total value of investments are
close to the factors that drive the amount of financial support provided by MDB, we regress
the same explanatory variables on the amount of support provided, using the previous model
specifications. Table 6.22 presents the results.
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Table 6.22: Determinants of the financial support provided by MDB in PPP
Dependent variable: Tobit Two-Part Model Heckman MLE
Real Dollar value y>0 dy y>0 dy
of MDB support (ln) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political system 0.421 -0.145 0.136 -0.146 0.136
(1.24) (-0.97) (1.38) (-1.03) (1.37)
Index Political Competitiveness 0.312 -0.205* 0.085 -0.205* 0.085
(1.05) (-1.72) (1.04) (-1.92) (1.04)
Checks (number) -0.131 -0.016 -0.025 -0.016 -0.025
(-1.03) (-0.22) (-0.58) (-0.24) (-0.57)
Creditor rights -0.454* 0.190* -0.140** 0.190* -0.140**
(-1.92) (1.89) (-2.24) (1.89) (-2.24)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 1.232** 0.222 0.289** 0.222 0.289**
(2.45) (1.38) (2.45) (1.39) (2.45)
English legal origin dummy 0.152 -0.078 0.063 -0.079 0.063
(0.23) (-0.32) (0.28) (-0.34) (0.28)
German legal origin dummy -1.804* 0.433 -0.510* 0.434 -0.510*
(-1.78) (1.36) (-1.88) (1.38) (-1.87)
Socialist legal origin dummy 0.958 0.187 0.218 0.187 0.218
(1.06) (0.44) (0.76) (0.47) (0.76)
Physical Integrity Index -0.176 0.046 -0.058 0.046 -0.058
(-1.18) (0.73) (-1.58) (0.76) (-1.58)
Empowerment Index 0.069 0.066 0.017 0.066* 0.017
(0.56) (1.53) (0.45) (1.65) (0.45)
Civil liberties -0.971*** 0.069 -0.250** 0.070 -0.250**
(-3.16) (0.47) (-2.48) (0.47) (-2.46)
Deposit money bank assets 2.705 1.573** 0.498 1.572*** 0.498
(1.62) (2.57) (1.09) (2.75) (1.09)
Liquid liabilities to GDP 2.239 1.093 0.497 1.092 0.497
(1.30) (1.41) (1.29) (1.52) (1.29)
Private credit to GDP -3.387** -0.501 -0.837** -0.499 -0.837**
(-2.41) (-0.90) (-2.27) (-0.94) (-2.27)
General government balance to GDP -0.063 -0.030 -0.011 -0.030 -0.011
(-1.28) (-1.39) (-0.98) (-1.50) (-0.98)
External debt to total exports 0.022 0.016** 0.005 0.016** 0.005
(1.25) (2.02) (1.08) (2.18) (1.07)
Economic growth -0.008 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.002
(-0.12) (0.34) (0.09) (0.36) (0.09)
Fuel exports -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.001
(-0.09) (1.41) (-0.37) (1.51) (-0.37)
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.721** 0.378** 0.131 0.378** 0.131
(2.26) (2.26) (1.28) (2.35) (1.27)
Inflation rate -0.048*** 0.003 -0.012** 0.003 -0.012**
(-3.17) (0.36) (-2.30) (0.36) (-2.30)
Population (ln) 1.189*** 0.317*** 0.263*** 0.316*** 0.263***
(4.84) (3.03) (3.36) (3.10) (3.36)
International reserves -0.157 -0.011 -0.036 -0.011 -0.036
(-1.63) (-0.30) (-1.46) (-0.32) (-1.46)
Time dummies jointly jointly not jointly jointly not jointly
significant*** significant significant*** significant significant***
Constant -40.483*** -8.754*** -8.492*** -8.735*** -8.491***
(-6.07) (-3.15) (-5.23) (-3.13) (-5.22)
Number of observations 732 286 732 732 732
Log-likelihood value -1082.73 -458.48 -415.91 -874.39
(Pseudo) R-Squared 7.06% 31.86% 15.08%
BIC 2429.28 1131.88 1089.06 2217.08
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level.
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses, except for Tobit.
In a first analysis, it is interesting to note that some factors which drive the number of PPP
with MDB participation (see Table 6.16) appear also as relevant determinants of the financial
support provided by those agencies, namely, Contract enforcement days, External debt or In-
flation rate.
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Focusing the analysis on the results from the Two-Part Model (columns 2 and 3), it is now
possible to disentangle factors that determine the decision to provide financial support, from
factors that drive the “amount” of such financial support, allowing a richer analysis.18
Factors that influence the MDB decision to provide financial support include measures of legal
risk, corroborating the intuition that riskier countries have a higher probability to benefit with
this support, in an attempt to create a protective umbrella. Also interesting is the sign and
significance of the Civil liberties measure, showing that countries that do not respect freedom
(with higher values in this indicator), are penalized with lower MDB involvement (what gives
support to hypothesis 7, developed in Section 6.3).
Concerning the economic and financial factors, a controlled inflation will improve the proba-
bility of a MDB financial support and countries with higher Private credit will need less this
support. Time-dummies appear particularly relevant in explaining the decision to provide fi-
nancial support. All coefficients are positive and statistically significant, showing a positive
trend over time (individual coefficients not reported).
Factors that explain the “amount” of financial support include some common factors that drive
overall PPP investments, like higher GDP per capita and the size of the market. In addition,
countries with higher debt levels, will benefit with higher MDB flows. More interesting is the
variable Creditor rights, that invert the sign in the two-parts of the model. It appears that once
the decision is taken to provide financial support to a riskier legal country, the amount of such
support will increase for countries that recognize more rights to creditors.
In addition, statistically relevant appears the variable Deposit money bank assets, the higher
the role of commercial banks in the financial intermediation, the higher the level of MDB flows.
Riskier political environments characterized by a lower level of elections competitiveness, will
lead to higher amounts of support, as expected.
18It is worth to emphasize that this analysis is different from the one presented in Section 6.6.2 - concerning
the probability of a MDB participate in a PPP project - because previously the unit of analysis was the PPP
project, and in this section, the analysis is developed per country and year.
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Comparing the models, the joint likelihood of the Two-Part model is exactly the same as the
LL value of the Heckman MLE model, -874.39. A close analysis of the results, comparing the
Two-Part Model and Heckman MLE, shows that there is no particular difference between the
coefficient estimates and their statistical relevance, for both equations (y > 0 and dy).
Once again, empirical evidence favors the Two-Part model over other specifications. More
specifically, the LR test of independence of the equations obtained with Heckman MLE gives a
p-value of 0.988, reinforcing the hypothesis that the two parts of the model are independent.
Heckman’s two-step procedure (or Heckit estimator) was also used (for convenience, results are
not reported). The results obtained show equal magnitude of the coefficients but some minor
differences appear in their statistical significance, when compared with Heckman MLE. This
could be partially explained by the fact that clustered robust standard errors are being used
when possible, but Heckman’s two-step do not allow for that option (STATA automatically
makes the correction for heteroscedasticity). Nevertheless, testing the hypothesis of indepen-
dence of the errors, the lambda coefficient shows a p-value=0.984. Hence, we do not reject the
independence between the errors of the two equations.
Once again, because the Heckit procedure is susceptible to collinearity problems, similarly to
what was exposed previously, a multicollinearity diagnostic was performed relating the inverse
Mills ratio term and the other regressors and no apparent problems were found.
To shed more light into the significance of the different risk dimensions, Table 6.23 presents
LR tests using a Two-Part model. Assuming independence of the two equations, LR tests are
performed for the “two parts”.
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Table 6.23: Likelihood Ratio tests for PPP investments and MDB financial support
LR tests Dependent variable
Two-Part Model Real Investment in PPP Real MDB financial support
N=732 dy y > 0 dy y > 0
Risk dimensions:
Political 7.98** 5.24 4.10 4.32
(0.0465) (0.1553) (0.2510) (0.2292)
Legal 6.71 17.78*** 14.26** 8.73
(0.2433) (0.0032) (0.0140) (0.1205)
Social 0.67 9.00** 15.12*** 3.00
(0.8794) (0.0292) (0.0017) (0.3922)
Financial 1.01 30.92*** 6.62* 8.13**
(0.7991) (0.0000) (0.0849) (0.0435)
Economic 54.75*** 342.47*** 41.24*** 47.05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time Dummies 45.28*** 48.30*** 36.72*** 16.89
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.3930)
Legend: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level *** at 1% level,
p-values in brackets.
The results above reinforce the earlier conclusion that factors which influence the decision to
invest or to provide financial support are quite different from those which determine the amount
of such financial flows. More particularly, if we consider PPP investments, a stable political
environment, good economic prospects and the time effect explain the decision to invest. Al-
though if we consider the investment level, there is evidence in favor of all risk dimensions
except the political environment.
Concerning the financial support provided by development banks, all the dimensions are rel-
evant to explain the decision to provide financial support, except the political – besides the
relevance of the time effect and of the economic variables, also the respect for human rights is
an important driver for this decision, as expected. In respect to the amount of financial aid
flows, only financial and economic factors appear to be relevant.
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6.7 Summary and suggestions for further research
Infrastructure projects are prone to specific risks given its nature and usually imply commit-
ment for longer maturities, what makes investors particularly exposed to risk. Therefore, private
lenders should evaluate the different risk factors, project specific but also, related to the country
environment where the project will be developed. This risk assessment will be reflected in the
willingness to enter in a PPP arrangement and in the degree of such commitment.
Aggregate empirical studies that evaluate country-specific determinants of infrastructure PPP,
allow to detect trends and provide useful insights about the macroeconomic and structural
characteristics that may encourage the intensity of investments and the participation of the
different agents.
A first conclusion of this work is that economic conditions constitute the most important risk
dimension, as determinants of PPP in infrastructure, particularly, the dimension of the market
and users’ purchasing power.
Concerning private sector participation, our results support the arguments that the degree of
private sector participation is higher for richer and less populous countries with a common law
legal origin and with less developed financial systems. Also, projects with MDB participation
have a higher degree of private sector involvement, highlighting the MDB “enabling” function,
as the perceived level of risk is reduced to the private agents.
In respect to the hypotheses drawn in Section 6.3, hypothesis 2 is confirmed through the variable
Checks, but hypotheses 4 and 6 are only corroborated partially – with Contract enforcement
days, Creditor rights in the legal dimension and Population, Fuel and Liquid liabilities to GDP
in the economic and financial dimensions exhibiting wrong signs and contracting the idea that
the degree of private participation is higher for countries with lower risk levels. Explanations
were already presented and are related with the web of contractual and financial agreements
inherent to PPP and with the fact that the majority of private participation is external partic-
ipation that compensate a lack of financial resources in the home country, among other factors.
In respect to hypothesis 8, there is no evidence of higher private involvement for countries that
respect more human rights and as such, this hypothesis is rejected.
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MDB participate more in infrastructure projects developed in poorer (measured by GDP per
capita and international reserves), less populous countries and with legal and financial systems
underdeveloped, as expected. Our findings support the hypotheses 3 and 5. Political variables
are not statistically significant, therefore rejecting hypothesis 1. Concerning human rights vari-
ables, the evidence is mixed - on one hand, MDB’s participation appears as a response to the
social risk and on the other hand, also as a rewarding mechanism to more socially responsible
countries, what confirms hypothesis 7 only partially.
In respect to the number of PPP projects, more transparent governments, richer and larger
markets with higher prospects of economic growth and countries with lower deficit levels bene-
fit with a higher number of infrastructure projects, corroborating our hypotheses 2 and 6. Yet,
the legal and social dimensions are not particularly relevant, rejecting hypotheses 4 and 8. A
pronounced time effect is also evident.
In what concerns the number of projects in which MDB participate, macroeconomic stability
is rewarded over the market dimension. In addition, a “risk effect” was evident, as riskier le-
gal environments and countries with higher debt levels, have more “MDB projects”. As such,
hypotheses 3 and 5 are confirmed, with Contract enforcement days, Private credit to GDP,
External debt and Fuel exports. By contrast, social and political variables are not relevant and
as a consequence, hypotheses 1 and 7 are rejected.
About financial flows to PPP, investment decisions were taken based mostly on the favorable
economic prospects, but also the institutional environment, measured by political and legal vari-
ables, matters to explain the decision to invest. The intensity of such investments is essentially
a response to the financial and economic conditions of the host countries, besides an evident
time effect. Our findings gives support to hypothesis 6 and only corroborates hypotheses 2
and 8 partially through the variables of Index of political competitiveness and Empowerment
Index, because Political system and Civil liberties exhibited the wrong sign. Legal variables
individually do not appear specially relevant, although jointly they are statistically significant,
as the LR test performed showed.
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Extending the analysis to the financial support provided by MDB, all the risk dimensions are
important determinants for the decision to provide support, except the political, meaning that
MDB evaluate the overall environment of developing countries as a critical pre-requisite for
providing financial aid flows, in particular, social and economic factors. To explain the level of
support, more relevant appear the economic and financial dimensions.
Our findings suggest that hypotheses 1 and 7 are verified, with Index of political competitiveness
and Civil liberties showing the expected sign. Riskier legal and financial countries apparently
are benefited on the MDB’ decision to give financial support, corroborating hypotheses 3 and
5, but in what concerns the amount of the financial support, the opposite effect is verified. It
seems that in the decision phase of whether or not to give support, riskier countries are pre-
ferred, but when deciding the amounts of the financial support, countries that exhibited lower
levels of legal and economic/financial risks are preferred.
At this point, it is relevant to mention some of the limitations of the present empirical study
and simultaneously, to present topics for further research. First, the level of a country’s risk,
assessed in different dimensions, is measured based on variables that were chosen purely on the
basis of theoretical relevance and data availability. It is not possible to know in advance, if the
same results will be obtained through a different set of explanatory variables used as proxies
for the same risk dimensions.
Second, in what concerns the MDB involvement in PPP, we only consider characteristics of the
recipient country to explain the probability of such involvement, also expressed in the number
of projects and in the amount of the financial support. However, related literature on aid allo-
cation may be considered, extending our analysis to include variables for the “donor interest”.
McGillivray (2003) mentions that for aid allocation, one modelling approach to be followed is
the “recipient need and donor interest”. This empirical framework is based in two assumptions
– the recipient need model assumes that donors are motivated purely by humanitarian motives
and, the donor interest model is premised on the assumption that donors are motivated purely
by commercial, political and strategic self interests. In this research, it was used only variables
that characterized the recipient countries and as an interesting topic for future research, we may
consider to include variables specifically related to the MDB, although for the moment these
data are not readily available, as far as we know.
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Third, an important issue is that of potential unobserved effects or omitted variables. Specific
geographical units, countries or regions, have characteristics that lead them both to have higher
performance (growth, productivity) and to develop more infrastructure projects and if these
aspects are unobserved, a methodological problem arise. In this empirical research to deal with
this issue, we used the pooled approach with clustered robust standard errors, a simpler panel
data method, but robust in many situations except when unobserved heterogeneity is correlated
with the regressors, demanding a fixed effects approach. Nevertheless, given the complexity of
some of the methods used, panel data estimation with fixed effects for these methods is still an
open subject in econometrics, but future research may consider to use more sophisticated panel
data formulations.
Fourth, new dimensions should be explored as potential determinants of infrastructure PPP: a
geographical and a technological dimension. Geography is documented as a key determinant of
the investment decisions either domestically or internationally (see Sarkissian and Schill, 2004),
and is expected to have an effect in infrastructure investments under PPP schemes, as well.
Technological factors, such as R&D expenditures and innovation, also matter to explain the
attractiveness of the markets to investors (see Porter, 1990). At this purpose, it should be
recalled that our data include information on emerging countries, where technological aspects
appear as potential drivers for growth and development.
To conclude, given the popularity of PPP and their exponential growth in recent years also with
a lot of controversy around the theme, it is expected that this study exploring new branches,
could add to the scarce empirical literature on the field and contribute to further research.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are widely used to cope with infrastructure deficits all over
the world. More efficiency and effectiveness on the public sector side and more infrastructure
assets and services are now required by a more active society, contributing to reinforce the trend
of private sector involvement in infrastructure businesses. Particularly relevant to developing
countries, PPP appear as the only mechanism available to finance important infrastructure
projects - the reason why PPP are supported by the World Bank, among others Multilateral
Development Banks (MDB).
Access to new sources of finance and enjoying private sector management skills can reduce costs
and improve quality, generating greater VfM. In a partnership, public and private partners share
a clear and common purpose, risks and responsibilities. PPP projects are by nature long-term
investments involving several participants in complex financial and contractual structures. Over
the lifespan of these projects the political, legal, social, financial and economic environment
could all change significantly. This is particularly true for developing and emerging countries,
where the institutional, social and economic conditions are less stable, contributing to the en-
hancement of risk and uncertainty.
In this scenario, an adequate identification, assessment and evaluation of risks is particularly
important. To understand how the different risk factors affect agents’ participation and the
intensity of infrastructure PPP projects, expressed in their number and value, is valuable for
policy reasons and for all engaged in the PPP market. Few academic research has been done
and conclusions of earlier articles have often been only partial or contradictory contributes to
justify this research.
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In addition, in what concerns the Portuguese reality, one can witness a lack of academic re-
search on PPP, in spite of the long Portuguese history with these partnerships and their macro-
economic significance.
Consequently, this thesis made two different contributions:
First, the empirical study performed explains what are the main drivers for the degree of private
sector involvement in PPP and explores the MDB’ role of risk reduction, topics, as far as we
know, not yet studied. In a brief summary, two conclusions seem to be immediate: (1) the
results have pointed to the dominance of the economic conditions and of the legal framework,
which constitute the most important risk dimensions, in explaining the agents’ participation
in PPP; (2) MDB’ participation is higher for riskier countries, corroborating in general the
hypotheses developed – the probability of having a PPP with a MDB participation is positively
related to the level of a country’s risk, emphasizing the mechanism of risk reduction.
In parallel, the determinants of the number of projects and of financial flows to PPP, are ex-
plored. The evidence reinforces the importance of the economic conditions, particularly the
dimension of the market and users’ purchasing power, and of the time-effect.
It is worth to mention that one innovative aspect of this empirical approach, is to test simultane-
ously a vast variety of variables, proxies for the different risk dimensions of a country, providing
a more complete “picture” of the determinants of infrastructure flows and of the participation
of the different agents to developing / emerging markets.
Second, presenting the PPP Portuguese experience, although focusing in only five cases, en-
hances the knowledge in the PPP field and sets out some key issues as determinants of success,
as well as, the main challenges for the near future. The analysis of the five PPP lead us to the
following recommendations mostly to the public sector: (1) a system of lessons learned must
be created, within a true PPP agency, with the goals of information sharing and accumulating
knowledge. At the same time, this system will improve the negotiation skills and will avoid past
errors, bringing more flexibility to deal with risks and uncertainties inherent to PPP projects;
(2) affordability must be ensured all over the life of the PPP project, a long-term perspective
is an imperative requisite for successful PPP; (3) particularly about transport projects, more
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realistic traffic projections must be developed to avoid negative financial consequences; (4) fi-
nally, as a “partnership” communication and interpersonal relationships should be nurtured
among all participants in a PPP.
Additionally, because efficiency and performance are concepts that are hard to measure, we
proposed a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model to evaluate the relative efficiency in an
application to road concessions (namely, the seven SCUT projects), but that could be extended
to different sectors, conditioned on the availability of proper data.
To sum up, this study makes an important contribution to the literature, due to the scarcity
of papers on the Portuguese reality, moreover when the available information is dispersed over
different sources.
Several limitations to this research have already been mentioned throughout the work. It is
worth to recall that, concerning the PPP Portuguese case studies, conclusions are only possible
to the cases under analysis. No generalizations are possible. Similarly, using DEA, conclusions
are only possible for the projects under consideration. In a comparison with the “best” project,
the other projects are ranked. Nevertheless, important insights have been obtained. In the
empirical application developed in Chapter 6, limitations are mostly related to the variables
and methodological approaches used and have been detailed in the previous section.
As a final note, the path to search a deeper understanding of PPP in all their features, merits




Table 1: Countries considered in the empirical analysis
Country Freq. Percent Country Freq. Percent
Albania 9 0.43 Madagascar 8 0.38
Argentina 181 8.64 Malawi 3 0.14
Armenia 4 0.19 Malaysia 89 4.25
Bangladesh 14 0.67 Mali 2 0.1
Benin 2 0.1 Mexico 60 2.86
Bolivia 27 1.29 Moldova 4 0.19
Brazil 324 15.47 Mongolia 2 0.1
Bulgaria 20 0.95 Morocco 12 0.57
Burkina Faso 2 0.1 Mozambique 10 0.48
Cambodia 6 0.29 Nepal 2 0.1
Cameroon 2 0.1 Niger 3 0.14
Chile 103 4.92 Nigeria 14 0.67
Colombia 90 4.3 Pakistan 37 1.77
Congo, Rep. 1 0.05 Panama 17 0.81
Costa Rica 26 1.24 Paraguay 5 0.24
Cte d’Ivoire 9 0.43 Peru 42 2
Dominican Republic 6 0.29 Philippines 81 3.87
Ecuador 24 1.15 Poland 44 2.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 18 0.86 Romania 7 0.33
El Salvador 16 0.76 Russian Federation 65 3.1
Georgia 9 0.43 Rwanda 2 0.1
Ghana 7 0.33 Senegal 7 0.33
Guatemala 25 1.19 South Africa 21 1
Honduras 10 0.48 Sri Lanka 13 0.62
India 253 12.08 Tanzania 13 0.62
Indonesia 77 3.68 Thailand 92 4.39
Jamaica 10 0.48 Togo 3 0.14
Jordan 8 0.38 Tunisia 6 0.29
Kazakhstan 19 0.91 Turkey 33 1.58
Kenya 12 0.57 Uganda 10 0.48
Kyrgyz Republic 2 0.1 Uruguay 13 0.62
Latvia 5 0.24 Venezuela, RB 15 0.72
Lesotho 1 0.05 Vietnam 18 0.86
Lithuania 9 0.43 Yemen, Rep. 3 0.14
Macedonia, FYR 3 0.14 Zambia 5 0.24
Total 2,095 100
Note: Information is showed for the larger database. For the other databases mentioned in Section 6.5, the same
countries were considered but with fewer observations.
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Blanc-Brude, F., H. Goldsmith, and T. Välilä (2006). Ex-ante construction costs in the European road sector:
A comparison of public-private partnerships and traditional public procurement. Economic & Financial
Report (2006/01). European Investment Bank.
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2 Secção.
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Relatório de Auditoria 04/2007 - 2 Secção.
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